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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
The present work comprises two experiments on brain electric correlates 
(mechanisms) of higher cognitive and emotional functions. The first study 
explored resting brain electric activity (EEG) of people differing in their 
belief in the paranormal. The second study explored information processing 
during the reading of emotion words in an Event-Related Potential (ERP) 
paradigm.  
In the study on paranormal belief, 35-channel eyes-closed resting EEG 
from 10 believers and 13 skeptics was analyzed. The subjects were selected 
from 105 volunteers as extreme cases in their declared belief or disbelief in 
paranormal phenomena. Two analysis approaches were used: Topographic 
analysis of the scalp EEG potential map landscapes (2-20 Hz EEG frequency 
band), and Low Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA) 
in seven frequency bands. The scalp EEG field mean maps of believers 
compared to skeptics showed a significant counter-clockwise rotation of 
field orientation. LORETA gravity centers of all frequency bands showed a 
shift to the left in believers vs. skeptics, most prominently in the functionally 
excitatory beta2 band. LORETA functional imaging clarified that the left-
shift in believers was due to stronger activity in left fronto-temporo-parietal 
areas. In self-rating of affective attitude (PANAS scales), our believers were 
less negative than our skeptics - a controversial issue in the literature. In 
sum, the observed EEG lateralization agreed with the ‘valence hypothesis’ 
that posits predominant left hemispheric processing for positive emotions.  
On the other hand, the question arises why our EEG results disagreed 
with earlier reports of predominant right hemispheric activity in believers 
compared to skeptics. When the subjects rated the emotion content of 
presented words, believers gave more extreme judgments than skeptics, in 
the positive as well as in the negative direction. Some earlier studies had 
reported more, other less positive, affective attitude in believers than 
skeptics (see above). In the light of our emotion rating results, we propose a 
third hypothesis about paranormal belief, emotionality and hemisphericity: 
believers in the paranormal might be more strongly influenced by 
momentarily available information than skeptics; they might be more 
engaged in, or empathizing with, or aware of their surround. Their 
 x
hemisphericity, in agreement with the valence theory, accordingly would 
change as function of the setting. 
The second experiment studied the processing of emotional content of 
visually presented words. Positive and negative emotion words (as rated in 
this and other studies) were presented for 450 msec each to 21 subjects while 
35-channel ERPs were recorded. Microstate analysis was applied that 
segmented the grand-grandmean ERP map series (averaged across 
conditions and subjects) into the putative steps of information processing. 
During the word presentation, 13 microstates were identified. Three of these 
microstates showed different potential map landscapes for positive vs. 
negative words: microstate #4, 106-122 msec; #6, 138-166 msec; and #7, 166-
198 msec post-stimulus onset. The differences included, for positive 
compared to negative emotions, a more counter-clockwise rotated ERP field 
axis in #4 and #6, but more clockwise rotation in #7. Scalp ERP amplitudes 
(in brackets: LORETA functional imaging) showed, in microstate #4, 
stronger activity for positive emotion right posterior (LORETA: right 
anterior), for negative emotion left central (LORETA: same); in #6 for 
positive emotion left anterior (LORETA: same), for negative emotion 
bilateral posterior (LORETA: left posterior); in #7, for positive emotion 
bilateral anterior (LORETA: right-predominant anterior), for negative 
emotion bilateral posterior (LORETA: right-predominant central). We note 
that different scalp localizations proof the existence of different intracerebral 
generators, but cannot directly indicate their localizations as it is possible 
with LORETA functional imaging, since brain electric generators possess 
orientations. 
The ERP results let us conclude that (1) during word processing, 
extraction of emotion content starts as early as 106 msec after stimulus onset; 
(2) during word processing, the brain identifies emotion content repeatedly 
in three separate, brief microstate epochs; and (3) this processing of emotion 
content in the three microstates involves different brain mechanisms to 
represent the distinction positive vs. negative valence.  
The results underline that word processing is a dynamic process, 
consisting of a rapid sequence of identifiable steps; even though the 
distinction ‘positive vs. negative emotion’ is done in three of these steps, 
their implementation in brain activity is different in all three, certainly not 
consistently following the valence hypothesis of lateralization. The results 
even suggest an anterior-posterior organization of brain mechanisms for 
valence distinction in some processing steps. We hypothesize that the 
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repeated processing steps that distinguish words according to valence serve 
as primary categorizations that are followed by different, secondary 
categorizations in the three microstates. Further experimentation will have 
to clarify the involved secondary categories of words. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit umfasst zwei Experimente zu den 
hirnelektrischen Korrelaten (Mechanismen) höherer kognitiver und 
emotionaler Funktionen. Das erste Experiment untersuchte das Ruhe-EEG 
bei Personen, die sich in ihrem Glauben an paranormale Phänomene 
unterscheiden. Das zweite Experiment untersuchte Ereignis-korrelierter 
Potentiale (Event-Related Potentials, ERPs) beim Lesen emotionaler Wörter. 
Im ersten Experiment zum Glauben an paranormale Phänomene wurde 
von 10 ‘Gläubigen’ und 13 ‘Skeptikern’ ein 35-Kanal Ruhe-EEG während 
geschlossenen Augen analysiert. Die Personen waren als Extremfälle in 
Bezug auf Glauben oder Skepsis gegenüber paranormalen Phänomenen aus 
105 Freiwilligen ausgewählt. Zwei verschiedene Analyse-Ansätze wurden 
benutzt: topographische Karten der Skalp-EEG-Felder (2-20 Hz EEG 
Frequenzband), und ‘Low Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography’ 
(LORETA) in sieben EEG Frequenz-Bändern. Die Achse der gemittelten 
Skalp-EEG-Felder bei Gläubigen war verglichen mit Skeptikern signifikant 
im Gegenuhrzeigersinn rotiert. In LORETA-Analyse zeigten die 
Aktivitätsschwerpunkte aller Frequenzbänder bei Gläubigen eine Links-
Verschiebung, am deutlichsten im funktionell exzitatorischen Beta2 
Frequenzband. Funktionelles LORETA-Imaging zeigte, dass die 
Linksverschiebung auf erhöhte Aktivität in den links fronto-temporo-
parietalen Arealen beruhte. In der Selbst-Beurteilung ihrer affektiven 
Haltung mittels PANAS-Skala erwiesen sich die Gläubigen als weniger 
negativ als die Skeptiker – in der Literatur ein kontroverses Thema. Unsere 
EEG-Lateralisierung steht somit in Einklang mit der Valenz-Hypothese 
emotionaler Verarbeitung, die eine hauptsächlich links-hemisphärische 
Verarbeitung positiver Emotionen postuliert.  
Andererseits stellt sich die Frage, weshalb unsere EEG-Resultate im 
Widerspruch zu früheren Berichten stehen, welche eine hauptsächlich 
rechts-hemisphärische Aktivität bei Gläubigen fanden. Die Selbst-
Beurteilung des emotionalen Gehalts angebotener Wörter zeigte bei unseren 
Gläubigen  verglichen mit Skeptikern extremere Beurteilungen sowohl in 
positiver wie auch negativer Richtung. Manche frühere Studien hatten 
positivere, andere negativere, affektive Haltungen bei Gläubigen im 
Vergleich zu Skeptikern gefunden (siehe oben). Auf Grund der vorliegenden 
 xiii
Selbstbeurteilungs-Daten schlagen wir eine dritte Hypothese zum Glauben 
an Paranormales, Emotionalität und hemisphärische Lateralisierung vor: 
Gläubige werden womöglich stärker durch im jeweiligen Moment gegebene 
Informationen beeinflusst als Skeptiker. Sie könnten stärker ihrer Umgebung 
bewusst sein, daran teilhaben bzw. davon absorbiert sein. Abhängig von 
diesem ‘setting’, und in Übereinstimmung mit der Valenz-Theorie, wäre 
dann auch die hemisphärische Lateralisierung verschieden. 
Das zweite Experiment untersuchte die Verarbeitung des emotionalen 
Gehalts visuell dargebotener Wörter im Gehirn. Emotional positive und 
negative Wörter (in dieser und anderern Studien beurteilt) wurden während 
je 450 msec 21 Versuchspersonen angeboten; dabei wurden ERPs in 35 
Kanälen registiert. Mikrozustands-Analyse unterteilte die Grand-Grand-
Mean ERPs (d.h. die ERPs gemittelt über Versuchsbedingungen und –
personen) in einzelne Informationsverarbeitungsschritte. Dreizehn 
Mikrozustände wurden während der 450 msec-Angebotszeit identifiziert. 
Die topographischen Karten der Skalp-ERP-Felder von drei dieser 
Mikrozustände unterschieden sich für positive vs. negative Wörter: 
Mikrozustand #4, 106-122 msec; #6, 138-166 msec; und #7, 166-198 msec nach 
Stimulusbeginn. Im Vergleich zu negativen zeigte sich bei positiven Wörtern 
eine Rotation der ERP-Feldachse von Mikrozustand #4 und #6 im 
Gegenuhrzeigersinn, von Mikrozustand #7 dagegen im Uhrzeigersinn. Die 
Analyse der Skalp-ERP-Amplituden (in Klammern Resultate der LORETA-
Analyse) zeigte folgende erhöhte Aktivitäten: im Mikrozustand #4 für 
positive Emotionen rechts posterior (LORETA: rechts anterior),  für negative 
Emotionen links zentral (LORETA: dito); im Mikrozustand #6 für positive 
Emotionen links anterior (LORETA: dito), für negative Emotionen bilateral 
posterior (LORETA: links posterior); in Mikrozustand #7 für positive 
Emotionen bilateral anterior (LORETA: rechtslastig anterior), für negative 
Emotionen bilateral posterior (LORETA: rechtslastig zentral). Verschiedene 
Skalp-Lokalisationen beweisen die Existenz verschiedener Generatoren, 
können aber nicht wie LORETA-Imaging direkt zur Lokalisation dienen, da 
hirnelektrische Quellen gerichtet sind. 
Die ERP-Resultate lassen folgende Schlüsse über die emotionale 
Verarbeitung von Wörtern zu: (1) die Extraktion emotionalen Gehalts 
beginnt bereits 106 msec nach Stimulusbeginn, (2) umfasst repetitiv drei 
separate, kurze Verarbeitungsschritte (Mikrozustände), und (3) erfolgt 
innerhalb dieser Schritte auf unterschiedliche Weisen, d.h. involviert 
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unterschiedliche Mechanismen im Gehirn um die Unterscheidung positiv-
negative zu inkorporieren. 
Die Befunde unterstreichen, dass Wortverarbeitung im Hirn ein 
dynamischer Prozess ist, der aus einer raschen Folge identifizierbarer 
Schritte besteht. Obzwar die Unterscheidung zwischen positiver und 
negativer Emotion in dreien dieser Schritte geschieht, ist ihre Sigantur als 
Hirnaktivität jeweils verschieden und folgt somit nicht der Valenz-
Hypothese der Lateralisierung. Die Resultate weisen sogar auf eine anterior-
posteriore Organisation der Hirnprozesse in bestimmten Schritten. Es wird 
vorgeschlagen, dass die repetitiven Verarbeitungsschritte, die Wörter nach 
emotionaler Valenz unterscheiden, als primäre Kategorisierung dienen, 
gefolgt von sekundären anderen Kategorisierungen in den drei 
Mikrozuständen. Diese hypothetisierten Kategorisierungen müssen in 
zukünftigen Untersuchungen geklärt werden. 
 xv
GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
BA = Brodmann Area 
EEG = Electroencephalogram 
ERP = Event-Related Potential 
FFT = Fast Fourier Transformation 
fMRI = functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
GFP = Global Field Power 
GMD = Global Map Dissimilarity 
LORETA = Low Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography 
MRI = Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
PCA = Principle Component Analysis 
PET = Positron Emission Tomography 
TANOVA = Topographic Analysis of Variance 
 
  
 
 
 1
PART 1: THEORETICAL PART
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1. ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY AND HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING 
 
1.1. Brief Historical Introduction to the Study of the EEG 
Being conscious seems to be effortless, but actually mental activity 
involves quite a bit of brain work: every thought, feeling, emotion or urge 
creates its own small rustle of activity - there will be a flashing discharge of 
neurons in many brain areas, followed by a local surges in blood flow and 
glucose consumption. 
The idea of reading something out of such changes is old. In the 1870’s, 
the French surgeon Paul Broca put 6 thermometers on the heads of 12 
colleagues, three on the left (on the anterior, temporal and occipital regions) 
and the other three symmetrically on the right side of the head. He 
measured the temperature under two different conditions: during resting 
and during reading. What he found was that after 10 min of reading, the 
temperature as measured by the 6 thermometers on the head had increased, 
i.e. changes in the mental activity of his colleagues changed the temperature 
on the scalp (Broca, 1877). Few years later, the Italian physiologist Angelo 
Mosso used a pressure pad (‘plethysmographic recording’) to measure 
increases of blood flow into an area of the brain of a peasant, who had a 
bone flap missing from the front of his skull (Mosso, 1881); he found that he 
could produce differences in the pressure simply by asking the man to 
multiply two numbers. Besides these works of Broca and Mosso there are 
other examples for those early attempts to read ‘brain’s changes’. 
Attempts to decode the electrical activity of the brain started just as 
early. After the discovery of the biological current in 1791 by the Italian 
Luigi Galvani (1791), Carlo Matteucci (1838), another Italian scientist, 
professor of physics at the university ‘Normale’ in Pisa, recorded in 1838 
voltage fluctuations from a muscle. At about the same time, Emil Heinrich 
Du Bois-Reymond (1848), professor of physiology at Berlin, recorded for the 
first time electric signals from a peripheral nerve.  
In the 1870’s the British physiologist Richard Caton (1875) examined the 
brains of rabbits and monkeys to see whether the action potential that Du 
Bois-Reymond had found to accompany an impulse in peripheral nerve and 
in spinal cord could also be detected in the brain when impulses passed 
through it. Two non-polarizable electrodes were either applied to the surface 
of both hemispheres, or one on the cortex and the other on the skull. The 
currents were recorded with a sensitive galvanometer. He was looking for 
voltage changes with sensory stimulation, flashing lights into the eyes of his 
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laboratory animals, which indeed he found. He named these the ‘electric 
currents of the brain’ (Caton, 1875). This was the discovery of the ERP.  
Sometime later, Adolf Beck (1890), a Polish physiologist, made the 
important observation that a current of variable strength is present at all 
times when any two points on the cortical surface of a rabbit are compared. 
This was the discovery of the ‘spontaneous’ activity of the brain.  
Other scientists of this period, Fleischl von Marxow, Gotch and Horsley, 
and Danilewski, unaware of Caton’s studies, claimed priority for the 
discovery of brain potentials (Brazier, 1957). So what was known of brain 
potentials at the end of the nineteenth century was that (a) the brain had 
‘spontaneous’ electrical activity, that (b) potential shifts of this spontaneous 
activity could be elicited by sensory stimulation and that (c) these evoked 
potentials could be recorded from the scalp (Brazier, 1957).  
Hans Berger, a German psychiatrist at the University of Jena, started his 
work on brain electric activity with recordings from cats and dogs at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Eventually, on July 6, 1924 Berger 
recorded for the first time voltage fluctuations from the skin overlying a 
bone defect in a 17 year old patient, who previously had been operated 
because of a brain tumor (Gloor, 1969). In the years following this first 
recording Berger recorded EEG from 38 others subjects. At the time of these 
early studies Berger already used the term ‘Elektrenkephalogramm’ in his 
diary, but for several years he still had doubts about the cerebral origin of 
the electrical oscillations he recorded from the scalp (Gloor, 1969). One of his 
first subjects was his young son, from whom he was able to record a fine 10 
per second rhythm: the ‘alpha rhythm’ (Berger, 1929). In the 1929 he 
published his first communication: ‘Über das Elektrenkephalogramm des 
Menschen’ (Berger, 1929), but this had very little impact on the scientific 
world: it was either ignored or regarded with open incredulity. He remained 
lonely and isolated in his interests and even later, when others confirmed his 
findings, he was often criticized and not taken seriously. The year 1934 
marked the end of Berger’s isolation, thanks to Adrian & Matthews’ 
publication (Adrian & Matthews, 1934). The outstanding contribution of 
Berger is not only that he demonstrated for the first time the 
electroencephalogram in man, but that he established its abnormality in 
pathological conditions affecting mental functions such as epileptic seizures 
and structural brain lesions (Gloor, 1969). In the course of these studies he 
was the first to propose a physiological model of attention and conscious 
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perception based on verifiable physiological observations (Adrian & 
Matthews, 1934). 
In the following years, amplifiers became more and more efficient to 
record brain activity from the intact scalp. These ‘EEG machines’ seemed to 
have great promise: EEG is a non-invasive method, is relatively cheap and 
easy to use. However, there was a big problem, the EEG electrodes are 
unselective. They pick up everything and in the noise of activity it is difficult 
to differentiate between the background noise and the noise done by a 
specific reaction or an individual thought. 
There was an important new aspect in the 1960s with the development 
of the averaging techniques for the detection of ‘evoked’ or ‘event related’ 
potential (EP or ERP). An ordinary EEG system would be used to record a 
subject doing a simple task that involved repetitive stimuli, such as listening 
to a tone or looking at an image, many dozens of times. Then, averaging the 
time epochs immediately after the stimuli, it became possible to filter out the 
background noise and just be left with the brain activity associated with the 
processing of the stimuli.  
 
1.2. Electrophysiological Basis of the EEG 
The basis for scalp EEG recordings are the field potentials originating in 
large neuronal populations. A single neuron does not produce enough 
electrical current to be measurable on the scalp. The major ‘generators’ for 
the EEG are post-synaptic potentials, generated by assemblies of cortical 
neurons, the pyramidal cells. The pyramidal cells are not randomly oriented 
in the cortical layers, but are arranged largely parallel to each other, 
perpendicular to the cortical surface. In order to produce a field strong 
enough to be recorded at some distance, the neurons must be have a certain 
geometry so that their individual electric fields sum up and do not cancel 
each other. Another basic condition for the measurement of a remote EEG is 
instantaneous synchronization of activity, i.e. the simultaneous occurrence 
of post-synaptic potentials of all pyramidal cells in a cluster. Additionally, 
the same type of post-synaptic potential, excitatory or inhibitory, 
advantageously should occur within the same cortical layer, for many 
pyramidal cells within a cluster. The indirect measurement of the post-
synaptic potentials from the scalp with EEG electrodes is possible because 
the generators are surrounded by conductive media: the cerebrospinal fluid, 
the meninges, the skull and the scalp.  
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As already described in the previous section, in human brain 
electrophysiology, two broad classes of activation can be distinguished: (1) 
‘spontaneous’ neural activity which constitutes the continuous brain 
activity, and (2) activity elicited by internal or external stimuli, the ‘event-
related potentials’ (ERP) or ‘evoked potentials’ (EP). Conventionally, 
spontaneous EEG is used for quantifying the global, functional state of the 
brain, whereas ERP/EP studies aim at elucidating different brain 
mechanisms of information processing; the latter can assess sensory or 
cognitive processing while the subject is involved in perceptual or cognitive 
tasks.  
 
1.2.1. Spontaneous EEG 
The EEG permits the continuous recording of brain electric activity from 
the scalp. The EEG reflects the summed and synchronized activity of large 
neuronal ensembles. Its amplitude ranges between about 5 to 100 microVolts 
and its wave frequency conventionally covers a range between 0.5 and 40 
Hz.  
Classically, analysis methods for spontaneous EEG activity used 
transformations into the frequency domain, assessing spectral power and 
coherence. In the present study, we distinguish 7 frequency bands, following 
Herrmann et al.’s factorial analyses of EEG data (Herrmann et al., 1978). The 
authors studied EEG spectra from 480 recordings of 5 minutes each, 
obtained from 60 healthy male volunteers; spectral resolution was 0.5 Hz ; 57 
frequency points between 1.5 and 30 Hz were analyzed. 
Lowest frequencies, called delta, range from 1.5-6 Hz, followed by theta 
ranging from 6.5-8 Hz. These slow frequencies are traditionally assumed to 
be associated with functional inhibition. In healthy adults, these low 
frequencies dominate the EEG during sleep. On the other hand, theta 
activity is also observed under the condition of ‘focused attention’ as the so-
called frontal midline theta activity (e.g. Asada et al., 1999; Ishii et al., 1999). 
Some authors (Aftanas & Golocheikine, 2002; Hebert & Lehmann, 1977; 
Kjaer et al., 2002; Tebecis, 1975) found an increase of theta during meditation 
compared with a no-meditation condition. In general, an increase of slow 
wave activity in adults can be a sign of pathological processes, e.g. vascular 
diseases or tumors of the central nervous system, inflammation, dementia, 
head trauma, intoxication or coma. Slow waves have a particular relation to 
ontogenesis: during maturation and development, the dominant EEG 
frequency in an awake individual increases, from predominant delta-theta of 
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the newborn to predominating alpha in most young adults to predominance 
of faster activity in the healthy elderly. 
In awake subjects one finds alpha activity in a state of relaxation, 
especially when the subjects are seated with closed eyes. In this situation, as 
soon as the eyes are opened, alpha activity disappears (so-called alpha 
‘blocking’, or ‘desynchronization’). The same phenomenon occurs when 
subjects start to concentrate on a mental task, e.g. mental arithmetic. Two 
different alpha frequency bands were distinguished: alpha1 from 8.5-10 Hz 
and alpha2 from 10.5-12 Hz. Alpha desynchronization is a consequence of 
endogenous or exogenous processes, by task or by stimulation. Thus, it 
represents the brain electrical component of the classical orienting reaction 
of Pavlov (see e.g. Koukkou & Gianotti, in press; Koukkou-Lehmann, 1987).  
In a state of active wakefulness, beta is the leading frequency band. Beta 
activity reflects functional excitation, intense mental activity. Nevertheless, 
some studies have shown that beta activity is decreased in response to 
movement: Pfurtscheller and collaborators showed a decrease of beta 
rhythms over sensorimotor areas following voluntary self-paced movement 
(Pfurtscheller, 1981), and in preparation for hand movement (Pfurtscheller et 
al., 1994). Cochin et al. (1998) showed the same phenomenon during the 
perception of motion. These results seem to contradict the well-known fact 
that beta activity reflects functional excitation. 
Also in the beta band, subsets of frequencies were identified by the 
factorial analyses of Herrmann et al. (1978), but not in clinical observations: 
beta1 from 12.5-18 Hz, beta2 from 18.5-21 Hz, and beta3 from 21.5-30 Hz. As 
quoted, these band definitions are not based on arbitrary divisions; rather, 
they were objectively determined as result of the factorial EEG analyses. 
A common, general observation is that large amplitudes occur with low 
EEG frequencies, while high EEG frequencies are associated with only small 
amplitudes, presumably since the underlying neuronal activity is 
desynchronized.  
In addition to the 7 discussed frequency bands, there are high 
frequencies around 40 Hz, called gamma frequency, which have gained in 
interest in the last years because their probable relevance in the ‘binding 
problem’ and in brain mechanisms of conscious perception.  
 
Brief Excursion on the ‘Binding Problem’  
The ‘binding problem’ refers to the problem of how the unity of 
conscious perception is brought about in the brain by the distributed 
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activities of large numbers of single elements. How are the appropriate 
neurons linked together so that, for example, visual perception is integrated 
to form a unitary perceptual experience? What makes binding of special 
interest for consciousness research is the experiential unity of consciousness: 
in subjective perception, objects appear as unified percepts located in one 
unified perceptual world. For the solution of the binding problem, two 
different perspectives were proposed: a spatial solution perspective and a 
temporal solution perspective. Briefly, the perspective of the spatial 
solutions presupposes anatomical connections among visual neurons and 
focuses on an explanation of how these connections may be formed (see 
Gold, 1999 for a review of this issue). An alternative solution has been 
proposed by von der Malsburg & Schneider (1986), who argued that 
neurons might form functional groups by some form of temporal 
correlation. On this perspective, neurons are bound by synchronous 
electrophysiological activity rather than by means of direct anatomical 
connections. Gray et al. (1989) have early proposed that specifically, 40 Hz 
oscillations of activity of neurons are the means by which a form of temporal 
correlation is achieved. Crick & Koch (1990) made the putative binding 
property of 40 Hz oscillation the centerpiece of their sketch of a theory of 
visual consciousness. They proposed that binding by means of synchronous 
40 Hz oscillations is not only the mechanism by which the visual system 
constructs a coherent percept but, in addition, that synchronous oscillation is 
a mechanism by which visual information finally results in conscious 
awareness. 
 
1.2.2. Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) 
The stimulus-dependent voltage variations in the EEG are called event-
related potentials (ERP) or event-related responses. ERPs are the potential 
changes with which the brain reacts to a particular stimulus. However, 
when recorded from scalp electrodes, the event-related electric activity is 
embedded in the ‘spontaneous’, background electric activity that is not 
contingent on the stimulus. Using a technical language, the evoked activity 
might be called the ‘signal’ (with amplitude between about 0.1 and 15 
microVolts) and the background activity might be called the ‘noise’. A low 
signal-to-noise ratio means that the evoked response may be masked or 
hidden by the background activity. Thus, in order to detect an evoked 
potential, it is indispensable to increase the signal-to-noise ratio. The 
solution is to diminish the amount of the noise, a goal achieved with 
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stimulus-contingent averaging (stimulus time-locked averaging). The 
rationale of this method is the following: Whereas the evoked potential 
present in an epoch is coherent with, or time-locked to, the evoking 
stimulus, the spontaneous electric activity is random in time-relation to the 
stimulus. Therefore, an algebraic summation of the stimuus-locked epochs 
containing both evoked and spontaneous activity over sufficient times 
causes a quasi cancellation of the spontaneous activity and, at the same time, 
a linear summation of the signal. Averaging of between 20 and 100 trials is 
usually sufficient to obtain a reasonable signal-to-noise ratio for ERPs. But it 
is clear that averaging of more trials will increase the signal-to-noise ratio.  
ERPs can be displayed in the form of a voltage waveshape as a function 
of time. The characteristic waveshape which arises with the averaging 
procedure is constituted by several peaks and troughs, so-called 
‘components’. Conventional ERP analysis typically is based on these ERP 
waveshapes, where the evoked activity is investigated in terms of peak 
latencies and amplitude. Peak latencies are the time point of the occurrence 
of the maximal negative or positive voltages measured after stimulus 
presentation. Amplitude is the strength of the voltage, usually measured in 
form of peak to peak amplitude or by measuring peaks against some 
‘baseline’, for example a pre-stimulus baseline. The components are 
conventionally labeled according to their polarity, positive (P) or negative 
(N) relative to the reference electrode, as well as according to their latency of 
occurrence (e.g., P100 for a positive peak at approximately 100 ms after 
stimulus onset) or according to their sequence of occurrence (e.g., first P1, 
then P2, and then P3a, P3b, P3c, etc.); for more detailed reviews about ERP 
methodology see e.g. Duffy et al. (1989).  
 
1.3. EEG and ERP Analysis: Methodological Considerations 
While analyzing spontaneous EEG and ERPs, several fundamental 
issues need to be considered: (a) the reference site, (b) the baseline, (c) the 
overlapping components, and (d) the physiological interpretations.  
(a) The reference site. For a given point on the scalp, information about 
EEG power and phase is ambiguous because the recorded waveshapes are 
dependent on the chosen reference. For a given ‘active’ elecrtrode, different 
reference electrodes give different, however equally correct EEG power 
spectra and ERP wave latencies and amplitudes (Lehmann, 1984; 1987). 
Since there is no possible physical proof for the electric inactivity of any 
reference site (Katznelson, 1981), it follows (Lehmann, 1984) that for any 
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single electrode location there are as many possible voltages as there are 
available reference electrode locations. Therefore, the choice of a reference 
will always remain a source of ambiguity and arbitrariness. For N electrodes 
on the scalp, at one moment in time, it is possible to record (N-1) voltages. 
This results in N*(N-1) possible waveshapes over time, which all have 
different forms but are correct. At the reference electrode, which by 
definition is set to electric zero, no voltages are recorded, and electrodes 
close to the reference electrode will tend to generally have lower waveshape 
amplitudes than electrodes that are further away from the reference 
electrode. The identification of a ‘component’ in a waveshape (latencies 
and/or amplitudes) of EEG and ERP will therefore always result in a large 
set of different, but nevertheless correct results for different references. This 
will ultimately lead to differences in the interpretation of the data if different 
references are used, which reduces the comparability and validity of the 
conclusions. The strategy of the ‘recomputation against the average 
reference’ is used to produce a privileged result. The average reference, from 
the point of view of physics is reasonable because one can assume that, for 
each moment in time, the sum of all electric charges on the scalp is zero, as 
each single generator in the brain must have positive and negative poles that 
are equally loaded. In terms of recording reference, this concept is 
implemented by defining the entire scalp area that has been recorded as 
electrically neutral. Thus, to compute the so-called average reference, for 
each moment in time the mean voltage of all electrodes is subtracted from 
the voltage at each electrode. Note that this procedure does not alter the 
potential difference between any pair of electrodes, i.e., the mapped, 
momentary potential landscape remains unchanged, only the ‘water level’ is 
changed. The average reference computation removes whatever spatial DC 
offset there is in the data.  
The recording reference, wherever it was located, always records – by 
definition – a zero potential difference against itself. Therefore the voltage of 
the average reference potential at the reference site is always zero minus the 
mean voltage of all recorded electrode positions, including the zero potential 
difference at the reference site. In practice this means that the recording 
reference can be a part of the normal electrode array and be used for analysis 
like all other electrode sites.  
 (b) The baseline. In many ERP studies, the data are analyzed against a 
pre-stimulus baseline, which means that for each channel, the baseline is 
defined by the mean of a time period of EEG directly preceding the 
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presentation of the stimulus. However, the brain electric field preceding an 
event cannot be expected to be flat as it is unreasonable to assume that at 
this time, the brain is doing nothing, especially not if the subject is expecting 
and/or preparing for the perception and processing of a stimulus. Results 
obtained at a given time after the stimulus using pre-stimulus baseline 
correction therefore represent ‘the amount of change introduced by the 
event, not the absolute state’ (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986). Comparable to 
the choice of reference in waveshape analysis, this introduces ambiguity as it 
is not possible any more to distinguish ERP differences that result from 
differences in processing from those that result from differences in 
preparation.  
(c) The overlapping components. It might well be that a certain component 
of an ERP is not produced by one single process, but by several. This 
considerable overlap of independent components in the waveshape can be 
extricated with difficulty. Coles & Rugg (1997) give the following example: 
An ERP component with a latency of 200 ms latency might not only reflect 
the activity of one particular generator that is maximally active at that time, 
but the combined activity of two or more different generators, one 
maximally active just before, and the other just after 200 ms latency. Their 
fields could then summate to a maximum at 200 ms, without the possibility 
to distinguish them anymore. A possible solution is the substraction of two 
ERPs that are obtained under tow different conditions, where one condition 
affects only one of the components. The drawback of this method is that it 
needs a priori assumptions about the possibly participating different ERP 
components. Another often employed statistical approach to account for 
overlap of ERP components is Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This 
multivariate technique performs factorial analysis from the ERP waveshapes 
across electrodes, conditions or experimental groups so that a description of 
statistically independent ‘orthogonal factors’ is achieved, which can be 
displayed in their time course. In other words, PCA components are 
statistically independent contributions to the variance across waveshapes, 
and do not necessarily correspond with peaks or troughs. Main 
disadvantages of this approach are the possible difficulty to interpret the 
resulting factor loadings in relation to the sequence of peaks and troughs of 
the original waveshape and the information loss about latency variations 
between conditions. We have also to note that the accuracy of this technique 
has been questioned since simulation studies demonstrated misallocation of 
variance across components by PCA (Wood & McCarthy, 1984).  
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(d) The physiological interpretations. Conventional waveshape analysis 
had often advanced the assumption that the scalp location of differences of 
EEG and ERP waveshapes indicates the site of processing in the brain. This 
assumption is only true if the generators implementing the function under 
investigation were oriented perpendicular to the scalp surface. However, the 
cortical surface, which contains the pyramidal cells arranged perpendicular 
to the cortical surface, only in part is parallel to the scalp surface. Cortical 
surface is folded in intricate ways so that the generators cannot be assumed 
to be generally perpendicular to the outer surface of the brain. Moreover, the 
accomplishments of magnetoencephalographic (MEG) measurements, in 
which only generators tangentially oriented to the surface can be recorded, 
obviously contradicts this assumption.  
 
1.4. Analysis of Scalp-Recorded EEG and ERP 
EEG and ERP recordings consist of one value for each moment in time 
and for each recorded location. EEG/ERP data represent a two dimensional 
array, time vs. space, which is traditionally read out over time, as brain 
waveshapes. The resulting illustration contains as many waveshapes as 
recording electrodes. Another possible approach to read the data out of the 
two-dimensional array is the read out over space, as brain field maps.  
The momentary brain electric field is given by the distribution of the 
electric potential on the scalp at a given time point. It is described uniquely 
by the voltages at all the electrode positions at one moment in time, using 
any of the electrodes as reference. To display measured brain electric fields, 
two-dimensional maps are constructed: The three-dimensional locations of 
the electrodes on the scalp are projected onto a two-dimensional surface in a 
schematic way where electrode positions are arranged in a rectangular grid 
pattern (see Fig. 1). Then, isopotential lines are drawn that connect the 
locations where equal potential values have been measured or, for the sake 
of better visualization, have been interpolated. The picture that is obtained 
by this procedure might be read in the same way as geographic maps, where 
‘valleys’ represent areas of the scalp where lower potential values have been 
recorded and ‘mountains’ are areas where higher potential values have been 
recorded. For the necessary interpolation of voltages between electrode 
locations, linear interpolation should be used to prevent spatial aliasing. 
Brain electric field potential maps are also often displayed as color coded 
maps (see the present study); usually red colors code for scalp areas with 
positive potential different compared to the recording reference and blue 
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colors code for scalp areas with negative potential different compared to the 
recording reference. In Fig. 2, twenty-one channels of EEG are shown as 
waveshapes and as maps. 
Since the topography of the mapped brain electric field reflects the 
relative differences in potential between the recording sites, it is not affected 
by the location of the reference. Changing the site of the recording reference 
will only influence the decision which one of the field lines is to be called the 
zero potential line. Thus, the spatial configuration of the field distribution, 
its ‘landscape’, remains invariant, only the labeling of the field lines changes. 
And using again the comparison with geographic maps: The topographical 
features remain identical when the electrical landscape is viewed from 
different points (references), similar to the constant relief of a geographical 
map where sea level is arbitrarily defined as zero level. 
Mapping implies no data reduction. It actually requires an increase of 
data, since interpolated lines are more than the originally available points. 
Mapping is ‘just’ another way to display the recorded EEG signals. Because 
mapping of electrical brain activity in itself does not constitute data analysis, 
in order to compare activity patterns with conventional statistical methods, 
the data must be reduced to quantitative descriptors of potential maps. In 
the follows, the two possible approach for data reduction were described, 
the reduction in the space domain and the reduction in the time domain. 
Note that when the data are reduced in the time domain, the different 
quantitative descriptors which are discussed in the next section (1.4.1.) are 
used for statistical comparisons.    
 
1.4.1. Data Reduction in the Space Domain: Quantitative Descriptors of 
the Maps and Comparisons between Maps 
The spatial configuration of the brain’s electric field on the scalp reflects 
the activities of neuronal populations. A change of the spatial configuration 
must have been caused by a change of the geometry of the neural activity in 
the brain, i.e., other neural elements must have become active. Conversely, 
however, similar spatial configurations may or may not have been generated 
by the same neural elements. 
When the geometry of active neural elements is stable and only the 
amount of activity is changed, the topography of the brain electric field will 
remain unchanged and only the strength of the field will change.  
The goal of an adequate analysis of brain electric field maps is to 
identify the activation of different neural generators under different 
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conditions. It is therefore essential that this analysis completely disconnects 
the spatial configuration of the field (‘landscape’) from its strength 
(‘hilliness’). 
 
The Electric Gravity Center 
The most simple and thereby most robust statement about a mapped 
electric field is the electric gravity center. It is an estimate of the mean 
location of all active, electric, intracerebral sources in two-dimensional 
space. With this descriptor, the momentary field configuration is expressed 
by only two parameters: a value for the location along the left-right axis and 
a value for the location along the anterior-posterior axis. The left-right and 
anterior-posterior coordinates can be plotted as a function of time (Fig. 3) 
and compared between two conditions or between two subject groups.  
 
The Extreme Potential Values 
A major feature of an electric field is its orientation. This is most simply 
assessed by the scalp field locations of the maximal and minimal field 
potential values; their potential difference is a measure of field strength 
(Lehmann, 1971). The positive extreme is the location of the electrode where 
the most positive voltage has been recorded, the negative extreme is the 
location of the electrode where the most negative voltage has been recorded. 
The choice of the reference electrode does not affect the locations of these 
two spatial descriptors because the most positive / negative voltage is a 
relative statement and does not depend on absolute values. Note that 
extremes can only be located at electrode positions correspondingly; the 
voltage between the two extreme potential values is independent of the 
chosen reference. As shown in the Fig. 3, the location of the extremes is 
described by the anterior-posterior and left-right coordinates of the 
schematic electrode array. Thus, extremes describe the topography of a map 
by two location parameters each. However, since more information is 
available about the mapped field configurations when one considers the 
values at all electrodes (‘area centroids’, below), the extracted extreme 
values will not be used in the present study.  
 
The Maps’ Centroids of Positive and Negative Potential Areas  
The locations of the centroids of positive and negative map areas 
(defined versus the average reference) assessed the field configuration with 
all available data. (‘Centroid’ has the same meaning as ‘gravity center’, but 
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in order to distinguish the measure from the global measure defined in the 
preceding paragraph, this terminology was chosen). As above for gravity 
centers, each centroid location is expressed by only two spatial parameters, 
an x (left-right) and a y (anterior-posterior) value. Other than in the case of 
the extremes, centroids can be located anywhere within the mapped 
electrode array, i.e., are not restricted to the electrode positions since they 
use the information at all electrodes (Lehmann, 1987; Wackemann et al., 
1993). Compared to the extreme locations, centroid locations have a 
tendency to be nearer to the center of the field and are less likely to occur 
near the borders of the electrode array. 
The left-right and anterior-posterior coordinates of the positive and 
negative centroid can be plotted as a function of time (Fig. 3) and compared 
between conditions or between subject groups.  
Note that the average location between the location of the positive and 
the negative centroids is the electric gravity center. 
 
Global Field Power (GFP) 
Scalp recorded fields reflect the synchronous activation of many 
intracranial neurons, and it has been proposed that steps of information 
processing are reflected by the occurrence of strong and pronounced 
potential fields (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980). In order to quantify the 
amount of activity in a given scalp potential field, i.e. in order to measure the 
electric strength (‘hilliness’) of a brain electric field map independent of its 
spatial configuration, Lehmann & Skrandies (1980) introduced the measure 
of Global Field Power (GFP, Formula 1).  
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 where ui is the voltage of the map u at the electrode i, u is the average 
voltage of all electrodes of the map u and N is the number of electrodes of 
the map u. 
The Global Field Power measure is computed as the mean of all possible 
potential differences in the field corresponding to the standard deviation of 
the potential values at all recording electrodes. Scalp potential fields with 
steep gradients and pronounced peaks and troughs, i.e. a very ‘hilly’ map, 
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will result in high Global Field Power, while Global Field Power is low in 
electrical fields with only shallow gradients that have a ‘flat’ appearance.  
This reference-free index quantifies the amount of activity in the 
analysed map and can be computed for each map, resulting in a single value 
at each time point, and these values can be plotted as a function of time (Fig. 
4). Maps at times of maximal Global Field Power imply the optimal signal-
to-noise ratios. High Global Field Power is typically associated with stable 
landscape configuration, while low Global Field Power is associated with 
changes in the landscape configurations.  
 
Global Map Dissimilarity (GMD) 
In order to compare the topographies of two maps independent from 
their strength and without prior feature extraction, Lehmann & Skrandies 
(1980) introduced the Global Map Dissimilarity (GMD, Formula 2) 
descriptor.  
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where ui is the voltage of map u at the electrode i, vi is the voltage of map 
v at the electrode i, u is the average voltage of all electrodes of map u,  v  is 
the average voltage of all electrodes of map v and N is the total number of 
electrodes. 
This one-number statement about the global spatial configuration 
dissimilarity of two maps corresponds to the Global Field Power of the 
difference map. This letter method implies prior map normalization to unity 
Global Field Power in order to make it insensitive to differences in overall 
scaling and to assess landscape difference only. 
Note that the Global Map Dissimilarity is 0 when two maps are equal, 
and that Global Map Dissimilarity maximally reaches 2.0 for the case where 
the two maps are identical in their topography but with inversed polarity. 
For the determination of start (end) points of microstates, the time moments 
of maximal Global Map Dissimilarity are used. 
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1.4.2. Data Reduction in the Time Domain: Temporal Parsing of Map 
Series into Microstates 
Examining brain electric activity as a series of maps of the momentary 
potential distributions demonstrates that a given map configuration tends to 
persist for a certain time duration and than changes relatively quickly (in the 
millisecond time range) into a new configuration that stays stable again for a 
certain time (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1984; see Fig. 4). The transitions 
between one map configuration to the next one are not smooth, but tend to 
occur quickly, ‘stepwise’. The time segments of stable map configurations 
were suggested to reflect steps of information processing; they were called 
functional microstates of the brain (Lehmann, 1987; Michel et al., 1992a). The 
study of the distribution and the time course of the momentary brain electric 
field topography therefore offers a unique possibility to obtain insights into 
important features of the brain’s processing of information. 
Changes in the spatial distribution of the electric signal, i.e. segment 
changes, and reflect changes of the functional state. On the other hand, the 
successive occurrence of microstates does not imply that brain information 
processing is strictly sequential: the underlying mechanism may be 
composed of any number of sequential or parallel physiological 
subprocesses (Lehmann, 1989). Following, it will be assumed that the 
distribution of active neuronal generators (without taking into account the 
intensity) characterizes uniquely the functional microstate of the brain 
(Lehmann, 1987). Due to the nonuniqueness of the electromagnetic inverse 
problem, it may occur that different source distributions produce exactly the 
same scalp field. However, changes in the scalp field are undoubtedly due to 
changes in the distribution of active sources. 
The main goal of a time-oriented analysis is to identify onset and offset 
times of particular field configurations, i.e., to identify time epochs where 
the potential field distributions is in a quasi-stable state. Which are the 
parameters or the measurements that we have to take into account to define 
a ‘quasi-stable’ state, i.e. a microstate? Essentially, there are two main 
approaches to assign the maps to the different microstates: (a) a ‘sequential 
approach’ (e.g., Lehmann et al., 1987; Strick & Lehmann, 1993), and (b) a 
‘global approach’ (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995; Koenig et al., 1999).  
 
(a) The Sequential Approach 
The sequential approach compares a map with the following map, in a 
sequential way: Two methods are available in the identification of segments 
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which are defined by field characteristic, the ‘global map dissimilarity’ and 
the ‘spatial window’. The descriptor of the global map dissimilarity was 
already discussed in the section 1.4.1.  
The second method available in the sequential identification of segments 
which are defined by field characteristic as ‘quasi-stable’ was proposed by 
Lehmann & Skrandies (1984). The segmentation was based on the following 
strategy: Two spatial windows were set up around the location of the 
extremes or centroids of the first map of the series. At the second time point, 
it was checked whether one of the descriptor (extremes or centroids) of this 
second map had left its spatial window. If this is the case, a new segment (a 
new microstate) was started and a new spatial window was set up. If this is 
not the case, the second map is considered belonging to the same segment 
and the next time point is then considered. Obviously in this approach, the 
size of the spatial window is of crucial importance for the identification of 
the segments and their length. The larger is the size of the spatial window, 
the longer will be the identified segment and the contrary. An often used 
strategy to determine the size of the spatial window is to use as size one or 
one half electrode distance. Strick & Lehmann (1993) introduced a boot-strap 
determination for window size, and Koenig & Lehmann (1996) introduced 
an elegant, ‘know all’ solution for this problem (see Koenig, 1995 and Koenig 
& Lehmann, 1996 for a detailed presentation of this solution). 
 
(b) The Global Approach: Microstate Clustering Analysis  
Different from the sequential approach, the global approach, a 
modification of the classical k-means clustering (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995), 
is not primarily driven by the sequence of the maps. The global approach 
examines the entire data set at all time points simultaneously and assigns all 
analysed maps to a limited number of clusters (class mean maps).  
The principle of clustering is reviewed in Fig. 5 (modified from Koenig 
et al., 1999), illustrating the clustering of a sequence of a 10 maps into 2 class 
mean maps. In a first step, 2 maps (so-called prototype map) are randomly 
selected between the 10 maps. In a second step, the similarity of the spatial 
configuration of each prototype map (let say, map A and B) with each of the 
10 maps is computed using the squared correlation coefficient to omit the 
maps’ polarities. If map 1 is more similar to the prototype A compared to the 
prototype B, than map 1 is assigned to the prototype A. Contrary, if map 1 is 
more similar to the prototype B compared to the prototype A, than map 1 is 
assigned to the prototype B. The assignment to prototype A or B is done for 
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all 10 maps. When the assignment is completed, an update of the prototypes 
configuration is done, by averaging all maps assigned to prototype A and B, 
separately, disregarding map polarity. This procedure is repeated in a 
second and later runs until no further changes in the assignment occur. 
Eventually, the percentage of the variance of the data explained by the 2 
class mean maps is determined. Explained variance might change 
depending on selected starting 2 prototypes. Therefore, to find the solution 
with the maximal explained variance, the entire procedure is repeated 20 
times with newly randomly selected starting prototypes.    
The complete procedure described above can be repeated aiming at 
different number of class mean maps. The optimal number of class mean 
maps is then determined by the minimum of the cross-validation index 
which considers both the number of used class mean maps and the percent 
variance explained by the class mean maps (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995).  
This procedure will be further illustrated in the section 7.2.5. by means 
of the data collected in the present investigation. 
 
1.5. From the Scalp-Recorded EEG/ERP to the Sources in the Head 
One aim of EEG/ERP recording is the identification of the active sources 
in the central nervous system. The underlying assumption is that 
information is processed in circumscribed brain areas, and that spontaneous 
activity patterns originate in specific structures of the brain. Thus, it is of 
interest to account for the scalp-recorded topography of electric activity in 
terms of anatomical localization of intracerebral, neuronal generators.  
A severe complication for the realization of this aim is the problem of 
the so-called ‘inverse solution’, i.e. the impossibility to compute the location, 
orientation and strength of electric sources in a volume based on surface 
data if there is more than one generator source. Any given scalp distribution 
of brain electrical activity can be explained by an infinite number of 
intracranial neural source distributions. Obviously, at any moment in time 
there is a very large number of generators active in the brain. Thus, the 
inverse problem, the computation of source locations from surface voltages 
cannot be solved uniquely for brain electric data. The only way to solve this 
problem is to constrain the problem. In the following, two different solutions 
of the inverse solution problem are described.  
The basis for the solutions is the fact that the surface electric field 
generated by one or several known sources in a volume can be calculated 
correctly. In other words, this so-called ‘forward solution’ is not ambiguous, 
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contrary to the inverse problem for more than one source. A model source 
dipole generator, the so-called ‘equivalent dipole’ has 6 parameters: 3 for 
location, 2 for orientation and one for strength.  
 
1.5.1. Single Source Localization of Frequency Bands: The FFT-Dipole-
Approximation 
The most simple constraint to the inverse problem of brain electric data 
is to assume a single dipole model generator source. Consider the case of an 
observed single momentary scalp field, of spontaneous or event-related 
brain electric activity. In order to find the putative single source, an iterative 
procedure is used. One computes the forward solutions, the scalp field 
distributions for very many single dipole models, using all possible locations 
and all possible orientations of the model source in the head. All computed 
scalp field distributions are compared to the actually observed scalp field. 
The computed field that best fits the observed field identifies the best-fitting 
single model source. It is worth pointing out that this single, best-fit model 
source is independent from the recording reference for the observed scalp 
field, and does not presuppose a scalp-orthogonal orientation of the source 
while explaining the measured electric field on the scalp.  
Lehmann & Michel (1990) proposed a source modeling approach in the 
frequency domain for EEG multichannel time series, the ‘FFT-Dipole-
Approximation’. Using multichannel brain electric field data, this method 
produces a potential distribution map for each frequency point of the 
Fourier transformation (FFT) by assuming a single phase angle. For each 
frequency point of the FFT, the cosine and sine FFT values of all electrodes 
are entered into a Nyquist diagram. A best fit-phase angle is computed as 
the first principal component of the data entries. All entries are projected 
onto this first principal component, and read out as a map. This map then is 
subjected to a conventional 3-dimensional model dipole source computation 
as described above. It is important that the location of one or several 
equivalent dipole generator models is not necessarily the location of the 
active neural elements. The computed model locations represents the 
location of the point of gravity of all neural activity.  
Note that the location of the positive and negative extremes and the 
locations of the centroids of the positive and negative potential areas can be 
considered as projections of the positive and negative poles of an 
intracerebral single model dipole onto the scalp; seen from the scalp, the 
 21
single equivalent dipole model solution is located between the locations of 
the positive and negative potential area centroids.  
 
1.5.2. Low Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA): EEG/ERP 
Functional Imaging 
Information is processed in parallel distributed networks and long-
range cooperation between different structures constitutes a basic feature of 
mechanisms of brain information processing (Singer, 1999). Due to this fact, 
neuronal activation is distributed over large areas of the central nervous 
system and its extension is unknown. Thus, Skrandies (2002, p. 14) warns 
that ‘the approach of single dipole solutions or the fit of a small number of 
dipoles to the data appears to be not appropriate when unknown source 
distributions shall be detected’. More realistic views of underlying 
mechanisms are approximated with methods that aim at the estimation of 
the most likely intracranial sources that may be distributed through an 
extended three-dimensional volume.  
The first attempt in this direction was the ‘minimum norm solution’ by 
Hämäläinen & Ilmoniemi (1984). The disadvantage of this solution was that 
it would always produce activity maxima only at the outer cortex, close to 
the electrodes, i.e. it misplaces deep sources into shallow depth (Pascual-
Marqui, 1999). 
Low Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA, Pascual-
Marqui et al., 1994; Pascual-Marqui et al., 1999) is another method aiming to 
solve the so-called inverse solution problem and belongs to the family of 
instantaneous, 3D distributed, discrete, linear inverse methods.   
Different from dipole models (see above), the LORETA method makes 
no assumption about the number of dipoles: LORETA directly computes the 
current distribution throughout the entire brain volume. But, as discussed 
above, some constrain is needed to find a solution to the inverse problem. 
LORETA assumes that the smoothest of all possible activity distributions is 
most plausible and to aimed at. This means that neighboring volume voxels 
should have maximally similar generator strength. This assumption is 
consistent with known electrophysiological data on neuronal activation: 
neighboring neuronal populations show highly correlated activity (Gray et 
al., 1989; Llinas, 1988; Silva et al., 1991). This is implemented by requiring 
that the electric activity at any given voxel must be as close as possible to the 
average activity of the neighboring voxels. The technical details of LORETA 
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are described in Pascual-Marqui et al. (1994) and Pascual-Marqui et al. 
(1999).  
This computation of the smoothest of all possible three-dimensional 
current distributions results in a true tomography that, however, has a 
relatively low spatial resolution. Thus, LORETA solves the inverse problem 
without a priori-knowledge of the number of sources, but by applying the 
restriction of maximal smoothness of the solution considering the 
neighboring voxels. The result is the current density at each voxel as the 
linear, weighted sum of the scalp electric potentials (Pascual-Marqui, 1995; 
Pascual-Marqui et al., 1999; Pascual-Marqui et al., 1994). In the 
implementation of LORETA used in the present study, the relation to brain 
anatomy is established by using a 3-shell spherical head model matched to 
the atlas of the human brain (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), available as a 
digitized MRI from the Brain Imaging Centre, Montral Neurologic Insititute. 
Registration between spherical and realistic head geometry uses EEG 
electrode coordinates reported by Towle et al. (1993), and the solution space 
is restricted to the grey matter of cortex and hippocampal regions, as 
determined by the corresponding digitized Probability Atlas available from 
the Brain Imaging Centre, Montral Neurologic Institute. A total of 2394 
cortical voxels are produced by the version of the LORETA program used in 
the present study. Each voxel represents a cube of 7x7x7 mm. The advantage 
of using the Talairach head model is that it allows precise neuroanatomical 
localization in standardized coordinates. (Ideally, it would be best to use the 
exact head model for each subject from the individual MRI. In this case, the 
final step would be to cross-register the individual anatomy to the standard 
Talairach atlas.)  
The LORETA images represent the electrical activity at each voxel as 
squared magnitude (i.e. power) of the computed current density.  
LORETA is one of many proposed solutions for the ‘inverse problem’. 
Compared with other published EEG/MEG instantaneous, 3D, discrete, 
linear inverse solutions, for LORETA the advantage of correctly localizing 
deep sources has been claimed (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1994) whereas the 
other methods (e.g., minimum norm, weighted minimum norm, and 
weighted resolution optimization) allegedly find the solutions biased 
towards the EEG/MEG sensors. There are several studies validating 
LORETA, based on, e.g., correct localization of the auditory cortex (Anderer 
et al., 1998a; b), the visual cortex (Steger et al., 2001), epileptic foce related to 
MRI lesions (Worrell et al., 2000).  
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1.6. Other Brain Imaging Methods 
In the last two decades, other brain imaging methods were developed 
and used to produce functional images of the brain. In this paragraph, a 
brief overview of these methods is given.  
 
1.6.1. PET and SPECT 
Cerebral blood flow (CBF) and metabolism are normally closely linked 
(Logothetis, 2002); hence, assessment of CBF may provide an indirect 
measure of neuronal activity.  
In SPECT (single photon emission computed tomography), a radioactive 
tracer is applied that specifically interacts with brain tissue. Technetium-99m 
hexamethyl propyleneamine oxime (99Tc-HMPAO), which is taken up by 
tissue and then trapped, is commonly used. Radiation is detected by rotating 
gamma cameras, and, by a process of backprojection and tomographic 
reconstruction, an image of blood flow is obtained.  
The idea of the functioning of PET (positron emission tomography) is 
simple. A fast-decaying radioactive tracer is injected into the bloodstream 
and then the brain is scanned while the person is immobilized. PET depends 
on the emission of positrons, the positively charged electrons released by 
certain isotopes upon their decay. In tissue, the positron unites with an 
electron, and the two particles convert their mass into radiation energy. It is 
this quick anti-particle annihilation that produces the gamma rays picked up 
by the system’s head-encircling detector ring. The gamma rays come in pairs 
which fly off in exactly opposite directions. By catching both, the scanner’s 
computers can draw a line running straight back through the original 
positron event in the brain. After a few million such readings, the scanner 
has an accurate, three-dimensional image of any metabolic hot spots in the 
brain. Several different positron emitters are available, but most work is 
done with oxygen-15, carbon-11, and fluorine-18. 
With both SPECT and PET, it is possible to label ligands (ion or a neutral 
molecule which binds to a receptor to form a complex) for a variety of drugs 
and neuroreceptors, for example, the D2 receptor, the benzodiazepine 
receptor, and opiate receptors.    
 
1.6.2. fMRI 
The principle of fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) is the 
examination of the physicochemical environment of the brain’s protons.  
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An object (proton) with a charge and velocity provokes a magnetic field 
adjacent to it. Because protons spin around their axis at random, the sum 
total of magnetization in an area of the brain is zero. On application of an 
external magnetic field, the particles and their charges align, just like the 
compass needle of a small compass in the earth’s magnetic field. In this 
artificially ordered state, the particles can then be probed by firing a tuned 
pulse of radio energy at them. Different kinds of atom resonate at different 
frequencies, so it is possible to measure with accuracy the concentration of 
various elements like iron, oxygen, of hydrogen. By taking these readings 
from many angles, just as with PET, a computer can be used to turn the 
information into a three-dimensional reconstruction.  
 
1.6.3. MEG 
A MEG (magnetoencephalogram) system is much like EEG in that it 
measures the magnet field activity of the brain. As was reviewed above, 
differences of scalp-recorded electric fields are due to postsynaptic 
potentials occurring on the cortical pyramidal neurons in the brain. These 
processes are caused by ionic current flows that also produce magnetic 
fields. These magnetic fields are extraordinarily weak, i.e. approximately 109 
times weaker than the background magnetism produced by the earth. MEG 
has its own drawbacks that have hampered its introduction until the end of 
the 1960s (Cohen, 1968; 1970). It requires the use of SQUIDS (super-
conducting quantum interference devices) as sensors. These electronic 
circuits use quantum effects to pick up the brain’s magnetic fields, but they 
only work when they are cooled to almost absolute zero in a bath of liquid 
helium. Finding ways of having something that cold almost touching a 
subject’s head is a challenge in itself.  
Due to the common neuronal generators for EEG and MEG, both 
techniques provide information on the same brain processes. From a 
physics-theoretic point of view, it was initially thought that MEG had higher 
spatial resolution than EEG, because magnetic fields have the advantage that 
they pass through the tissues of the head without distortion. This was 
proven false in a study that objectively compared the spatial resolution of 
both methods (Pascual-Marqui & Biscay-Lirio, 1993), showing that MEG 
offers no advantages over EEG in terms of information on brain processes.  
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1.6.4. EEG and Other Brain Imaging Methods in Comparison 
In this paragraph we first list the advantages and the limitations of the 
EEG/ERP. Secondly, we aim to compare the other brain imaging techniques 
described briefly above with EEG/ERP, starting with the advantages and 
ending by the drawbacks. Time resolution, space resolution as well as the 
invasiveness of the brain imaging methods described in this paragraph are 
summarized in the Fig. 6. 
 
1.6.4.1. Advantaged and Limitation of EEG/ERP 
The scalp recorded EEG/ERP technique is completely non-invasive, is 
low-cost, offers an extremely high sensitivity to changes in the internal 
(central nervous system) state, and has virtually unlimited time resolution 
(Ozaki & Lehmann, 2000).  
The limitations of the EEG/ERP technique are: First, there is insufficient 
information in the EEG (recorded from the scalp) for a unique determination 
of the three-dimensional source distribution. This is the so-called ‘inverse 
solution problem’ (see section 1.5.). An approximate solution for the three-
dimensional distribution modeling is the LORETA method (see section 
1.5.2.), but still with a low spatial resolution.  
The second disadvantage is the fact that the high sensitivity to all 
information arriving in the brain requires a careful experimental design that 
excludes as much as possible sensory input and internal states that are not 
part of the design. The high sensitivity leads also to the co-registration of 
non-cerebral electrical currents from the body or of the surround that are 
obviously not of interest in brain studies. These unwanted co-registrations 
are called artifacts. There are two categories of artifacts: internal and 
external. The internal artifacts are, for example, muscle movements, eyes 
movements, eyes blinks, or heart beat. The external artifacts are electrical 
sources, such as all electrical equipment used for the recording and for other 
purposes (e.g., elevators, paging systems). There are of course several 
strategies to avoid or at least to reduce artifacts. There are also ways to 
eliminate certain artifacts, e.g. eye movements, but EEG epochs that are still 
contamined with non-cerebral artifacts despite all efforts should be excluded 
from further analysis.  
Another general limitation is that a large, but unknown amount of brain 
neural activity cannot be measured from the scalp. Some neuronal 
populations might not have sufficient synchronous activation to generate a 
measurable signal. Other neuronal populations, e.g. in thalamic nuclei, 
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presumably generate a closed electric field because of their non-parallel 
orientation; these neurons are arranged in such a way that it is likely that 
they cannot produce a measurable electrical signal on the scalp. It might 
therefore well be that several important neural processes cannot be detected 
using this technique.   
 
1.6.4.2. EEG/ERP vs. MEG, PET, SPECT, and fMRI 
MEG compared with EEG/ERP data are easier to measure in one respect: 
no electrodes need to be placed on the subject’s head. On the other hand, 
there is the restriction that the subject’s head has to be completely 
immobilized. This is problematic if one has to work with non-cooperative 
patients. The cost of the device is around 10 times higher than for EEG, and 
maintenance is very expensive. A third problematic aspect of the MEG 
technique is that neural generators that are oriented parallel to the scalp 
surface are very difficult to measure.   
PET and SPECT are invasive techniques, since the tracers used to mark 
the CBF are radioactive. Another disadvantage compared with EEG/ERP is 
the relatively low time resolution, in the range of many seconds for PET and 
in the range of minutes for SPECT. On the other hand, the space resolution 
of these two techniques compared with the EEG/ERP is relatively high, 3-5 
mm resolution for PET and 6-10 mm for SPECT. Both techniques are very 
expensive.  
MRI machines are expensive. The space resolution is the highest 
available in brain imaging methods, at about 2 mm, but the time resolution 
of fMRI compared with EEG/ERP is again very low, with conventional 
strategies in the range of seconds; recent special, selective methods can reach 
a resolution of 150 msec.   
In sum, the brain reacts with very high sensitivity to changes in the 
external and internal environment. Therefore, relevant brain processes for 
information processing must occur in a very short time range, in fractions of 
seconds. Scalp recorded brain electric activity appears to be a most 
appropriate and useful tool for studying human brain processes of 
perceptual and cognitive functions.  
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2. BELIEF IN THE PARANORMAL  
 
Paranormal belief literally means ‘belief besides normal’ and is 
traditionally defined as belief in phenomena, which, if true, violate basic 
limiting principles of science (Broad, 1953). Irwin (1999) described 
parapsychology as the ‘scientific study of experiences which, if they are as 
they seem to be, are in principle outside the realm of human capabilities as 
presently conceived by conventional scientists. Thus parapsychological 
phenomena ostensibly indicate the operation of factors unknown to or 
unrecognized by orthodox science, popularly referred to as paranormal 
factors.’ (Irwin, 1999, p. 1). The paranormal phenomena include a range of 
phenomena such as ‘superstitious beliefs’ (e.g., black cats and breaking 
mirrors cause bad luck), ‘precognition’ (i.e., the apparent foreknowledge of 
as yet undetermined future events), ‘clairvoyance’ (i.e., the paranormal 
acquisition of any information directly from a physical source), ‘telepathy’ 
(i.e., the apparent ability to communicate information from one mind to 
another), ‘telekinesis’ (i.e., the apparent ability to influence the environment 
seemingly by intention or other mental activity alone), ‘communication with 
the dead’, ‘out-of-body experiences’, and a host of other such phenomena.  
In our opinion, if we accept the definition of Broad (1953) a very 
interesting question arises: what about religiosity and the often related belief 
in the ‘supernatural’, i.e. belief in supernatural agents such as angels or 
demons, the present-day occurrence of miracles, the causal power of prayer? 
Should one make a distinction between the belief in the supernatural and the 
belief in paranormal phenomena?  
Factor analytic studies (Grimmer & White, 1990; Haraldsson & 
Houtkooper, 1996; Johnston et al., 1995) have shown that one should 
differentiate between these two categories of beliefs; in fact these studies 
have indicated that certain individuals do make distinctions between 
supernatural phenomena and paranormal phenomena like ESP (extra-
sensory perception, for instance clairvoyance), telekinesis, precognition, and 
so forth. The reason why people make such discriminations appears to 
depend on whether they have preexisting religious beliefs (Clarke, 1995). 
Prior beliefs may influence which phenomena are accepted as credible 
occurrences and which are treated with skepticism. Indeed, Christians may 
express disbelief about ESP or telekinesis but belief in guardian angels or 
miracles. Beck & Miller (2001) referred to this bias as ‘metaphysical 
chauvinism’, whereby one rejects certain quasi-empirical claims if they are 
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not consistent with one’s metaphysical assumptions, despite simultaneously 
holding beliefs that are equally unverifiable from an empirical point of view. 
Beck & Miller (2001) also contended that metaphysical chauvinism is shaped 
not only by prior religious belief but also by the life experiences of the 
individual.  
For the present study we used the Mischo questionnaire (see 
APPENDIX 1, Mischo et al., 1993) for the pre-selection of our subjects. The 6 
items included in the Mischo questionnaire asked about telepathy (e.g. ‘I 
had at least one telepathic experience with another person’), clairvoyance (‘I 
never had ay extrasensory perceptions’), and precognition (e.g. ‘I had at least 
one presentiment that came true and that I thought was not due to chance’). 
If we accept the distinction between belief in the supernatural and belief in 
the paranormal described above, then our ‘believers’, i.e. subjects scoring 
high on the Mischo questionnaire, believed in the existence of paranormal 
phenomena. Since we did not ask about supernatural belief, we cannot 
assume that (1) our ‘believers’ also believe in supernatural phenomena, and 
that (2) our ‘skeptics’, i.e. subjects scoring low on the Mischo questionnaire 
or, in other words, subjects who strongly disbelief in paranormal 
phenomena, do not believe in supernatural phenomena.   
In sum, in this study we focused on the belief/skepticism in telepathy, 
clairvoyance and precognition. This is an argument to keep in mind when 
reading the many results found in the literature, because the populations 
investigated in other reports sometimes differ very much from the 
population investigated in the present study.  
 
2.1. Paranormal Belief and ‘Magical Ideation’ 
Paranormal belief is closely linked to the ‘Magical Ideation’, which has 
been defined as ‘belief in forms of causation that by conventional standards 
are invalid’ (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). As long as we agree on what the 
‘conventional standards’ are, it is easy to provide examples of ‘Magical 
Ideation’. Most of us would probably not hesitate to consider dancing for 
rain to be based on invalid assumptions about causality. An especially 
notorious lack of agreement on the conventional standards of the laws of 
causation is found in the area of paranormal belief. 
Brugger & Graves (1997) provided an extensive overview of findings 
from their own and independent studies showing that the link between 
‘Magical Ideation’ and paranormal belief has been suggested by 
neuropsychological experiments. Measures of ‘Magical Ideation’ are found 
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to correlate positively with global paranormal belief and with belief in 
precognition, superstition, extraordinary life forms, and also in traditional 
religious concepts (Thalbourne, 1985; 1994; Thalbourne et al., 1995; 
Thalbourne & French, 1995; Tobacyk & Wilkinson, 1990; Williams & Irwin, 
1991). The ‘Magical Ideation Scale’ by Eckblad & Chapman (1983), which is 
one of the scales administered in the present study, was previously shown to 
be significantly correlated with the Mischo questionnaire (Pizzagalli et al., 
2001; Pizzagalli et al., 2000).  
 
2.2. The ‘Magical Ideation Scale’ by Eckblad & Chapman 
The ‘Magical Ideation’ scale is a 30-item true-false scale assessing the 
presence of hallucination-like experiences and delusion-like, paranormal 
beliefs. The complete scale is shown in APPENDIX 2. This scale was 
developed and evaluated during a 10 year longitudinal study initiated by 
the Chapman group. These authors aimed at producing DSM-based scales of 
current deviant functioning to identify young adults who may be psychosis-
prone. After reassessing the original population (only 5% of subjects 
dropped out), the authors found that the originally high scorers on the 
‘Magical Ideation’ scale, especially those who reported psychotic-like 
experiences of at least moderate deviance, exceeded control subjects on the 
later outbreak of psychosis, the number of psychotic relatives, and the 
severity of overall schizotypal symptoms (Kwapil et al., 1999).  
 
2.3 ‘Magical Ideation’ and Schizotypy 
Eckblad & Chapman (1983) considered ‘Magical Ideation’ as the best-
documented indicator of positive symptoms of schizotypy. Lenzenweger 
(1994) showed that the ‘Magical Ideation Scale’ has good reliability and 
validity in assessing ‘schizotypy’ or psychosis-proneness in the normal 
population. Note that individuals identified as psychosis-prone will not 
necessarily decompensate in clinical psychosis, but show higher 
vulnerability for this. In the ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders’ (APA, 1994) ‘Magical Ideation’ is described as a key feature in 
schizotypal personality disorder and also in schizophrenia.  
There are models which define ‘psychosis’ as a series of symptoms that 
are aligned along a continuum (Eysenck, 1952; Meehl, 1962). According to 
this idea, psychotic characteristics should no longer be the prerogative of the 
classically diagnosable psychotic patient, but form, instead, part of the array 
of psychological and biological features that characterize individual 
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variations between human beings. In the model of Meehl (1962) schizotypy 
represents the personality organization of a schizotaxic person. Meehl wrote: 
‘If the interpersonal regime is favourable, and the schizotaxic person also 
has the good fortune to inherit a low anxiety readiness, physical vigor, 
general resistance to stress and the like, he will remain a well-compensated 
‘normal’ schizotype, never manifesting symptoms of mental disease…Only a 
subset of schizotypic personalities decompensate into clinical 
schizophrenia’. (p. 830). Several studies showed the validity of Meehl’s 
model; in fact, they demonstrated that positive schizophrenic 
symptomatology (e.g. delusion- and hallucination-like phenomena) are 
present in non-psychotic subjects in the absence of manifest illness (Claridge 
& Broks, 1984; Thalbourne, 1994; Verdoux et al., 1998).  
 
2.4. Paranormal Belief and Schizotypy 
The relation between paranormal beliefs and schizotypal personality 
traits has been closely examined in recent years. Rust (1992) found atypical 
schizotypy scores, measured with the Rust Inventory of Schizotypal 
Cognitions (RISC) among members of occult sects. Relations between 
schizotypal traits and paranormal-related phenomena such as out-of-body 
experiences have been demonstrated by McCreery & Claridge (1995). 
Straube et al. (1998) found a close relation between schizotypal traits 
measured with the Schizotypal Personality Scale and paranormal beliefs 
measured with the Mischo questionnaire among adolescents. In another 
study done by the same group, the authors showed that in a large sample of 
374 students anomalous experiences (self-reported paranormal abilities, 
experiences and beliefs) were closely related to schizotypal traits (Wolfradt 
et al., 1999).  
Thus, the formation and the maintenance of paranormal beliefs appear 
important for understanding schizotypal ideation. 
Studying people differing only in their declared belief in paranormal 
phenomena while being completely healthy, give us the opportunity to 
study some cognitive and emotional aspects that these people share with 
subjects with a diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder. Moreover, the 
assumption that schizotypal subjects may have the inherent vulnerability to 
develop schizophrenia (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Kwapil et al., 1999) 
makes this population attractive to research into the issue of the prodrom of 
psychosis.  
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In the Experiment I, two are the aspects of paranormal belief that were 
discussed: paranormal belief and hemisphericity, and paranormal belief and 
emotionality. Therefore, in the next two sections, an overview of the 
literature about these two aspects is given. 
  
2.5. Paranormal Belief and Hemisphericity 
In neuropsychological studies, paranormal belief has often been 
reported to be related to a relative overactivation of the right hemisphere. A 
selection of the growing body of literature is reviewed here. 
Leonhard & Brugger (1998) studied 40 right-handed men with a 
lateralized tachistoscopic lexical decision task. Subjects also completed the 
‘Magical Ideation Scale’.  The authors found that although the 20 subjects 
with Magical Ideation scores below the median displayed the expected right 
visual field/left hemisphere superiority in lexical decision accuracy, the 20 
high scorers were equally proficient in both visual fields. Compared to the 
low scorers, they made significantly more correct decisions in the left visual 
field/right hemisphere. The results showed a reduced left hemisphere 
language dominance for believers in paranormal and the authors proposed 
that this dominance failure facilitates the emergence of paranormal ideas by 
way of right hemisphere associative processing characteristics, that is, coarse 
rather than focused semantic activation.  
Pizzagalli et al. (2001) administered a lateralized semantic priming task 
to healthy subjects who were either strong believers or strong skeptics in 
paranormal phenomena. This paper reported stronger indirect (but not 
direct) semantic priming in believers than skeptics, an effect which was 
confined to the left visual field/right hemisphere stimulations. The authors 
interpreted their findings as (1) evidence for a specialization of the right 
hemisphere for the appreciation of specifically remote associations, and (2) 
as evidence for a relative overactivation of the right hemisphere for the 
believers.  
Mohr et al. (2001b) studied 40 right-handed subjects (20 women and 20 
men) in an olfactory detection experiment. Subjects were given the ‘Magical 
Ideation Scale’. The results illustrated that over both nostrils, subjects with 
high Magical Ideation scores showed elevated olfactory detection thresholds 
that subjects with low Magical Ideation scores. Moreover, in men but not in 
women, left-nostril acuity was inversely correlated to MI raw scores. The 
olfactory system, from the receptor in the nasal epithelium to cerebral 
olfactory regions, is mainly ipsilaterally connected. Therefore, the authors 
 32
suggested that the selective impairment of left-nostril performance is related 
to left functional abnormalities in believers in the paranormal. Interestingly, 
the reported olfactory detection impairments on the left side were also found 
in another study testing unmedicated patients with schizophrenia (Purdon 
& Flor-Henry, 2000). 
Taylor et al. (2002) aimed to study right hemispatial inattention in 
believers and skeptics with an implicit line bisection task. They administered 
the ‘Magical Ideation Scale’, to 40 right-handed men who had copied and 
later recalled the Rey-Osterrieth complex figure. Implicit line bisection 
performances were defined as the bisecting lines of the complex figure’s 
large rectangle and were recorded for the copy and delay conditions. The 
results showed that Magical Ideation scores were significantly correlated 
with a leftward shift in bisections in the delay but not in the copy condition, 
indicating a significant relationship between the degree of right hemispatial 
inattention (i.e., a processing advantage of the right and disadvantage of the 
left hemisphere) and belief in the paranormal. 
In a response commonality analysis of verbal fluency test, Duchêne et al. 
(1998) found that people with high scores on Magical Ideation scale 
generated more rare words than those with low scores. Since disinhibite 
semantic network activation in the right hemisphere may be responsible for 
the production of more rare than common associations, the authors 
interpreted their findings as an enhanced right hemispheric function in the 
group of the believers.  
In a previous study done in our laboratory (Gianotti et al., 2001), 
believers and skeptics in paranormal phenomena were asked to produce 
single-word associations to preselected semantically related or unrelated 
word pairs. Response commonalities and association latencies for each 
association was calculated. The results showed that believers as compared to 
skeptics produced more rare associations, i.e. associations produced by only 
few subjects of the sample. Whereas idiosyncratic and common associations 
were comparably frequent within both groups of subjects. These findings 
indicate that believers have a facilitated capacity to see a relationship 
between words, and thus produce associations that are neither common nor 
absolutely unique. The authors interpreted the findings as due to enhanced 
right hemispheric contributions.   
In another study of semantic association, Mohr et al. (2001a) investigated 
whether high Magical Ideation scorers would also perceive remote 
associations produced by independent subjects as being more closely related 
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than low Magical Ideation scorers. Two experiments were set up: In the first 
experiment, word pairs were constructed from a conventional categorical 
fluency task. The task was to judge the semantic distance between the two 
words. In the second experiment, the associations to word pairs from the 
study described above (Gianotti et al., 2001) were presented. Subjects had to 
judge the semantic distance of the association to the word pair. The results 
of both experiments showed that higher Magical Ideation scorers considered 
unrelated words as more closely associated than did lower Magical Ideation 
scorers. These findings indicate that for loosely associated word, high 
Magical Ideation scorers have a facilitated capacity to see a relationship 
between words that have been produced by independent subjects. 
Therefore, the authors suggested that an enhanced right hemispheric 
functions may not only be relevant for the production of remote associations 
(see study above by Gianotti et al., 2001) but also for the perception of 
remote association.  
In a EEG study, Pizzagalli et al. (2000) investigated subjects who were 
either strong believers or strong skeptics in paranormal phenomena during 
resting EEG. The EEG data were subjected to the FFT-Dipole-Approximation 
(see section 1.5.1. for a description of the method) and the results showed 
that the source of the beta2 frequency band was more right located for 
subjects who strong belief in paranormal phenomena. The authors 
interpreted their findings as evidence for a relative overactivation of the 
right hemisphere for the believers.  
 
2.6. Paranormal Belief and Affectivity  
Affective aspects of belief in the paranormal were controversially 
discussed in the literature. Two major lines of discussion can be identified: 
(1) On the one hand there are authors describing believers in the paranormal 
being more positive in their affect compared with skeptics and (2) on the 
other hand there are studies showing the opposite, i.e. that believers are 
more negative in their affect.   
(1) The first line of discussion links belief in the paranormal with 
positive affect and/or hedonic components. Brugger (1995) showed a 
significant negative correlation in 40 students between the belief in the 
paranormal, measured with the ‘Australian Shep-Goat Scale’ by Thalbourne 
& Delin (1993), and anhedonic personality traits, measured with the scales 
for physical and social anhedonia by Chapman et al. (1976). He interpreted 
the results as a hyperactivation of medial temporal lobe structures. Jaanus 
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(1990) described this negative correlation in a more general form, i.e. in 
regard to belief in general: ‘Disbelief is inherently allied to negation, 
unpleasure, and unreality just as belief is to affirmation, joy, and reality’. In 
1988, Taylor & Brown (1988) published an article that challenged the notion 
that accurate perceptions of self and the world are essential for mental 
health. They argued instead that people’s perceptions in these domains are 
positively biased and that these positive illusions, especially the illusion to 
effect change in the environment and the future (a particularity of the 
paranormal belief), involve an enhanced ‘joie de vivre’ and promote 
psychological well-being. This model of mental health was further 
supported by empirical studies, summarized in another paper by Taylor & 
Brown (1994). Blackmore (1992) characterized the tenacious skeptic as 
somebody who needs lots of evidence before seeing or experiencing 
anything. Because of this enhanced ‘critical’ threshold, the skeptic on the one 
hand does not believe and on the other hand misses a lot of fun. Windholz & 
Diamant (1974) found that believers in ‚extraordinary phenomena’ scored 
higher, among other things, on the Hypomania scale of the MMPI.  
(2) A different point of view links belief in the paranormal with negative 
affect and/or anhedonic components. The greatest number of experiments 
that investigated the relationship between negative affect and reported level 
of paranormal belief comes from Dudley’s group (Dudley, 1999; 2000; 
Dudley & Whisnand, 2000). In a first experiment, published in 1999, these 
authors followed the idea that belief in the paranormal may increase during 
periods of uncertainty, ambiguity or uncontrollability, resulting in negative 
emotions (Dudley, 1999). They tested the hypothesis that the level of 
superstitious belief, i.e. a typical phenomenon in paranormal belief, 
increases following exposure to uncontrollable situations. To accomplish 
this, 116 students were tested for their level of superstitious belief before and 
after attempting to solve an unsolvable problem. Participants were given a 
word puzzle to complete. The word puzzle consisted of 20 names of foreign 
countries and cities. Two list of word puzzle were constructed: a solvable 
and an unsolvable one. A random half of the participants received the 
solvable and the other half received the unsolvable puzzles. The results 
showed that the participant’s reported level of superstitious belief increased 
after exposure to the unsolvable problem, but decreased after exposure to 
the unsolvable problem. Thus, they showed that negative emotions, 
resulting when failure occurs, may induce the increase of superstitious 
beliefs. Already Keinan (1994) came to similar conclusions; he found that 
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during the Gulf War, residents living in high-stress areas, i.e. those more 
likely to be hit by a missile, reported higher levels of magical thinking than 
residents living in low-stress areas. In an even earlier study Malinowski 
(1954) described that Trobriand islanders’ superstitious ideas about success 
in fishing developed exclusively in waters with a very high uncertainty of 
success, which is in line with the idea that negative emotions enhance the 
belief in the paranormal.  
 Dudley tested in another experiment negative affect, measured with the 
negative scale of the PANAS questionnaire, and paranormal belief, 
measured with the revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS, (Tobacyk, 1988), 
depending on the questionnaire’s paper colour (Dudley, 2000). Both 
questionnaires were printed on paper that was either white, blue, or red. It 
was expected that blue would elicit negative emotions, red would elicit 
positive emotions, and white would be neutral. The participants that 
completed the two questionnaires printed on blue paper reported a 
significant higher level of negative affect and of paranormal belief compared 
with the participants that completed the questionnaires printed in either red 
or white. From the results of this experiment, Dudley concluded that 
negative affect influenced the level of paranormal belief. In a next 
experiment Dudley (2000), he focused on the question whether the opposite 
relationship also exists, i.e. does the priming of paranormal beliefs influence 
the affect? Three questionnaires were used for this study: PANAS, PBS, and 
Rotter’s locus of control scale (LOCS). A random third of the 90 participants 
completed the PANAS immediately following completion of the PBS; 
another third completed the PANAS immediately following completion of 
LOCS, and the final third of the participants completed only the PANAS. 
The results showed that the group that received the PBS prior to the 
PANAS, but not the groups that either received the LOCS or that received 
nothing prior to the PANAS, showed a higher negative affect score. These 
results indicated that exposure to the PBS may have induced negative 
emotions. 
In a further experiment, Dudley & Whisnand (2000) tested the 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between paranormal belief and a 
depressive attributional style. They administered the PBS and the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire by Peterson et al. (1982) to 52 
undergraduate students and they found a statistically weak correlation 
between paranormal belief and depressive attributional style. This last 
finding is also consistent with the general relationship between paranormal 
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belief and negative emotional states proposed by Dudley and colleagues. 
The authors discussed the proposed relationship in two ways: One possible 
explanation may have to do with a lack of critical thinking and information 
processing ability that occurs when in a negative emotional state. For 
example, studies have shown that during periods of high anxiety, working 
memory capacity is restricted (Darke, 1988; MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993). 
Dudley and colleagues concluded that this restriction may then impair 
cognitive ability, such as the critical evaluation of paranormal phenomena. 
However, this explanation does not adequately explain why negative affect 
would increase following exposure to the PBS. Another explanation of the 
link between negative affect and paranormal belief may be mood-congruent 
memory. According to mood-congruency, emotional states act as retrieval 
cues that evoke memories of events involving the same emotion (Willner & 
Neiva, 1986). Mood-congruency is a mechanism that may allow paranormal 
beliefs to be invoked in uncertain situations. Once these beliefs are recalled, 
they might then be used to rationalize failure, lowering the chances of the 
development of learned helplessness, depression, or other byproducts of 
negative emotional states. Dudley argued that in this way certain 
paranormal beliefs may serve an adaptive function.  
In a previous study done in our laboratory, Pizzagalli et al. (2000) 
studied believers (n=19) and skeptics (n=18) preselected with the Mischo 
questionnaire (Mischo et al., 1993) for differences in the resting EEG and in 
their declared affectivity, using the trait form of the Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale (PANAS, Watson et al., 1988). The authors found that believers 
scored significantly higher on the negative affect scale compared to skeptics, 
i.e. believers showed more general negative affect than skeptics.  
In a recent study, Beck & Miller (2001) tested 94 students for the effects 
of religiosity and negative affect on belief in the paranormal and 
supernatural. They found a significant positive correlation between 
experiences of negative affect over the preceding year and belief in the 
paranormal. Using a regression analysis they also found that negative affect 
during the preceding year predicted greater belief in the paranormal. 
According to their model, the authors interpreted the findings as follows: if a 
person is relatively content, happy, and free from negative affect, then he or 
she may feel little internal impetus to modify his or her current stance 
(skepticism or belief). Contrary, if negative affects increases over time, than 
the person may increase his or her belief in the paranormal. However, in our 
opinion, the study presents two major limitations: the authors should 
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examine the beliefs over time and in response not only to negative but also 
to positive life events.  
 
2.7. Concluding Remarks  
While the results of the many neuropsychological studies and the sole 
EEG study about ‘Paranormal Belief and Hemisphericity’ are in agreement, 
the results of the studies dealing with ‘Paranormal Belief and Affectivity’ are 
not. 
There appear to be several, independent reasons for these latter 
divergent results: First, the samples investigated in many studies reviewed 
above are very different, since the inventories used to define the concept of 
‘belief in the paranormal’ were dissimilar. Some measures devised by 
parapsychologists are purely sheep-goat scales, that is, they index no more 
than belief in extra-sensory perception (Thalbourne & Delin, 1993). Other 
instruments tap a greater range of parapsychological claims; for example, 
the Mischo questionnaire (Mischo et al., 1993) addresses belief in telepathy, 
precognition and clairvoyance. Beck & Miller (2001) recently mentioned this 
point and complained about the fact that researchers have frequently used 
the terms ‘paranormal’ and ‘supernatural’ interchangeably in the empirical 
literature. Roe & Morgan (2002) designed a study to assess whether the 
relationship between narcissistic personality and paranormal belief 
identified by Tobacyk & Mitchell (1987) earlier could be replicated with a 
general population and to see whether the effect could be found with a 
narrower definition of paranormal beliefs that focuses only on belief in 
psychic phenomena. 75 participants completed the Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory and two measures of paranormal belief, the Paranormal Belief 
Scale and the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale. There was no correlation 
between narcissism and Paranormal Belief Scale scores, but narcissism and 
Australian Sheep-Goat Scale scores were significantly positively correlated. 
Of the three subscales to the Australian Sheep-Goat measure, scores for 
narcissism correlated with belief in ESP and ‘telekinesis’ but not in ‘Life after 
death’. Thus, it seems that the concept of ‘belief in the paranormal’ contains 
many sub-concepts, which are not necessarily closely related with each other 
and which are not correlated in the same manner with other variables, for 
example with the positive or negative affect. 
Because of this variation in the assessment of paranormal belief, caution 
should be exercised in accepting at face value any findings on the nature of 
such belief; that is, it is advisable to ask if ‘paranormal’ is being used by the 
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researcher in a limited parapsychological sense or instead is intended to 
signify a much broader domain of attitudes. The majority of empirical data 
in fact do relate to paranormal belief in its broadest sense. Thus, one should 
use a narrower definition of the concept ‘belief in the paranormal’ to target 
the studied aspects more exactly.  
Irwin (1999) complained also about the fact that the discussion of the 
topic of paranormal belief tends to be in terms of ‘believers’ and ‘skeptics’. 
However, on the basis of a cluster analysis Irwin (1997) had identified a 
four-category typology; the respective subgroups of which may be described 
as traditional religious believers, New Agers, tentative believers, and 
skeptics.  
Another reason for the diverging results described above may be the 
heterogeneity of the measured variable. Brugger (1995) examined the 
anhedonic personality traits, measured with the scales for physical and 
social anhedonia by Chapman et al. (1976). Taylor & Brown (1988, 1994) 
mentioned a ‘joie de vivre’ variable. Blackmore (1992) characterized the 
tenacious skeptics as somebody who misses a lot of fun. Windholz & 
Diamant (1974) used the Hypomania scale of the MMPI. Beck & Miller 
(2001) focused at negative affect (NA scale) during the year preceding the 
investigation. Pizzagalli et al. (2000) studied the subjects in their declared 
affectivity, using the trait form of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(PANAS, Watson et al., 1988). The state form of the PANAS was used by 
Dudley (2000); Dudley and colleagues also measured the depressive 
attributional style (Dudley & Whisnand, 2000) and studied negative 
emotions in an indirect way, i.e. exposing subjects to unsolvable problems 
(Dudley, 1999).  
For this review on belief in the paranormal and affectivity, we decided 
to use two broad categories, i.e. positive and negative affect, and we 
attempted to review the pertinent literature according to this classification. 
However, creating such a dichotomy, useful for an overview, in a certain 
perspective one necessarily has to sacrifice some factors that contain 
important informations as seen from other views. 
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3. LANGUAGE PROCESSING IN NEUROSCIENCE 
 
In the second half of the 19th century, Broca (1861) and Wernicke (1874) 
described two different lesions of the brain that produce different types of 
aphasia, i.e. the partial loss of language abilities. Since these early findings, 
many further patients have been described with circumscribed impairments 
of selective language abilities while other abilities were relatively spared. 
These dissociations have contributed considerably to today’s knowledge 
about the dimensions along which human language might be organized. It 
seems that three important dimensions of the brain’s lexical organization are 
(1) semantics, i.e. word meaning, (2) syntax (or grammar), i.e. sentence 
structure, and (3) phonology. Semantic categories can be of the type ‘abstract 
vs. concrete words’, ‘living things and food vs. inanimate objects’, ‘animals’, 
‘countries’, ‘fruits’, ‘vegetables’, ‘positive vs. negative words’, and others. 
Grammatical categories can be of the type ‘nouns vs. verbs’, ‘content vs. 
function words’ and others. Phonological categories can be of the type 
‘rhymed vs. non-rhymed words’. We have to note that this third dimension 
plays an important role in the processing of written language and not only 
in acoustic language processing. 
Since the aim of the present study was to investigate the processing of 
emotionally loaded words, that were presented visually, we will concentrate 
on the literature dealing especially with the semantic dimension of language 
processing. Nevertheless, because of the interrelations of the issue a brief 
overview of the literature about the grammar and the phonologic 
dimensions will also be given. 
Research on human language and word processing branched into two 
directions. One of these branches focused on neuroanatomy, namely, which 
areas of the brain are involved when language is perceived or produced. In 
recent years, more and more neuropsychological studies have been devoted 
to the investigation of networks of cortical mechanisms necessary for word 
processing, and psychophysiological studies have been investigating the 
brain areas that ‘light up’ when words are being produced or 
comprehended. The other branch focuses more on temporal properties of 
human language processing. These studies include both psychological and 
electrophysiological experiments. In psychological experiments, models of 
language processing are brought into relations with behavioral data such as 
reaction times or subjective reports when the subject could not 
unambiguously identify a presented stimulus. In electrophysiological 
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experiments, the momentary electrical state of the brain as a function of time 
is recorded while the subject is involved in language tasks and conclusions 
are drawn in terms of language-related sequential steps of information 
processing.  
This second branch, the temporal characteristics of perceiving 
emotionally loaded words, is the core of the present investigation. This is 
why we will concentrate more on the literature concerned with the temporal 
properties of word processing rather than the literature concerned with the 
neuroanatomical correlates of word processing.  
 
3.1. Localizing Language in the Brain 
Traditionally, the issue of the neuroanatomy is analyzed from three 
different perspectives, (1) the localizationist’s, (2) the holistic’s and (3) the 
Hebbian’s perspective. (1) Localizationists would assume that small cortical 
areas are fully capable of performing complex cognitive operations. A 
localizationist would, for example, propose that an area of a few square 
centimeters of cortical surface is the locus of word comprehension 
(Wernicke, 1874) or the locus of word production (Broca, 1861). According to 
this view, the psychological process (word comprehension, or production) is 
restricted to one area, that is, no other areas are assumed to contribute to this 
specific process. Only during pathological conditions or during 
development may there be a shift of the process to another equally narrow 
area (Luria, 1973). (2) In contrast, a holistic approach would imply that the 
entire cortex exhibits equipotentiality with regard to all cognitive operations 
and that all cortical areas can contribute to sufficiently complex processes, 
such as those involved in language (for an overview, see Deacon, 1989). (3) 
The Hebbian model (Hebb, 1949) is in sharp contrast to both of these views. 
Cell assemblies with defined cortical topographies are assumed to form the 
neurobiological representations of cognitive elements such as words. This 
position is radically different from a localizationist approach, because it 
assumes that neurons in different cortical areas may be part of the same 
distributed functional networks. The Hebbian point of view is also different 
form the holistic’s view (that ‘everything is equally distributed’), because it 
implies that the representation of, for example, a word may involve cortical 
areas entirely different from those contributing to the representation of, say, 
an odor. Accordingly, the representation of a word would not be restricted 
to a small cortical locus, but would be distributed over well-defined areas, 
for example over Broca’s, Wernicke’s, and some other areas.  
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In our opinion, this third point of view seems to be the more appropriate 
when complex cognitive processes, like language processing, are discussed 
and analyzed. The often cited clinical case of Pineas Gage (described for 
instance in Damasio, 1999), would speak against a holistic approach. In fact, 
despite a very bad brain injury, the patient was still able to speak normally. 
Against a strict localizationist approach speaks the fact that high cognitive 
brain processes rely on many different processing activities that presumably 
run in parallel, so that it appears very improbable to assume that a 
circumscribed part of the brain is responsible for all processes.  
 
3.1.1. Human Lesion Studies  
As already briefly mentioned above, in 1861 Broca  discovered that 
lesions in the posterior region of the frontal lobe of the left hemisphere 
produce a type of aphasia which today is called Broca aphasia or motor 
aphasia. It is best characterized by major word finding difficulties and 
disturbed syntactic structure of spontaneous speech, whereas understanding 
remains relatively unimpaired. Wernicke described in 1874 a different type 
of aphasia. His patients presented an overshooting language production 
often lacking in meaningful content but with a relatively intact syntactic 
structure while their understanding of language was strongly impaired. This 
latter type of language impairment is closely associated with lesions in the 
superior temporal gyrus of the left hemisphere.  
The broadest type of semantic classes that were observed as dissociated 
in aphasic patients are of the type abstract vs. concrete. Warrington (1975) 
and Warrington & Shallice (1984) presented data of patients who had either 
selectively impaired or preserved abilities to correctly define concrete words 
compared with abstract words.  
Another type of dissociation that has repeatedly been found is the 
distinction between inanimate objects and living things or foods. There have 
been reports of patients with selectively spared comprehension of living 
things and foods (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) while other studies 
reported patients where this class was selectively imparired (e.g., Hillis & 
Caramazza, 1991; Warrington & Shallice, 1984).  
There is also evidence for more fine-grained categorical impairments of 
semantic knowledge. For instance, a striking finding was made by McKenna 
& Warrington (1978) who described a patient with a selectively spared 
preservation of the semantic category ‘countries’. 
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Several studies reported on patients who presented with selective 
impairments of either nouns or verbs. Miceli et al. (1984) compared the 
speech of 5 patients with severe Broca aphasia, 5 patients with mild aphasia 
of the anomia type and 10 normals. They found that the patients with Broca 
aphasia had more difficulty producing verbs compared to nouns. Contrary, 
the anomic patients and the normals produced verbs better than nouns.  
A similar study was carried out by Zingeser & Berndt (1990); they found 
relative impairments in single verb production in Broca patients and 
reversed patterns in anomic patients.  
 
3.1.2. Brain Imaging Studies 
Studies on language-related functions in normal subjects have been 
initiated using PET in attempts to localize the activation centers during the 
processing of aurally and visually presented words (Petersen et al., 1988).  
Petersen et al. (1990) have identified a center of visual word form (VWF), i.e., 
a cortical area in which words are specifically represented, in the left medial 
extrastriate cortex of the occipital lobe. They observed strong activation in 
this region when subjects viewed real words and pseudo-words that obey 
English spelling rules, but not when they viewed unreadable strings of 
letters and letter-like forms (false fonts). They also located the focus of 
semantic processing in the left inferior frontal cortex. 
However, the activation of the medial extrastriate cortex in word 
processing was not reproduced in a subsequent PET study by Howard et al. 
(1992). They employed a task of reading words aloud, which was compared 
with a control of viewing false fonts and speaking a predetermined word. 
They did not observe significant activation in the medial occipital cortex 
under the reading condition. Instead, activation occurred in the left temporal 
area, which presumably belongs to the visual association cortex. The authors 
proposed that this area is the center of word recognition.  
In the experiment by Price et al. (1994) who followed the paradigms of 
Petersen’s and of Howard’s experiments, activation of the medial occipital 
cortex was not observed under the conditions of reading words silently and 
aloud. They observed strong activation in the left temporal areas which has 
been suggested to mediate the phonological process, i.e., the process 
encoding visual form into phonology, and in the left inferior frontal cortex 
and the supplementary motor areas, presumed to mediate the semantic 
process for lexical decision.  
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In their experiments in subjects reading words or naming pictures 
silently and aloud, Bookheimer et al. (1995) observed activation in the 
medial extrastriate cortex under both conditions, suggesting that this area is 
not specialized for visual word processing. They also observed strong 
activation in the left inferior occipitotemporal cortex, anterior cingulated 
cortex, and left inferior frontal gyrus.  
In their fMRI study, Pugh et al. (1996) have shown that the medial 
extrastriate cortex is more strongly activated with real words than with 
consonant strings, which is in general agreement with Petersen’s 
observation.   
Vanderberghe et al. (1996) studied the functional anatomy of the 
semantic processing of words and of pictures by using PET. The results of 
the study showed a word-specific activation related to semantic tasks 
localized to the left superior temporal sulcus, left anterior middle temporal 
gyrus, and left inferior frontal sulcus. 
Bauregard and colleagues (1997) investigated in a PET study 10 normal 
individuals, examining components of processing of passively viewed 
words. Subjects viewed blocks of random-letter strings or abstract, concrete, 
or emotional words (words with positive or negative emotional valence). All 
words (and to a lesser extent the random letters) produced robust activity in 
the left posterior temporal lobe, in addition to bilateral occipital activation. 
Furthermore, emotional words produced activation in orbital and midline 
frontal structures. Further activation in the left orbital frontal gyrus, the left 
inferior temporal gyrus, the left caudate nucleus, the anterior cingulate, and 
the cerebellum could be ascribed to the anticipatory state. The authors 
described this pattern of activity as suggesting that the occipital regions are 
recruited for visual-perceptual analysis of words, and the left temporal lobe 
represents the neural substrate for the orthographic lexicon. In addition, 
emotionally relevant material produces additional processing in limbic brain 
structures of the frontal lobes.  
Across these studies, we find considerable inconsistency as to the 
existence of a visual area that may specifically be involved in word 
processing. The lack of agreement between the results of the different 
studies might in part be due to differences in methodology between the 
studies, differences in duration of stimulus presentations, differences in 
instructions to the subjects, or more in general, differences in the cognitive 
tasks. Nevertheless, even if the experimental task was very similar, often 
very different results appeared. In our opinion, a possible source of the 
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controversial results from similar experiments is the subtraction of the 
signals obtained in the task and control conditions. It is assumed that the 
cortical process occurring during the control condition is equally reproduced 
during the task condition, and the difference between task and control is the 
process that is inherently required in performing the task. The value 
remaining after subtraction of the signal measured during control from that 
during task thus is argued to be the task-related activity. However, the task-
related and other unrelated processes might not be simply additive, but 
there might instead be some interaction (Bookheimer et al., 1995; Kuriki et 
al., 1998; Price et al., 1994). This non-linear effect would modify the 
conclusions drawn from the subtraction results.   
In contrast to this, there is no need for subtraction of the control signals 
form the task signals in EEG or MEG measurements, because of the 
relatively high signal-to-noise ratio of the electromagnetic response of the 
brain. These EEG or MEG responses reflecting neural activity are 
distinctively detected, while other response-unrelated activity is diminished 
during the averaging over repeated task trials (see ERP procedure, section 
1.2.2.). 
In sum, only a certain number of the described brain areas should be 
finally accepted as related to semantic processing, the remainder probably 
reflecting the activity of other subsequent or auxiliary processes, such as 
attentional control, perceptual analyses, and so on.  
As a conclusion from these lesions studies and brain imaging studies, it 
can be said that the both approaches are unable to provide information 
about the time course of the underlying processes, i.e. how the brain shifts 
from a state representing the physical appearance of the stimulus to a state 
that represents its meaning.  
 
3.2. The Time Course of Language Processing in the Brain 
3.2.1. Psychological Experiments 
In order to investigate the time course of the brain’s language 
processing, many studies have been carried out in which the latencies of 
some kind of reaction to a language stimulus were studied. One of the most 
frequently used paradigms is the so-called lexical decision task. In this type 
of experiments, single words or non-words are presented to the subject in 
random order and the subject has to decide as fast as possible whether the 
presented stimulus was a word or a non-word. The most prominent effect 
that has been observed is an effect of word frequency; frequent words are 
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recognized faster than infrequent words. This effect may account for about 
50% of the variance (Whaley, 1978) and it depends only on the individual 
familiarity of the stimuli.  
Another frequently used paradigm is the priming experiment. In 1971, 
Meyer & Schvanefeldt (1971) found that in a lexical decision task 
experiment, a first stimulus (prime) accelerates the recognition of a 
following stimulus (target) if the two words are semantically related. This 
effect persists even if the subject is not able to consciously identify the prime 
(Marcel, 1983).  
Posner & Snyder (1975) proposed a model that might account for these 
findings: The percept of a words leads to a spreading activation within the 
lexical long-term memory structures. This activation is narrowed down until 
one semantic field, representing the meaning of the perceived word, 
eventually reaches a threshold activation level and leads to conscious 
identification. The word frequency effect might be due to lowered threshold 
activity levels of the representations of frequently used words. Effects of 
priming could then be explained by a pre-activation through neighbouring 
semantic fields.  
 
3.2.2. Psychophysiological Experiments 
ERPs have frequently been used in the study of human language and 
have provided a series of electrophysiological signs of language processing.  
The probably most classical experimental design used in language 
related semantic processing ERP studies is the so called ‘N400’ paradigm. It 
was first described by Kutas & Hillyard (1980) and has since often been 
repeated with various modifications and alterations (Kutas & Van Petten, 
1988). In this paradigm, some of the last words of sequentially presented 
sentences are incongruous with the preceding context and violate the 
semantic expectations of the subject (for example: ‘I drink tee with dogs’). 
The percept of these incongruous sentence endings typically elicits a 
negative ERP component peaking at about 400 msec after the stimulus, with 
maximal amplitude at centroparietal sites. The N400 can be evoked not only 
by semantically incongruous sentence endings, but also in other related 
conditions, as for example when self-referential statements such as ‘my 
name is manuela’ are presented and subjectively false (Fischler et al., 1984). 
Components resembling the N400 have also been found in tasks where word 
series were presented without sentence structure, but where the critical 
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words were not semantically related with the previous words (Harbin et al., 
1984).  
In a clinical approach, Brandeis & Lehmann (1994) found that the N400 
component systematically decreases in aphasic patients with increasing 
degree of language impairment.  
Interestingly, although the N400 component has classically been 
considered as a specific-language-related component, several recent studies 
have shown N400-like effects in response to pictures (Holcomb & 
McPherson, 1994). Moreover, N400 presents its peak amplitude about 400 
msec after stimulus onset, at a time that could be considered as too late for 
reading processes. Actually, Holcomb (1993) argued that the mechanism 
underlying the N400 is more probably a relatively late postlexical process 
than the process itself. 
In the recent years, another visual-semantic related potential was 
discussed, the Recognition Potential (RP; Rudell, 1991; Rudell & Hua, 1997). 
The RP reaches its positive peak at about 200-250 msec after stimulus onset 
(Rudell, 1992). However, as Rudell & Hua (1997) also pointed out, the 
possibility cannot be ruled out that the processes reflected by the RP are 
related to orthographic analysis rather than semantic analysis. To test this 
hypothesis, Martin-Loeches et al. (1999) set up an experiment with 
‘semantically correct words’ (SC), ‘nonwords with orthographic correct 
rules’ (OC) and ‘nonwords created with random letter’ (RL) as stimuli. EEG 
was recorded bipolarly with 2 electrodes placed on the inion and on Pz. The 
authors found a significant greater amplitude for RP component, ranging 
from 250 to 310 msec, after SC compared to OC or RL stimuli, confirming the 
hypothesis that RP is sensitive to the semantic level of reading analysis.  
In a more recent study, Martin-Loeches et al. (2001) used a similar 
paradigm as described above with an additional differentiation in the 
stimulus classes: concrete vs. abstract words. EEG was recorded with 58 
channels and recomputed against the average reference. The authors 
focused their attention on the RP component, ranging from 240 to 296 msec, 
and they found that RP showed smaller amplitude during abstract material 
processing than during the reading of concrete material. Moreover, abstract 
material also evoked a larger RP component than pseudowords or 
unpronounceable letter strings. In the same study, source analysis (BESA, 
Brain Electric Source Analysis Scherg, 1990) was applied: 2 sources were 
localized during the RP component on the left (one source) and right (one 
source) lingual gyri.   
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From the same laboratory comes the study of Hinojosa et al. (2000). They 
compared words, pictures, Chinese characters and control stimuli in a 58-
channel ERP study. Only RP component was analyzed. The RP was 
identified for both words and pictures, being higher in the case of words. 
Chinese characters also produced a reduced RP. The results showed that the 
RP is an electrical brain response that is sensitive to common aspects of both 
words and pictures. These common aspects may be those related to the 
presence of semantic contents. This is true despite the existence of a RP to 
Chinese characters, a meaningless stimulus for the subjects. Meaningless 
stimuli have been shown to evoke a RP (see above). However, the amplitude 
of the RP to these meaningless stimuli was always significantly reduced as 
compared to semantic content stimuli, as has also been the case with the 
Chinese characters. Dipole analysis showed similar RP neural generators 
location for pictures and words, namely in the lingual gyrus. 
In a later study, Hinojosa et al. (2001b) investigated the RP components 
evoked by words of two different semantic categories: animals and tools. As 
stimulus material, four different categories were used: semantically correct 
animal names, semantically correct tool names, orthographically correct 
nonwords, and random letters. 59-channel EEG was recorded and 
recomputed against average reference. The results could not greater RP 
component for semantically correct nouns (animal and tools) compared with 
nonwords and compared with random letters, but no distinctions were 
found when comparing the activity evoked by animals and that evoked by 
tools. The authors discussed the absence of topographical differences when 
comparing animals and tools, as evidence against a semantic system 
organize exclusively by category, in which animals and tools categories 
would be allotted to separate cerebral areas, as proposed by the domain-
specific knowledge hypothesis (DSKH). DSKH assumes a modular 
perspective in which semantic knowledge is compartmentalized according 
to category. 
West et al. (2001) investigated concrete vs. abstract words in a 13-
channels ERP study. Waveshapes analysis was used. The results showed 
two endogenous ERP components that were modulated by tasks requiring 
higher-level cognitive processing of concrete and abstract words: the N400 
(at about 400 to 500 msec after stimulus onset) and the N700 (at about 650-
750 msec after stimulus onset) components.   
Cohen et al. (2000) recorded 128-channel ERP (referenced to vertex and 
recomputed off-line against average reference) from 5 normal subjects. 80 
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real words and 80 non-words consisting of a random string of consonants 
were presented either to the right or to the left visual field. The ERP evoked 
by words compared to non-words showed topographical differences from 
240 to 360 msec: the word stimuli elicited a prolonged left temporal 
negativity accompanied by a diffuse anterior positivity. The word/non-word 
difference at this latency showed the same topography whether the stimuli 
were presented in the LVF or the RVF. The authors concluded that the same 
topography suggested convergent processing within the left temporal lobe.  
In 2001, Khateb et al. (2001) investigated the time course of the 
hemispheric involvement in the processing of semantic category 
information. 41-channel ERPs were recorded from 15 subjects during a 
categorisation task of sequentially presented word pairs. Subjects had to 
judge mentally after the appearance of the second word whether the words 
of a pair were semantically related (SR) or not (SU). A temporal 
segmentation of ERP map series into sequences of quasi-stable map 
configurations (microstates) revealed a total of seven microstates during the 
first 600 msec of the prentation of the second word. While the first 5 
segments (appearing from 70 to 400 msec) showed different map 
configurations as a function of visual field, the last two segments which 
appeared between 400 and 600 msec differentiated SR from SU.     
Posner & Pavese (1998) aimed to differentiate between lexical semantic 
(i.e., the processing of the meaning of the single word) and sentential 
semantic stimuli (i.e., the processing of relating a current word to other 
words within the same sentence). 12 subjects were analyzed with 128-
channel ERPs (referenced to Cz and recomputed off-line to average 
reference) during two tasks: (1) a single lexical task, where subjects were 
asked to decide whether the word presented represented a natural or a 
manufactured object and (2) a single sentence task, where participants were 
instructed to decide whether the word presented fit the previously 
presented sentence or not. The two tasks conditions were compared and the 
results showed differences starting at 160 msec in the left frontal channels, 
with the lexical task condition showing a larger amplitude. The authors 
interpreted this larger amplitude as reflecting greater activation of the 
frontal area in the lexical task.  
Brandeis & Lehmann (1986) recorded 16-channel ERPs to words and 
meaningless nonwords consisting of letter-like elements. All stimuli were 
shown in a subliminal viewing condition, i.e. masked to prevent recognition. 
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The authors found differences in the topography of the evoked brain electric 
fields between 296 and 416 msec after stimulus presentation. 
Koenig et al. (1998) collected ERPs in 27 channels from 25 subjects who 
were presented with single, imagery-type and abstract-type words. The 
stimuli were presented centrally for 450 msec. 1020 msec during and after 
stimulus presentation were analyzed. The applied microstate analysis 
identified 3 segments, during which imagery-type and abstract-type words 
elicited significant different scalp map topographies: between 286 and 354 
msec; between 550 and 606 msec and between 606 and 666 msec.   
In an intracranial EEG study, Nobre et al. (1994) studied visual 
processing of words and word-like stimuli (letter-strings) by recording field 
potentials directly from the human inferior temporal lobe. The results 
showed that two discrete portions of the fusiform gyrus responded 
preferentially to letter-strings. A region of the posterior fusiform gyrus 
responded equally to words and non-words, and was unaffected by the 
semantic context in which words were presented. In contrast, a region of the 
anterior fusiform gyrus was sensitive to these stimulus dimensions.  
Halgren et al. (1994) used intracranial recording in order to localize ERP 
generators of information-processing stages after word (and face; not 
discussed here) presentation. 33 patients with depth electrodes implanted in 
order to direct surgical treatment of drug-resistant epilepsy were analyzed. 
Depth recordings were obtained from sites in the occipital, temporal and 
parietal cortices and limbic system (amygdala, hippocampal formation and 
posterior cingulate gyrus). The patients did a declarative memory 
recognition task in which words were presented for 300 ms every 3 s. The 
authors discussed the successive ERP components that were found in the 
study as putative information-processing functions based on their cognitive 
correlates, as well as the functions and connections of their generating 
structures. The putative function of the N75-P105 component (in the results 
not visible in response to words, presumably because words were presented 
foveally) is a simple feature detection in primary visual cortex (V1 and V2, 
corresponding to Brodamnn Areas 17, 18). Visual-form encoding (in 
fusiform gyrus) or visual-phonemic encoding (in angular gyrus) may occur 
between 150 and 280 ms. During the N310, words may be multiply encoded 
for form and identity (inferotemporal), emotional (amygdala), recent 
declarative mnestic (hippocampal formation), and semantic (supramarginal 
and superior temporal sulcal supramodal cortices) characteristics. These 
multiple characteristics may be contextually integrated across 
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inferotemporal, supramodal association, and limbic cortices during the 
N430, with cognitive closure following in the P630.  
As already mentioned in the section 3., a brief overview of the literature 
about the two other lexical dimensions of human language processing, i.e. 
lexical and phonological, will be given. Moreover, a couple of studies that 
compared the three dimensions will also be discussed in the following.  
In a study set up by Federmeier et al. (2000), 26-channel ERP (referenced 
to left mastoid, and re-referenced off-line to the algebraic mean of left and 
right mastoids) were recorded from 22 subjects. Stimulus material consisted 
of 60 each of four types of target words: (i) word class-ambiguous items that 
can be used as either nouns or verbs, (ii) unambiguous nouns, (iii) 
unambiguous verbs, (iiii) pronounceable pseudowords. Target words 
appeared in two types of minimally contrastive sentence contex: (a) Noun-
predicting contexts (e.g., ‘john wanted the…’) and (b) verb-predicting 
contexts (e.g., ‘john wanted to…’). The results showed that, (1) ambiguous 
items differed from unambiguous ones over frontal regions starting at 150 
msec; (2) unambiguous verbs elicited a left-lateralized, anterior positivity by 
ca. 200 msec, though only when these items are used appropriately as verbs; 
and (3) pseudowords elicited increased central negativity from 250 to 450 
msec (N400) relative to real words. These results support the notion that 
different neural networks implement the representation of nouns and of 
verbs. However, the results also make it clear that word class-ambiguous 
items constitute yet another class of lexical items with a distinct neural 
representation.  
Koenig & Lehmann (1996) recorded 20-channel ERPs from 17 healthy 
subjects during the randomly presentation of nouns and verbs. Using a 
microstate segmentation analysis of the brain electric scalp maps, they found 
significant differences elicited by nouns vs. verbs in the second identified 
microstate, between 117 and 172 msec: noun-related scalp maps differed 
significantly from verb-related maps along the left-right axis.  
Khateb et al. (1999) recorded 41-channels ERP (referenced to Cz and 
recomputed off-line against the average reference) from 14 subjects during a 
semantic and a phonological reading task. In the semantic task condition, 
semantically related word pairs vs. unrelated word pairs were presented. In 
the phonological task condition, rhymed words pairs vs. not rhymed words 
pairs were presented. It is important to note that identical words were used 
in both tasks. The results showed that semantic and phonological word 
processing start to differently activate the neuronal language network in the 
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brain 280 msec after stimulus onset and that the differences lasted for a brief 
period of 100 msec.  
Does grammatical information become available before the words’ 
meaning (semantic), or vice-versa? Pulvermüller et al. (2001) addressed this 
question by investigating magnetic brain responses to words belonging to 
different grammatical and semantic categories. In a single-case study, using 
a 148-channel whole-head magnetometer, the ERP recording showed that 
100 msec after stimulus onset, significantly stronger neuromagnetic 
responses were elicited by words with strong multimodal semantic 
associations than by other word material. Subsequent to this early difference 
related to word meaning, additional differences in MEG responses emerged 
for words from different grammatical categories (at about 125 msec). 
Together, these results suggest that word meaning can be reflected by early 
neuromagnetic brain responses and before the grammatical information 
about the word is encoded.  
Takashima et al. (2001) recorded 6-channel ERP (from F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, 
and P4, referenced to the linked earlobes) from 14 healthy subjects and 13 
patients with schizophrenia, while they silently read content (nouns, verbs) 
vs. function words (particles) separately. Only results from the healthy 
control group are discussed here. The authors confined the ERPs analysis to 
2 components: the P200 (occurring at about 150-300 msec) and the N400. The 
results from the P200 component showed a larger response elicited by the 
content word class compared to the function word class. The authors 
interpreted this finding suggesting that greater resources might be used to 
identify the content words which were less frequent, more unusual and 
more complex compared to the function words which were often repeated 
during the experiment. No differences were found in the N400 component.  
A similar experiment was set out up by Hinojosa et al. (2001a): the 
authors recorded 59-channel ERPs (referenced to the right mastoid, and 
recomputed off-line against the average reference) from 20 subjects while 
they silently read (a) animal names, (b) content words (only nouns), (c) 
function words, (d) pseudowords, and (e) random letters. Subjects were 
instructed to press a button as fast as possible every time they detected an 
animal name. The analysis was restricted to the RP potential, between 232 
and 288 msec. The results showed that there were no significant differences 
when comparing the RP evoked by content and function words over the left 
hemisphere. However, over the right hemisphere this situation changed: the 
RP evoked by content words was significantly higher than the RP evoked by 
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function words. Thus, so concluded the authors, whereas the semantic 
processing of content words recruits brain areas of both hemispheres, the 
semantic processing of function words is left-lateralized.  
 
3.2.3. ERP Studies and Brain Electric Correlates of Visually Presented 
Emotion Words  
A specific category of the semantic dimension of the brain’s lexical 
organization is the emotional content of words. The aim of the present study 
is to compare the brain electric activity evoked by emotionally positive and 
negative words. Therefore, a separate section in this overview about the 
literature on ‘word processing’ is devoted to previous studies that focused 
on the specific aspect of emotion.  
Begleiter & Platz (1969) described cortical evoked potentials to affective 
word stimuli. The authors recorded ERPs from O2 (referenced to ear lobes). 
In addition to late effects occurring after about 365 msec, the results 
demonstrated the influence of affective meaning at component latencies 
between 95 and 170 msec.  
Begleiter et al. (1979) recorded ERPs (from F3/4, C3/4, P3/4 referenced to 
linked ears) while subjects viewed for 20 msec the same set of words during 
two conditions, letter identification (attending to the structural content) and 
affective rating (attending to the connotative content of the words). 
Presenting only the results from the electrodes P3 and P4, significant 
amplitude differences to emotionally positive, negative and neutral words in 
the N1-P2 ERP component (140-200 msec) were reported during rating of the 
affective connotation; the positive words elicited the largest, the neutral the 
smallest amplitudes. No hemispheric differences were found in the 
processing of emotional or neutral words, although the N1-P2 component 
amplitudes were generally greater over P3 than P4. 
 Chapman (1979) and Chapman et al. (1980) selected words along 
Osgood’s semantic dimensions of evaluation (good-bad), potency (strong-
weak) and activity (active-passive). Using semantic differential measures of 
meaning, Osgood’s work (e.g., Osgood, 1952) indicated that the connotative 
meaning of a word can be represented in a three-dimensional semantic 
space. ERPs were recorded (from one lead between Cz and Pz, referenced to 
linked earlobe) during word presentation (17 msec). Using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), the authors found ERP differences along each 
dimension, with the largest differences in the evaluation dimension: Positive 
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words evoked larger amplitudes than negative words in the range between 
200 and 420 msec.  
Kostandov & Arzumanov (1986) recorded 5-channel ERPs (from Cz, 
right and left ‘occipital’ leads, right and left ‘associative’ leads, i.e., middle of 
the distance between Pz and the mastoid; referenced to ipsilateral left and 
right mastoids) while a word pair was subliminally presented (15 msec) to 
the subjects, one word in each hemifield. The subjects (n=unknown) were all 
in a state of heavy emotional stress, since they had all committed offenses 
out of jealousy. There were three presentation conditions: A neutral word in 
the LVF and one in the RVF, a neutral word in the LVF and an emotional 
word (i.e., related to the subject’s conflict situation) in the RVF, and vice 
versa. Restricting their analysis to the P300 component, the authors found 
that the words elicited larger P300 amplitudes over the left hemisphere and 
specifically that emotional  words evoked larger P300 amplitudes than the 
neutral ones over both hemispheres (at the vertex, the occipital and the 
associative leads). Therefore, the presentation of subliminal emotional words 
did not affect hemispheric asymmetry.  
Vanderploeg et al. (1987) recorded the ERPs (from Fz, Pz, F7/8, and T5/6, 
referenced to linked earlobes) during the presentation and emotional rating 
of emotional words and face drawings as stimuli (neutral, positive and 
negative connotation). The authors failed to find influences of the emotional 
connotation of the words on ERP components, but effect of the face 
drawings. 
The goal of the investigation of Naumann et al. (1992) was to assess 
whether cognitive and affective information processing functions of the 
same verbal material can be separated by means of the late positive complex 
of the ERP. In two studies, they recorded ERP (from Pz, Cz, and Pz, 
referenced to the left mastoid) while subjects viewed words for 125 msec in 
two distinct experimental conditions: Affective (i.e., judging the subjective 
emotional value of the stimulus) and cognitive (i.e., deciding the numbers of 
letters) condition. The analysis was restricted to the P300 (300-700 msec) and 
slow wave (700-1200 msec) components. They demonstrated that active, 
conscious evaluation of affective meaning of the stimuli elicited a long 
lasting shift (maximal over the frontal lead); this shift was independent of 
the emotional category (it was also present by neutral words) but was absent 
in the cognitive condition. Moreover, the P300 amplitudes were enhanced 
over the parietal lead when presenting emotional (i.e., both negative and 
positive) words compared to neutral ones, independent whether the task 
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was cognitive or affective. Therefore, the results showed a frontal slow 
potential effect caused by the emotional processing task and a parietal P300 
effect due to the subjective affective meaning of the words.  
Two previous studies done in our laboratory (Esslen, 1997; Pizzagalli, 
1998) investigated the brain electric signature of emotionally negative, 
positive and neutral words by means of 27-channel ERP. Esslen (1997) 
presented the words in random sequences, centrally for 450 msec at intervals 
of 1800 msec. Pizzagalli (1998) presented the words in random sequence, for 
100 msec in either the left visual field (=right hemisphere stimulation) or 
right visual field (=left hemisphere stimulation) at intervals of 2000 msec. 
Space-oriented microstate analysis (e.g., Lehmann, 1987; Lehmann & 
Skrandies, 1984) was employed to identify basic brain information 
processing steps. Esslen found significant differences (computed by Global 
Dissimilarity) between positive and negative words in three microstates: 
from 122 to 182 msec; from 182-230 msec; and from 230 to 294 msec. 
Pizzagalli found significant differences in a microstate lasting from 116 to 
188 msec, and described the topographical differences between the two ERPs 
(emotionally positive and negative words) by means of map centroid 
locations.  
Skrandies (1998) investigated words along the Osgood’s dimension of 
evaluation (good-bad), potency (strong-weak) and activity (active-passive) 
in German subjects. Thus, 6 semantic word classes, containing each 20 
words, were used for an ERP study recorded with 30 EEG-channels. Words 
were presented centrally for 1000 msec. The evoked components were 
identified topographically at peak times of the Global Field Power curve 
(GFP). During the first identified component, ranging from 80 to 130 msec 
(mean latency of 108 msec) the ERP maps evoked by emotionally positive vs. 
negative words (i.e., dimension of evaluation) were significantly different in 
regard to centroid locations.  
In a latter study, Skrandies & Chiu (2003) used the same paradigm of the 
previous study (‘semantic differential technique’) with Chinese adults. ERP 
were recorded with 32-channels. Evoked activity was computed for each 
semantic class. The evoked components were identified topographically at 
peak times of the Global Field Power curve (GFP). During the first identified 
component, ranging from 80 to 130 msec (mean latency of 108.2 msec for 
positive words and 105.0 msec for negative words) the results showed a 
significant effect of semantic meaning on the brain electric activity. With this 
replication study they could show that (1) the semantic dimensions are 
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similar in German and Chinese subjects, and that (2) significant differences 
in scalp topography between semantic classes are not restricted to late 
‘cognitive’ components, but already brain activity in primary visual areas is 
affected by semantic meaning of verbal stimuli (positive vs. negative words). 
 
3.3. Concluding Remarks 
After this lengthy but nevertheless not exhaustive review of the 
literature about the issue of language, in particular about the time 
processing of words as detected in brain electric fields what can be 
concluded? 
From the many studies presented and discussed above (for an overview, 
see Table 1) it appears that many EEG studies focused on pre-defined ERP 
components, which based on the literature available until today, conceive of 
semantic processing as a relatively ‘late’ event. Traditionally, the attention of 
the researchers was focused on the so-called N400 component. In recent 
years, many studies were published that focused on the RP (response 
potential) component, occurring at 250 msec after stimulus onset.  
This approach precludes the possibility to examine earlier components, 
which in our opinion seem to be probable and expectable candidate in the 
search for brain mechanisms of language processing. Since it is known that 
visual information reaches the occipital visual cortex within around 30 msec 
(e.g., Cigánek, 1961), why should the brain wait until 200-400 msec later to 
analyze the semantic content of the arrived information? If one hypothesizes 
the information processing stream as a series of serial steps, then the time 
course described above could make sense. But, since most of the theories 
dealing with this issue refer to the presence of parallel information 
processing rather than serial information processing, it appears uneconomic 
to wait so long to get access to essentials information for our survival, such 
the meaning of the stimuli. It must be faster so that people can interact with 
their environment.  
Evidence from intracranial recordings and from scalp ERP recordings 
also gives cause to expect that ‘early’ processing occurs considerably quicker 
than is commonly thought.  
Halgren et al. (1994) used a declarative memory recognition task in a 
intracranial recording study, and showed that by about 75 msec, in BA 17, 
the recorded component distinguished between familiar and novel faces. In 
a similar study, Seeck et al. (1997) showed differential response to repeated 
and non-repeated faces in human intracranial and surface evoked potentials 
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as early as 50-90 msec post-stimulus. Similar values from intracranial 
recordings have been reported for visual motion input into area V5 of 
human cerebral cortex (ffytche et al., 1995).  
Thorpe et al. (1996) have used some 4000 unique photographs, half of 
which contained an animal of some sort as target in a go/no-go task. They 
found a robust frontal negativity in the no-go trials which onset at just 150 
msec. They contended that this represented a point in time before which the 
visual processing needed to achieve the complex neural computations 
required by their stimuli had taken place. This provided a time frame within 
which the human visual system must be able to process complex natural 
images. Curran et al. (2002) recorded ERPs during categorization and 
recognition tasks. The results revealed that the N1 component (156-200 
msec) was sensitive to category membership. Hopf et al. (2002) found in a 
target discrimination task, that the N1 component (beginning within 150 
msec of stimulus onset) discriminates between target and non target.  
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4. FUNCTIONAL ASYMMETRY IN THE PROCESSING OF EMOTION 
 
The literature of brain physiology and emotion studies is dominated by 
the discussion about hemispheric or preferences and differences in emotion 
processing. On one hand there is the hypothesis that emotion processing is 
generally a function of the right hemisphere (right-hemisphere hypothesis). 
On the other hand there is the so-called valence-hypothesis which implies 
left hemisphere dominance for positive emotions and right hemisphere 
dominance for negative emotions, regardless of processing mode, i.e. 
regardless of perception or expression of emotion and regardless of input 
channel.  
 
4.1. The Right-Hemisphere Hypothesis 
According to this theory it is exclusively the right hemisphere that is 
responsible for emotion processing. A selection of studies that support the 
right-hemisphere hypothesis is reviewed, even if the support is not always 
unambiguous.  
Vanderploeg et al. (1987) visually presented words and faces of positive, 
negative, or neutral valence. They reported significant results in different 
ERP waveshapes (late positive components) only during the stimulation 
with faces. A greater slow-wave amplitude for emotional than for neutral 
faces was found over the right hemisphere. 
In a study by Laurian et al. (1991) the subjects had to respond, by 
pressing a button, to pictures of emotional faces (positive and negative) that 
were mixed with neutral faces. When the subjects had to discriminate 
between emotional and neutral faces, the largest ERP amplitudes were 
observed over centro-parietal area with a maximum at C4, i.e., over right 
hemisphere, for the emotional faces.  
Kayser et al. (1997) presented to their subjects 16 faces with 
dermatological diseases as negative emotional stimuli, and of the same 16 
faces after healing or operation as neutral stimuli. The pictures were 
presented to the left or right visual hemifield. The results showed influence 
of emotional content in N200, early P300, late P300, and slow ERP waves. 
Asymmetries in emotional processing were restricted to N200 and early 
P300 with maximal effects over the right parietal region. The authors 
interpreted their results as confirmation for a right hemispheric superiority 
in emotion-related processing. Unfortunately, this used a confounding 
stimulus selection. As the authors themselves admitted, the deformed faces 
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were rated as negative, aversive, which does not represent emotion in 
general. Therefore, right hemisphere dominance in response to the 
emotional stimuli might actually have been responses to negative stimuli in 
this study.  
Krolak-Salmon et al. (2001) used positive, negative and neutral faces as 
stimuli. They found differences in the ERPs between neutral and emotional 
faces. Topographic maps showed a specific right temporal activity related to 
all emotional expressions, lending strong support to the right-hemispheric 
hypothesis of right hemisphere dominance for emotional (face) processing.  
 
4.2. The Valence-Hypothesis  
Evidence for the valence-hypothesis first came from patient studies. 
Terzian & Ceccotto (1959) used the ‘Wada-Test’ to localize the speech areas 
in patients before neurosurgery. In this technique, barbiturates were injected 
in the arteria carotis of the patients, either in the right or in the left cervical’s 
side. The injection causes an ipsilateral ‘drop off’ of the hemisphere, so that 
the contralateral hemisphere can be better analyzed. The authors found that 
emotional reactions of the patients correlated with the side of the injection: 
narcotization of the right hemisphere caused anosognosia and maniacal 
reactions; narcotization of the left hemisphere caused a negative and 
depressive state.  
Gainotti (1972) compared the emotional effects of lesions in the right 
hemisphere or in the left hemisphere: after a lesion in the right hemisphere, 
the patient showed indifference and inadequate euphoria. After a lesion in 
the left hemisphere, depressive reactions were present in the patient.  
Bear & Fedio (1977) investigated patients with epilepsy in temporal lobe 
and found relative consistent differences in the emotional state of the 
patients, depending on the localization of the epileptical focus. If the focus 
was found in the right hemisphere, the emotional state of these patients was 
worse compared with patients with the focus of the epilepsy localized in the 
left hemisphere. 
Later neuropsychological research has (e.g., Nelson et al., 1993) or has 
not (e.g., Gass & Lawhorn, 1991) confirmed these early observations (for 
reviews, see Borod, 1992 and Gainotti, 1989). 
Main support for the valence-hypothesis comes in addition from several 
EEG studies. A selection is reviewed here.  
Henriques & Davidson (1991) compared resting EEG alpha power 
between clinically depressed and normals, and observed a pattern of 
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increased right-sided frontal cortical activation in the depressed subjects. 
This finding was supplemented by a study of Allen et al. (1993), who 
compared resting alpha activity between subjects with bipolar seasonal 
affective disorder and normal controls. The authors reported on greater 
frontal right than left cortical activation in the depressed group.  
A direct approach to investigate lateralized regional activation in 
emotionality is provided by several investigators who induced positive and 
negative emotion in normal subjects and simultaneously recorded 
multichannel EEG.  
Tucker et al. (1981) induced a euphoric or depressive mood with verbal 
suggestions and then assessed regional alpha power. The authors reported 
that subjects showed relative right-sided cortical activation only over the 
frontal region after depressed mood was induced, compared with the 
euphoric mood condition.  
This pattern of frontal asymmetry shift due to the induction of negative 
and positive emotion was also observed by Reeves et al. (1989), who 
recorded EEG while their subjects watched positive and negative scenes 
from television shows.  
Davidson et al. (1990) presented positive and negative film clips while 
EEG was collected. The authors reported that the experience of disgust 
(indicating by corresponding facial signs) was associated with relative right-
sided activation in anterior regions compared with the experience of 
happiness (also indicated by corresponding facial signs), whereas the 
experience of happiness was associated with relative left-sided anterior 
activation compared with disgust.  
In addition to these observations obtained from adult subjects, Davidson 
& Fox (1982) and Davidson & Fox (1989) reported similar frontal asymmetry 
shifts due to the induction of positive and negative emotions in 10-months-
old infants. In both studies, EEG was recorded while infants either viewed 
videotaped segments of an actress generating happy or sad facial 
expressions (Davidson & Fox, 1982), or infants were approached by their 
mother or a stranger (Davidson & Fox, 1989).  
Pizzagalli et al. (1998) showed pictures of faces of psychiatric patients 
(from the ‘Szondi Test’). These faces are supposed to elicit a wide range of 
emotions and to force approach- as well as withdrawal-related emotional 
judgment. After EEG recording, subjects self-rated each face image on a scale 
from ‘liked’ to ‘disliked’. These ratings were used to dichotomize the face 
images into the affective evaluation categories of ‘liked’ and ‘disliked’ for 
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each subject and the subjects into the affective attitudes of ‘philanthropists’ 
and ‘misanthropists’ (depending on their mean rating across images). The 
electric gravity center for ‘disliked’ faces was located more to the right and 
somewhat more posterior than for ‘liked’ faces. Similar differences were 
found between ‘misanthropists’ (more right and more posterior) and 
‘philanthropists’.  
A third line of evidence supporting the valence-hypothesis emerged 
from investigations in which asymmetries of cortical activation have been 
assessed via resting EEG in normals, and used to predict affective trait-like 
behavior occurring subsequent to the recording of EEG.  
Jacobs & Snyder (1996) recorded resting EEG from male subjects and 
reported on an association between relative right-sided frontal cortical 
activation and increased generalized negative affect, measured with the 
PANAS.  
Tomarken et al. (1990) observed a significant relation between relative 
right-sided cortical activation and increased affective reactivity to negative 
film clips which was restricted to the frontal region.  
Petruzzello & Landers (1994) reported on an association between 
increased relative right-sided cortical activation and increased trait anxiety 
in a sample of both sexes. 
Pizzagalli et al. (1999a) investigated subjects with negative attitude vs. 
subjects with positive attitude (as assessed by self-rating of emotional faces) 
during resting EEG. The EEG data were subjected to the FFT-Dipole-
Approximation (see section 1.5.1. for a description of the method) and the 
results showed that the source of the alpha and beta frequency bands were 
more right located for subjects with negative attitude.  
 
4.3. Concluding Remarks 
All in all taking together the results of the studies described above, there is a 
great deal of evidence from EEG studies supporting the valence-hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, these findings are contrasted by research reports of 
investigators who used similar approaches to induce emotion, but did not 
observe significant asymmetry shifts between positive and negative 
emotional states. Cole & Ray (1985) recorded EEG while subjects 
remembered or imagined pleasant of unpleasant events, or viewed positive 
or negative slides. No regional shifts of alpha asymmetry were recorded 
between the affective conditions. To similar results came Schellberg et al. 
(1993), who recorded EEG while subjects watched positive and negative film 
 61
clips. In addition, there is evidence of an association between regional 
asymmetry and emotion that is opposed to the valence-hypothesis. Tucker & 
Dawson (1984) asked students from an actor’s school, to remember personal 
experience to create emotional states of sexual arousal or depression while 
EEG was recorded. The results showed greater right-sided activation during 
sexual arousal than for the depressive state, which assumes a reverse 
asymmetry than expected by the valence-hypothesis. 
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PART 2: EMPIRICAL PART 
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5. SUBJECTS AND PROTOCOL OF THE EXPERIMENTS 
 
5.1. Subjects 
The subjects were recruited from the undergraduate students who 
attended the introductory psychology course of the winter semester 1999 at 
the University of Zurich. All 340 students were given a six-item 
questionnaire to fill in. The questionnaire assesses belief in and experience of 
paranormal phenomena (APPENDIX 1; Mischo et al., 1993; Pizzagalli et al., 
2001; Pizzagalli et al., 2000; Schienle et al., 1996), mainly telepathy, 
precognition and general extrasensory perception. The items had to be 
scored on a 4-point scale. The possible scores ranged from 0 to 18, denoting 
strong skepticism (score=0) and strong belief in paranormal phenomena 
(score=18), respectively. Willingness to participate in a later study on 
neuropsychological and physiological aspects of belief in extrasensory 
perception was also asked. 188 of the 340 students returned the 
questionnaire, but only 146 students expressed their willingness to 
participate. Of these 146 questionnaires, 7 were not correctly filled out (not 
all the questions were answered). The students were additionally asked 
about their handedness, asked as a forced-choice alternative: right-handed 
or left-handed. Only right-handed subjects were selected. Another selection 
criterion was German or Swiss-German as native language. From the 139 
completely filled questionnaires, 34 were rejected because of left handedness 
or/and because of foreign native language.  
Drawing on the upper and lower extremes of the scale scores, 13 subject 
pairs matched for age and educational level were formed. However, three 
subjects of the upper extreme were eventually not willing to participate. 
Thus finally, 10 scoring in the upper extreme of the scale scores (believers; 
mean=17.2, S.D.=1.0; 6 women, 4 men) and 13 subjects scoring in the lower 
extreme (skeptics; mean=2.7, S.D.=1.8; 8 women, 5 men) participated in the 
study. None had any history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, or 
alcohol or drug abuse. The study had been approved by the local Ethics 
Committee. All subjects gave their written, informed consent and were paid 
40 Swiss Francs for their participation.  
 
5.2. Protocol 
After arrival at the laboratory and before placing the electrodes, subjects 
were informed about the experimental design, but not about the specific aim 
of the study. The instruction included the information that the subjects were 
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going to see words on the PC screen while their EEG was recorded, and that 
they should keep the last one in mind and repeat it if a quotation mark 
followed the word. They were not told that the study aimed at 
differentiating EEG responses to words with different emotional load. 
During electrode placement, subjects completed the German version of the 
Handedness Inventory of Chapman & Chapman (1987; APPENDIX 3). The 
inventory contains 13 questions on which hand subjects prefer for a variety 
of manual activities (i.e., hand used to write). Subjects were asked to choose 
between one of the three possibilities: right hand, left hand or both hands.  
Thirty-five electrodes were used for the recording, placed according to 
the 10/10 international system (Nuwer et al., 1998). The selected positions 
were Fp1/2, Fpz, AF3/4, F7/8, F3/4, Fz, FC5/6, FC1/2, T7/8, C3/4, Cz, CP5/6, 
CP1/2, P7/8, P3/4, Pz, PO3/4, O1/2, Oz, O9/O10. Horizontal and vertical eye 
movements were recorded with two electrodes at the outer left and right 
canthus and an electrode at the left infraorbital site. The placement of the 
electrodes is shown in Fig. 7. 
After cleaning the scalp locations first with a Nihon Kohden skin 
preparation gel (SkinPure) and then with alcohol, Grass gold plated cup 
electrodes were attached with Grass EC2 Electrode Cream. Impedances were 
kept below 5 kΩ. Cz was used as recording reference. Filter settings were 
between 0.5 and 70 Hz. The signals were continuously with 250 samples per 
second/channel. Onset and offset of the stimuli generated TTL-pulses that 
were recorded simultaneously on the 64-channel EEG-acquisition system 
(hardware: M & I Ltd., Prague, Czech Republic; acquisition software: 
Easys221, Neuroscience Technology Research Ltd., Prague, Czech Republic).  
After electrode attachment, subjects entered the sound, light, and 
electrically shielded EEG recording chamber and were seated in a 
comfortable chair. The experimenter in the adjacent recording room was in 
contact with the subject via an intercom, always open on the subject’s side. 
Subjects were told that the experiment consisted of EEG recordings, first 
during resting with open or closed eyes as requested by the experimenter 
(REST EEG), then during the viewing of words on the computer display 
with the task to repeat the last word shown if it was followed by a question 
mark. The latter recording was analyzed as event-related potentials (ERPs).     
The resting EEG recording consisted of (1) 20 sec eyes open, (2) 40 sec 
eyes closed, (3) 20 sec eyes open, and (4) 40 sec eyes closed.  
The ERP recording consisted of the presentation of 74 words with 
different emotional valence in eight runs (for detailed descriptions of the 
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stimulation material and protocol, see section 7.2.1.). During the recording of 
the ERP data, the subject placed the head into a forehead-chin rest so that the 
distance between subject’s eyes and the PC screen remained constant (100 
cm) and head movements were minimized.  
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6. EXPERIMENT I: SPONTANEOUS EEG AND BELIEF IN THE 
PARANORMAL 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Several studies demonstrated that positive schizophrenic 
symptomatology (e.g. delusion- and hallucination-like phenomena) are 
present in non-psychotic subjects (Claridge & Broks, 1984; Thalbourne, 1994; 
Verdoux et al., 1998). This observation led Meehl (1962) to the idea of 
psychosis as a continuum, i.e. that psychosis is defined as a series of 
symptoms that are aligned along a continuum from normal to pathologic. 
According to this idea, psychotic characteristics should no longer be the 
prerogative of the classically diagnosable psychotic patient. They exist, 
instead, as part of the array of psychological and biological features that 
characterize individual variations between human beings. This continuity 
model of psychosis offered more than the simple psychotic vs. non-psychotic 
dichotomy to describe human ‘psychotic’ behavior. If psychotic symptoms 
can be found not only in clinical but also in healthy populations, brain 
mechanisms underlying schizophrenia could be tested with healthy subjects 
possessing a psychotic thinking style, so called ‘schizotypal’ subjects. The 
advantage of this approach, the ‘psychometric high-risk paradigm’, is that 
brain processes underlying schizophrenia can be investigated in populations 
uncontaminated by confounding variables like hospitalization or 
medication.  
Pathological peculiarities of ideation (odd beliefs or magical thinking, 
such a superstition, clairvoyance, belief in telepathy, ‘6th sense’) and 
unusual perceptual experiences are key features in schizophrenia and 
schizotypal personality disorder (APA, 1994) and have been linked to the 
positive dimension of SPD and schizophrenia, together with ‘ideas of 
reference’, ‘unusual experiences’, and ‘suspiciousness/paranoid ideation’ 
(Raine et al., 1994). Thus, the formation and maintenance of paranormal 
beliefs, i.e. the belief in supernatural or paranormal phenomena as, for 
instance, extrasensory perception and psychokinesis, appear important for 
the understanding of schizotypal ideation and for schizophrenia. Previous 
research demonstrated a link between paranormal belief and schizotypy as 
well as other schizophrenia-relevant features (Thalbourne, 1994; Tobacyk & 
Milford, 1983; for reviews, see Irwin, 1993 for the psychological perspective, 
and Brugger, 2001 for the neurobehavioral view). 
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In sum: Normal subjects, differing only in their declared belief in 
paranormal phenomena, give us the possibility to discover important 
aspects of the neurocognitive processes underlying the formation and 
maintenance of paranormal beliefs, which is a key feature in schizophrenia 
and in schizotypy.  
The aim of the present experiment I was to elucidate the 
electrophysiological basis of the neurocognitive processes underlying belief 
in the paranormal. 
The electrophysiological correlates of belief in paranormal phenomena 
were studied during task-free resting, in order to avoid potentially 
confounding effects of task execution and focusing of attention. To our 
knowledge, up to now only one study on paranormal belief was carried out 
with resting EEG. In this study by Pizzagalli et al., 2000, believers compared 
to skeptics showed a more right-located gravity center of the beta2 EEG 
frequency band (i.e., of excitatory activity of the brain). This result support 
the hypothesis of a relative overactivation of the right hemisphere in 
believers (Duchêne et al., 1998; Gianotti et al., 2001; Leonhard & Brugger, 
1998; Mohr et al., 2001a; Mohr et al., 2001b; Pizzagalli et al., 2001; Taylor et 
al., 2002) compared to skeptics.  
According to the many neuropsychological studies and to the only 
electrophysiological study, we hypothesize that believers are related with a 
relative overactivation of the right hemisphere, and thus, we expect a shift to 
the right of the gravity centers for the fast frequency bands.  
 
6.2. Methods 
6.2.1. Questionnaire 
All subjects completed two questionnaires, the Magical Ideation Scale, 
the Positive and Negative Affect Scale. 
The Magical Ideation Scale (MI) is a 30-item true-false scale developed 
by Eckblad & Chapman (1983). The questionnaire assesses the presence of 
hallucination-like experiences and delusion-like, paranormal beliefs. The 
scale has good reliability and validity in assessing ‘schizotypy’ or psychosis-
proneness in the normal population (Lenzenweger, 1994). The complete 
scale is shown in the APPENDIX 2. 
The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988; 
APPENDIX 4) contains 20 emotion descriptors; 10 of these assess positive 
affect (PA; e.g. enthusiastic, inspired), and 10 assess negative affect (NA; e.g. 
afraid, distressed). Subjects were asked to rate the items on a 5-point Likert-
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type scale (1=very slightly or not al all, 5=extremely). In the trait form, subjects 
indicate how they feel ‘in general’ and not, like in the state form, at the 
moment of the examination. The PANAS scale was administered because it 
is known that affective dimensions of personality influence patterns of brain 
asymmetry (Pizzagalli et al., 1999a; Tomarken et al., 1992), and thus may 
represent a confounding variable in our experiment.  
 
6.2.2. EEG Recording 
The EEG was continuously recorded from 35 scalp locations as 
described in section 5.2., while the subjects were in two conditions: eyes 
open and eyes closed. Subjects were asked in succession to: close and then to 
open the eyes (20 sec), close the eyes (40 sec), open the eyes (20 sec) and close 
the eyes again (40 sec). The subjects were instructed to keep their regard 
steady on a mark on the wall of the dimly lit recording room.  
 
6.2.3. EEG Pre-Processing 
The EEG from the two 40-sec-eyes-closed conditions was reviewed off-
line for artifacts (EOG, movements, muscle) examining successive epochs 
with a moving, non-overlapping window of 2048 msec. All artifact-free 
epochs were extracted for subsequent analyses. A total of 22.1 (S.D.=8.2) 
artifact-free epochs per subject were available, about equal for the two 
groups (believers: mean=23.5, S.D.=7.3; skeptics: mean=21.0, S.D.=9.2; t=0.72; 
df=22; ns). The channels O9 and O10 were omitted because of very frequent 
contamination with muscle artifacts in the majority of the subjects. 
All epochs were digitally downsampled from the original 250 
samples/sec to 128 samples/sec. All epochs were then shortened to 2000 
msec.  
 
6.2.4. EEG Analyses and Statistics 
All available artifact-free epochs were subjected to two different 
analyses, (a) the topographic configuration of the scalp EEG, and (b) Low 
Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA, in seven EEG frequency 
bands). The results were compared between believers and skeptics. 
 
(a) Topographic Configuration of the Scalp EEG  
The data epochs were digitally bandpassed between 2-20 Hz and 
recomputed against average reference (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980) into 
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sequences of momentary maps of the brain electric field’s topographic 
configuration (landscape maps of potential distribution). Global Field Power 
was computed for each sample point. For optimal signal-to-noise ratio, only 
those momentary maps that occurred at time moments of maximal Global 
Field Power (Koenig et al., 1999; Lehmann et al., 1987; Strick & Lehmann, 
1993; Wackemann et al., 1993) were used for further analysis. (The curve of 
Global Field Power that is computed from all simultaneously recorded EEG 
curves shows approximately twice the wave frequency of the original EEG). 
There was no difference between the number of the GFP maxima/sec, i.e. 
GFP waves/sec for believers and skeptics (believers: mean=21.0, S.D.=1.40; 
skeptics: mean=21.0, S.D.=1.1; t=0.12; df=22; ns), indicating that there was no 
group difference in unspecific arousal.  
On the average, for each believer, 987 momentary maps and for each 
skeptic, 882 momentary maps were available. For each subject, all available 
maps were averaged in such a way that the average landscape structure was 
revealed while disregarding polarity. One can think of this procedure as the 
computation of an average map that shows a minimal sum of the standard 
deviations at all 33 electrodes. Minimal standard deviation at a given 
electrode for the average of say, 2 maps, can be found by comparing 
standard deviations of the average of the original maps and of the average 
where one member map was entered with inversed polarity. Thus, for many 
member maps, all possible combinations of polarity inverted of the member 
maps would have to be examined for minimal standard deviation. The 
averaging computation that was actually utilized was a Principle 
Component Analysis approach. The resulting average map across all 
momentary maps will be called model maps. For each subject, the model 
map (illustrated in Fig. 8) shows two areas of opposite potential polarity, in 
the picture arbitrarily labeled as red and blue for ease of visualization. 
Clearly, the average potential structure of the model maps in Fig. 8 showed, 
in all subjects, two areas of opposite potential polarity, one anterior and one 
posterior area, demarcated by a band of minimal values extending from left 
to right. Even though the areas of extreme values computationally represent 
opposite polarities, after the average computation, there is no more polarity 
assignment possible for these areas since the maps were averaged 
disregarding polarity.    
For each subject, the location of the centroids of the anterior and 
posterior opposing polarity-areas of the model maps were determined, 
yielding location parameters on the left-right and anterior-posterior head 
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axes. Unpaired t-tests for statistical comparison between believers and 
skeptics were performed for the locations.  
Additionally, the orientation of the scalp electric fields was assessed by 
the orientation of the line connecting the two centroid locations of the model 
maps. This orientation was measured as the angle, in counterclock-wise 
direction, between the left-right head axis and the line connecting the 
centroids of the two map areas of opposed polarity. Examination of the 
model maps (Fig. 8) showed that the angles of field orientation of all 23 
subjects were within a narrow range, from 92 to 112 degrees for believers, 
and from 86 to 99 degrees for skeptics. Thus, using the angle values for 
statistics was justified, and these angle values were tested for group 
differences, using unpaired t-tests.  
 
 (b) LORETA 
The data epochs were digitally filtered via Fourier Transformation (box 
car window) into the seven non-overlapping, independent  frequency bands 
after Herrmann and colleagues (Herrmann et al., 1978; Kubicki et al., 1979): 
delta (1.5-6 Hz), theta (6.5-8 Hz), alpha1 (8.5-10 Hz), alpha2 (10.5-12 Hz), 
beta1 (12.5-18 Hz), beta2 (18.5-21 Hz), and beta3 (21.5-30 Hz). Separately for 
the seven frequency bands, LORETA (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1994) was used 
to compute, from the scalp-recorded electric potential distributions, the 
three-dimensional intracortical distribution of electric activity (current 
density in 2394 cortical voxels) produced by the neuronal generators. For 
each frequency band, these LORETA images of intracortical current density 
distributions were computed for each subject. 
Gravity centers of the LORETA-computed intracerebral distributions of 
current density: To gain an overview of the basic characteristics of the three-
dimensional distribution of intracortical current density, for each subject and 
for each frequency band, the mean location (the center of gravity) of the 
distributed current density on the three head dimensions was computed.  
LORETA images of the intracerebral distributions of current density: For 
each frequency band, the LORETA images of current density distributions 
were averaged across subjects separately for believers and skeptics, and the 
differences between groups were examined. Statistical significance of the 
differences in the distributions between groups was assessed by voxel-by-
voxel t-tests of the LORETA images, using the log-transformed power of 
current density and subject-wise normalization. The voxel-by-voxel P-values 
were corrected for multiple testing following Nichols & Holmes (2002). 
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6.3. Results  
6.3.1. Self-Report Measurements 
The two subject groups that were preselected according to their 
differential beliefs in paranormal phenomena differed in their Magical 
Ideation scores (believers: mean=17.4, S.D.=5.1; skeptics: mean=6.5, S.D.=3.5; 
t=6.29; df=21; P<0.00001), and in the scores of the Negative Affective Scale 
(NA) as assessed with the PANAS scale (believers: mean=17.0, S.D.=3.2; 
skeptics: mean=21.9, S.D.=6.3; t=-2.23; df=21; P<0.037). No difference was 
found in the scores of the Positive Affective Scale (PA; believers: mean=34.0; 
S.D.=5.4; skeptics: mean=34.5, S.D.=4.1; ns). Moreover, believers and skeptics 
did not differ in regard to age, educational level and handedness score 
(Chapman & Chapman, 1987), as listed in Table 2. 
 
6.3.2. EEG Results 
(a) Topographic Configuration of the Scalp EEG 
The potential distribution structure of the subjects’ model maps in Fig. 8 
was compared using the location of the centroids of the maps’ anterior and 
posterior areas of opposing polarity. The two subject groups (believers vs. 
skeptics) showed significant location differences on the left-right axis (see 
Fig. 9): for believers, the anterior centroid was located significantly more to 
the left (P=0.012), and the posterior centroid significantly more to the right 
(P=0.046) compared to skeptics. No difference was found in the location of 
the gravity center. 
Reflecting the results above, the orientation of the brain electric scalp 
fields (insets in Fig. 8, and Fig. 9) of believers was significantly counter-
clockwise rotated compared to skeptics (believers: mean angle=98.1, S.D.=5.8 
degrees; skeptics: mean angle=92.3, S.D.=3.6 degrees; P=0.016).  
 
(b) LORETA 
Gravity centers of LORETA-computed intracerebral distributions of 
current density: The general geometry of the frequency band gravity centers 
was comparable to the source model locations reported in previous analyses 
of eyes-closed EEG recordings (Kondakor et al., 1997; Lehmann et al., 1993; 
Michel et al., 1992b; Pizzagalli et al., 1999a; Pizzagalli et al., 2000) with delta 
sources most anterior and alpha most posterior and most to the right.  
Comparing the gravity center locations between believers and skeptics, 
believers had more left located gravity centers for all seven EEG frequency 
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bands; more anteriorly located gravity centers for all bands except delta and 
beta3; and more inferior located gravity centers for all bands except delta 
and beta2. Taking together the results in the seven, independent frequency 
bands, the locations on the left-right dimension of the head (Fig. 10) differed 
significantly between groups (binomial test: n=7, P=0.016), but there was no 
overall difference on the other two dimensions. Examining the band-wise 
location differences on the left-right axis that are illustrated in Fig. 10  with 
individual t-tests, the lowest P-value was found for the beta2 band (P=0.128), 
with the following location data: believers’ mean location =-1.03, S.D.=5.07; 
skeptics’ mean location=1.88, S.D.=3.74 (t=-1.59; df=21).  
LORETA images of the intracerebral distributions of current density: For 
this beta2 frequency band, the LORETA images of the differences between 
groups are shown in Fig. 11.  It is clear that at all depths, believers had 
stronger activity than skeptics in the left anterior cortical regions. However, 
the voxel-by-voxel t-tests when corrected for multiple testing did not reach 
significance, similar to the results in the other six frequency bands.  
 
6.4. Discussion  
The present Experiment I investigated the contribution of belief in the 
paranormal to a putative right-hemisphericity in normals.  
From a large group of subjects, two subgroups had been selected that 
differed maximally in their declared belief or disbelief (skepticism) in 
paranormal phenomena, and the brain electric activity of these subjects was 
recorded during a resting, task-free condition.  
 
Behaviour 
The Magical Ideation Scale 
Our behavioural data showed a significant difference between believers 
and skeptics in the ‘Magical Ideation Scale’: believers scored significantly 
higher than skeptics. This result is in line with previous results, showing a 
significant correlation between the ‘Magical Ideation Scale’ and the Mischo 
questionnaire (Pizzagalli et al., 2001; Pizzagalli et al., 2000). Thus, this study 
corroborates the recently closely examined positive correlation between 
paranormal beliefs and schizotypal personality traits (McCreery & Claridge, 
1995; Rust, 1992; Straube et al., 1998; Wolfradt et al., 1999), confirming that 
the study of people differing only in their declared belief in paranormal 
phenomena while being completely healthy, give us the opportunity to 
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study some cognitive and emotional aspects that these people share with 
subjects with a diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder.    
 
The PANAS Scales 
The behavioural results concerning the other administered 
questionnaire, the PANAS, were somehow surprising and very interesting 
for the present discussion about the contribution of belief in the paranormal 
to a putative right-hemisphericity in normals. The PANAS is a measurement 
of general affective trait of the subject. In our study, PANAS showed a less 
negative, general affective attitude for believers compared to skeptics.  
This finding agrees with several other studies in the controversial 
literature, but is contrary to the other position in the literature. In fact, as to 
the emotionality of believers, two idiosyncratic points of view were 
discussed in the literature (for a detailed discussion, see section 2.6.). 
Studying emotionality and belief in the paranormal, Brugger (1995) found a 
negative significant correlation between paranormal belief and an anhedonic 
scale. This negative correlation was described in a more general form, i.e. in 
regard to belief in general, by Jaanus (1990, p. 8): ‘Disbelief is inherently 
allied to negation, unpleasure, and unreality just as belief is to affirmation, 
joy, and reality’. Taylor & Brown (1988; 1994) presented a summary of 
empirical studies showing that cognitive, positive illusions, especially the 
illusion to be able to effect changes in the environment and future, involve 
an enhanced ‘joie de vivre’. Blackmore (1992) characterized the tenacious 
skeptic as somebody who needs lots of evidence before seeing or 
experiencing anything. Because of this enhanced ‘critical’ threshold, the 
skeptic on the one hand does not believe and on the other hand misses a lot 
of fun.  
Pizzagalli et al. (2000) reported that believers in the paranormal showed 
more negative, general affect compared to skeptics. Anhedonic components 
in subjects with schizotypal/paranormal ideation were reported in other 
studies (Beck & Miller, 2001; Chapman et al., 1994; Kwapil et al., 1999). Beck 
& Miller (2001) demonstrated that increased belief in the paranormal 
predicted reports on high negative affect. In four different experiments, 
Dudley and colleagues reported a relationship between negative affect and 
level of paranormal belief (Dudley, 1999; 2000; Dudley & Whisnand, 2000). 
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The EEG  
Topographic Configuration of the Scalp EEG    
The results of the topographic configuration of the scalp EEG showed 
that believers compared to skeptics showed a shift to the left of the anterior 
centroid and a shift to the right of the posterior centroid. The significantly 
different location of the centroids results in a more counter-clockwise 
rotated electric field for the believers compared to the skeptics. Although 
there are no directly comparable studies on field orientation and emotion 
during resting in the literature, scalp field rotations in relation to processing 
of newly arriving, emotional information had been reported. Skrandies 
(1998) reported in an ERP study an early (between 80-130 msec after 
stimulus presentation) difference in location of the positive and negative 
ERP centroids after the presentation of words with a positive valence 
compared with words with a negative valence. Thus, this specific time of 
information processing, a difference in the electric scalp field distribution to 
stimuli with positive or negative emotional valence is in agreement with the 
present data observed during spontaneous brain activity. Our believers, i.e. 
the group with a less negative emotional attitude in the PANAS rating 
compared with our skeptics, showed during resting a more counter-
clockwise rotated electric field, reminiscent of Skrandies’ results after 
presentation of positive valence stimuli compared with negative ones in 
normals. 
 
LORETA 
Gravity Centers of LORETA Images 
Contrary to our working hypothesis, in the present study, believers in 
the paranormal compared with skeptics showed a more left-located 
LORETA gravity center in the fast beta2 band that implements excitatory 
activity. This suggests a relative left-hemispheric dominance of brain activity 
in our believers. A previous study by Pizzagalli et al. (2000) had shown 
opposite results: believers compared to skeptics showed a more right-
located dipole source model gravity center of the beta2 EEG frequency band. 
Taking Pizzagalli et al.’s results as hypothesis for confirmatory testing, 
reversed hemisphericity would have been indicated at a single-ended 
P-value of P=0.06 in our data. However, many neuropsychological studies 
(Duchêne & Brugger, 1998; Gianotti et al., 2001; Leonhard et al., 1998; Mohr 
et al., 2001a; Mohr et al., 2001b; Pizzagalli et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2002) also 
 77
supported the right hemisphere-hypothesis of belief function. Further, if one 
widens the scope of this discussion on brain hemisphericity and believe to 
include available reports on religious experience in neurologically healthy 
subjects, a relevant study illustrates (Fig. 1 in Azari et al., 2001) a clear right-
hemispheric predominance of PET-detected brain activity during religious 
experience in dorsolateral prefrontal (BA 9) and medial parietal cortex (BA 
7).  
The fact that there were no significant difference in the location of the 
gravity center between our believers and skeptics when analyzing the full-
band topographic configuration of the scalp EEG seems to contradict the 
difference found for the LORETA gravity center of the beta2 band. In fact, in 
LORETA not only the significant beta2 band, but all bands showed more left 
located gravity centers for believers compared to skeptics, albeit not 
significant. However, these seemingly contradictory results can be explained 
by the following arguments: (1) A location shift of intracortical brain electric 
activity does not necessarily need to appear as a corresponding location shift 
when the same electric activity is recorded on the scalp, because, as 
discussed in section 1.5., electric generators have orientations, and therefore, 
one cannot conclude that scalp recorded potentials are generated by 
perpendicularly underlying sources; that implies that there is not a direct, 
unambiguous relationship between scalp recorded activity and intracortical 
generators. (2) The extreme reduction of the multichannel data to a single 
gravity center on the scalp is less likely to reflect differences than an 
approach that fully unfolds the available data into a larger result space such 
as LORETA. (3) In the implementation of LORETA used in the present 
study, the solution space is the cortical and hippocampal grey matter, thus 
possibly enhancing mildly lateralizing solutions.  
 
LORETA Imaging of the Beta-2 Frequency Band    
The LORETA images of the activity difference between believers and 
skeptics in the beta2 band clarified that the more left located gravity center 
for the believers was due to a relative stronger activation of the left 
hemisphere, especially in frontal, temporal and parietal areas.  
Thus, our EEG results in the beta2 band contradict our hypothesized 
stronger right hemisphere activation in believers compared to skeptics. 
However, based on the well-known valence-hypothesis (discussed in section 
4.2.) that predicts hemisphericity of brain activity as function of 
emotionality, our psychological results of the PANAS scales need to be taken 
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into account. In fact, according to the valence-hypothesis, the EEG results 
(shift of the gravity center in beta2 to the left for believers) were in line with 
the psychological results (less general negative affect).  
In the sole EEG study on belief in the paranormal, Pizzagalli et al. (2000) 
found (1) a relative overactivation of right hemisphere in the believers, and 
(2) a more negative, general affective attitude of the believers. We found a 
reverse pattern of hemispheric activation as well as a reverse pattern of 
general affective attitude. The valence-hypothesis can account for the EEG 
and the psychological results of both studies.  
In conclusion, in this present study, we demonstrated that considering 
the fairly uniform opinion on affective attitude and hemisphere (valence), 
and the controversial opinion on belief and affective attitude (discussed at 
the beginning of this section), it is evident that a clear hemisphericity cannot 
be expected for belief, since a possible confoundation with affectivity might 
be involved. 
Nevertheless, an open and intriguing question remains: Why were our 
believers less negative in their general affective attitude, compared to 
reports of many other studies? 
We will come back to this question in the General Discussion, after more 
results will have become available in the present Experiment II. 
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7. EXPERIMENT II: EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS WHILE READING 
EMOTION WORDS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Reading subsumes a variety of brain processes that lead from visual 
letter identification to the comprehension of the content and context of the 
written word. Most psycholinguistic models distinguish at least three 
processes that are activated when reading common words: the grammatical, 
the phonological and the semantic encoding of the word. The emotional 
content of words belongs to the semantic realm. In the present investigation, 
in order to study the processing of emotion content we used emotionally 
loaded words as stimuli to investigate the time course of putative 
emotion(semantic)-related modulations of brain electric activity. Most of 
recent studies concerned with recordings of electromagnetic brain activity 
during language processing, especially during the encoding of semantic 
content, have centered on late components.  
Discovering emotionally salient cues in the environment plays a 
fundamental role in evolutionary adaptation. To have survival values, 
monitoring of potentially salient cues with emotional valence (positive vs. 
negative) should be rapid and appropriate (LeDoux, 1995). Human 
behavioral studies (Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; 
Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Öhman & Soares, 1994) have consistently 
demonstrated that emotional perception and judgment can take place 
outside the real of consciousness, i.e. pre-attentively, without effort and 
automatically. But when reviewing the psychological and 
electrophysiological literature on emotions, a discrepancy emerges. While 
behavioral studies have consistently demonstrated the emotions are 
extracted pre-attentively and influence subsequent perception, only few 
eletrophysiological studies have found correlates for these processes 
(Begleiter & Platz, 1969; Begleiter et al., 1979; Esslen, 1997; Pizzagalli, 1998; 
Pizzagalli et al., 2002; Pizzagalli et al., 1999b; Skrandies, 1998; Skrandies & 
Chiu, 2003). We have to note that most of these studies were done in our 
laboratory.    
A major drawback of conventional ERP studies is the fact that they have 
concentrated on measuring latencies and amplitudes of components 
recorded at one or a few recording sites. Such analyses do not yield 
satisfying information as to which different cortical areas are activated in 
different task conditions. Delayed or prolonged activation of the same 
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cortical areas or slight variations of the strength of activity in one of several 
simultaneously active areas might lead to the development of ‘new’ 
components at certain electrode sites. Hence, any interpretations regarding 
differences of components with respect to neurophysiological generators in 
the brain are invalid when comparing ERP waveshapes of a few scalp 
locations. In addition, all the differences reported on characteristics of ERP 
waveshapes are reference-dependent, i.e. waveshapes, and thereby 
including latencies and amplitudes, change when the recording reference 
has changed, making comparisons of studies that used different reference 
locations impossible. If the aim of an ERP study is to show differences in the 
configuration of the active areas in the brain between conditions, spatial 
analysis of the electric potential distributions on the scalp (ERP mapping) is 
required. Only if the configuration of the electric potential distribution 
differs between conditions, then it is valid to assume that different 
generators have been active in the brain (Lehmann, 1987).  
For this reason, multi-channel ERP recordings and reference-
independent spatial analysis procedures have been used in the present 
investigation. The first step in this analysis procedure is to consider the ERP 
recordings as a series of instantaneous maps, i.e. as a millisecond-by-
millisecond assessment of the brain electric field measured on the scalp. 
Inspection of these map series reveals that the topography of the field is not 
randomly varying over time, but that it tends to remain quasi-stable for 
certain time periods. These periods of stable map configuration are 
concatenated by very brief, rapid transition periods. This basic observation 
led to the concept of ‘functional microstates’ of brain functioning (Lehmann 
& Skrandies, 1980), where each period of stable map topography is 
conceptualized to reflect a certain functional process in the stream of 
information processing. Stimulus processing is thus reflected by a certain 
number of functional microstates, and when different processing is required, 
the type, the sequence and/or the duration of these microstates differ (e.g., 
Brandeis et al., 1995; Koenig et al., 1998).  
In the present study we used the approach of microstates analysis as 
initial step in the analysis of the brain electric activity present when subjects 
read emotionally loaded words. Having parsed the stream of momentary 
potential distribution maps into a limited number of microstates, we 
explored whether or not the words of different emotional loads activated 
different functional brain processes, and, if yes, when these differences 
occurred after stimulus onset. More specifically, our aim was to study the 
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dynamics of the neuronal network that is involved in processing the 
emotional content of visually presented words. In view of previous ERP 
studies we hypothesized that (1) if different semantic categories, in our case 
emotional postivite vs. negative words, activate different processing in the 
word analysis, than these differences would be seen by changes in the 
repertoire of the functional microstates of the brain. Moreover, based on few 
earlier publications (Begleiter & Platz, 1969; Skrandies, 1998; Skrandies & 
Chiu, 2003) we hypothesized that (2) differences in the semantic analysis of 
the presented words occur very early after stimulus onset, namely around 
100 msec.   
 
7.2. Methods 
7.2.1. Stimulus Material and Procedure 
54 emotionally loaded (27 positive and 27 negative) and 20 emotionally 
neutral words were used for the ERP stimulation. The utilized list of 74 
words was previously developed by Michaela Esslen and Thomas Koenig 
(Esslen, 1997), who kindly permitted us to use this stimulus material for our 
study. To obtain these emotionally neutral, positive and negative loaded 
word stimuli, a list of 116 words had been generated using dictionaries. 15 
subjects judged each word for its emotional content on a 1-7 digital scale 
(1=emotionally very negative; 7=emotionally very positive). Making sure 
that the words did not differ in word length (between 3 and 6 letters and 
between 1 and 3 syllables), frequency of occurrence in German texts 
(Rosengren, 1977, list F), and visual-abstract meaning, 27 words were 
assigned to the negative, 27 to the positive and 20 to the neutral stimulus 
category class. The words are listed in APPENDIX 5 with their English 
translation. 
The 74 words were used in two studies (Esslen, 1997; Pizzagalli, 1998), 
prior to the present experiment. After each of these two previous 
experiments, the subjects had to judge the emotional content of the 
presented words. These previous ratings of the emotional content of the 
words are listed in APPENDIX 6. 
As mentioned above, words can vary on many scales (e.g. word length, 
frequency of occurrence, visual-abstract meaning) and therefore, there are 
various word properties that might affect brain processes. Behavioral studies 
in which response times and accuracies of responses were measured 
precisely have demonstrated that various properties of stimuli influence 
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information processing in the brain. Several of these results were paralleled 
by results in psychophysiological experiments (Pulvermüller, 1999). 
 
Word Length 
Reading the word ‘hippopotamus’ needs more time than reading the 
word ‘cat’: already this naïve observation that long words are more difficult 
to read than short ones is paralleled by the observation than words of 
different length elicit different electric responses as measured in the EEG, 
regardless of the modality of presentation, auditory (Woodward et al., 1990) 
or visual (Kaufman, 1994). 
In order to eliminate this potentially confounding variable, Esslen and 
Koenig (Esslen, 1997) matched the words of the three stimulus classes 
according to the length of the words, measured by the parameter ‘number of 
letters’.  
Using a 1-way ANOVA, differences in word length (measured by 
number of letters) between the three words classes were calculated. The 3 
word classes did not differ in regard to word length, measured in letters 
(positive: mean=4.85, S.D.=0.77, negative: mean=4.96, S.D.=0.85, neutral: 
mean=4.95, S.D.=0.60; ns).  
Nevertheless, according to the some studies (Pulvermüller, 1999) two 
other parameters were of basic importance when one studies the length of 
words, i.e. ‘number of syllables’ and ‘length of the displayed words 
measured in cm’. We decided to take these two additional parameters into 
account and the results of the two 1-way ANOVAs showed no differences 
between the three classes using the parameter ‘length of the displayed 
words measured in cm’ (positive: mean=6.55, S.D.=1.33, negative: mean=6.31, 
S.D.=1.17, neutral: mean=6.45, S.D.=1.23; ns); but a statistical trend was found 
using the parameter ‘number of syllables’ (positive: mean=1.56, S.D.=0.51, 
negative: mean=1.41, S.D.=0.50, neutral=1.75, S.D.=0.55; F2,71=2.53, P<0.1). 
Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests showed that the largest difference was 
between negative and neutral words (P=0.06). Contrary, no difference was 
found between positive and negative words. 
The length of the displayed stimulus words as measured in cm, in 
number of letters and in number of syllables is reported in APPENDIX 7. 
 
Frequency of Occurrence 
A second important factor influencing behavioral and physiological 
responses to words is the frequency of occurrence, i.e. whether a word is 
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common or exceptional in spoken or written language. Word frequency is 
well known to have a strong influence on accuracies and response times in 
word processing (see, e.g. Bradley, 1978; Mohr, 1996) and on cortical 
potentials evoked by word presentation (Polich & Donchin, 1988; Rugg, 
1990; Rugg & Doyle, 1992). 
Analyzing spoken or written text, the frequency of words has been 
reported in several studies (for German: Rosengren, 1977; Ruoff, 1990).  
Words in the three stimulus category classes were matched in regard to 
this potentially confounding variable. The 1-way ANOVA results 
demonstrated that no differences existed between the three classes in regard 
to the frequency of occurrence in German texts (Rosengren, 1977), (positive: 
mean=98.5, S.D.=85.0; negative: mean=71.2, S.D.=86.0; neutral: mean=90.1, 
S.D.=142.4; ns; see APPENDIX 8). 
 
Visual vs. Abstract Meaning 
The third important and potentially confounding variable that Esslen 
and Koenig decided to take into account when preparing the stimulus 
material is the visual-abstract meaning. 
Koenig et al. (1998) demonstrated in an ERP-study, that imagery-type 
and abstract-type visually presented words elicited, in part, different 
microstates. Lehmann et al. (1998) recorded EEG, while randomly prompted 
reports of recall of spontaneous, conscious experiences were collected. These 
mentation reports were classified into visual imagery and abstract thoughts. 
These two types of reported experiences were associated with different 
microstates immediately preceding the prompts.  
In order to ensure that this visual vs. abstract dimension of word 
meaning did not confound our results, the 15 subjects who rated the 
stimulus words for their emotional content, also rated the words for their 
visual vs. abstract meaning (1=abstract meaning; 7=visual meaning; see 
APPENDIX 8). The 1-way ANOVA results of the abstract vs. visual ratings 
showed no difference between the three word classes (positive: mean=5.07, 
S.D.=1.47, negative: mean=4.80, S.D.=0.98, neutral: mean=4.68, S.D.=1.81; ns). 
 
7.2.2. ERP Recording: Stimulation and Recording Protocol 
The instructions were verbally given to the subjects while the electrodes 
where mounted. Before the start of the recording, the subjects read the same 
instructions again on the display screen. The subjects were asked to fixate a 
cross (fixation point) in the middle of the PC screen until the stimulus word 
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appeared, and to read the word silently and carefully. However, in order to 
ensure that subjects were carrying out the task, they were told that 
sometimes, instead of a word, a question mark would appear on the screen; 
subjects were instructed to repeat loudly the last word that was presented 
before the question mark appeared. We decided to introduce this feature to 
keep the subject’s attention on a high level. In order to avoid artifacts as 
much as possible, caused for instance by manual responses or verbal 
responses, no other task was given. All subjects underwent a training 
session consisting of a presentation of 10 words. 
Words, fixation point and question marks were displayed in black on a 
light grey background in the middle of the computer screen placed 100 cm 
from the subject’s eyes.  
A PC with ERTS software (BeriSoft Cooperation, Frankfurt, Germany) 
was used for stimulus presentation.  
Words were presented 8 times (runs) for a total of 596 (74 words X 8 
runs) word presentation for each subject. The 8 runs were carried out, 
showing always different pseudo-random sequences of the 74 words. Each 
subject viewed new pseudo-random sequences of the words, prepared in 
advance using a random number generator (i.e., using the function ‘random’ 
implemented in Borland Delphi 4.0), with the constraint that a word of the 
same word class (negative, positive or neutral) not occur more than 2 times 
in sequence.  
Words were presented for 450 msec in the middle of a PC screen at 
intervals of 2000 msec. Between two runs, there was a 1 minute interval. The 
experiment lasted ca. 27 min.  
Section 5.2. described the general procedure for ERP recording including 
the electrode positions and amplification settings. The ERTS software 
(BeriSoft Cooperation, Frankfurt, Germany), used for stimulus presentation, 
showed simultaneously a stimulus on the screen viewed by the subject, and 
sent a signal to the ERP acquisition system (hardware: M & I Ltd., Prague; 
Software: Easys221, Neuroscience Technology Research Ltd., Prague, Czech 
Republic). Thus, each stimulus presentation was marked online with a tag 
from the acquisition system. Positive, negative and neutral word classes 
were marked with three different tags. 
 
7.2.3. Post-Recording Judgment of Emotional Content  
After the EEG recording, the subjects were asked to judge the emotional 
content of all words used in the ERP experiment on a 7-point scale from 
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‘very negative word’ (position ‘1’) and to ‘very positive word’ (position ‘7’). 
The middle of the scale, i.e. at the position ‘4’, was labeled ‘neutral word’. 
All 74 words were printed on two A4-size paper pages, randomly ordered in 
regard to emotional content. For each word, subjects had to mark the 
appropriate rating with a cross. Mean and S.D. of the judged emotional 
content was computed across subjects.  
 
7.2.4. ERP Pre-Processing 
Off line, the ERP recording epochs starting at onset of the word 
presentations to 512 msec later (=128 timeframes), thus covering the entire 
word presentation from onset to offset, were carefully inspected on a screen 
display for eye movements, muscle and other artifacts.  Artifact epochs were 
omitted from further processing. The channels O9 and O10 were discarded 
completely because of very frequent contamination with muscle artifacts in 
the majority of the subjects.  
The number of the artifact-free epochs finally available for analysis was 
compared between the three word classes using a repeated measure 
ANOVA, with Word Classes (positive, negative and neutral) as within subject 
factor. The repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant factor effect 
(positive: mean=130.4, S.D.=43.1, negative: mean=129.1, S.D.=40.4, neutral: 
mean=94.0, S.D.=30.2; F2,71=126.55, P<0.0001). Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests 
showed that negative vs. neutral classes differed significantly (P<0.0001), as 
well as positive vs. neutral classes (P<0.0001). Contrary, no difference was 
found between positive and negative classes. 
We decided to discard the neutral word class in the final analysis for 
two reasons: (1) the number of artifact-free epochs used for the ERP 
averaging of the neutral class was significantly smaller compared to the 
positive and negative classes (see above). (2) Because of the statistical trend 
found between number of syllables composing the neutral words compared 
with the number of syllables composing the negative words (see section 
7.2.1.).  
The ERP data of two subjects had to be omitted from further processing 
because of serious technical errors during recording that could not be 
repaired post-hoc so that 21 subjects were entered in the analysis of this 
Experiment II. 
For each subject, the available ERP epochs were averaged separately for 
the emotionally positive and negative word classes. The averaged ERPs 
were digitally band passed between 2 and 20 Hz and recomputed against 
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average reference (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980). In order to normalize the 
data across subjects and conditions, Global Field Power for each timeframe 
was set to 1. The mean of the resulting ERP map series across subjects was 
computed for the first 113 maps (= timeframes = 448 msec) during the 
stimulus presentation, separately for the two emotion classes. These two 
grandmean ERP map series are shown in Figs. 12 and 13, respectively.  
 
7.2.5. ERP Analysis and Statistics 
7.2.5.1. Map Landscape Descriptors 
In order to obtain a general survey of the grandmean ERP map series 
before further analyses, the following parameters were extracted from each 
grandmean ERP map (n=113) and plotted as a function of time: Global Field 
Power, the location of the map gravity center, the locations of the two 
potential area centroids. As descriptive statistics, the parameters were tested 
between the two conditions (paired t-tests of positive vs. negative emotion 
words) for each timeframe. 
 
7.2.5.2. Microstate Analysis 
The two grandmean ERP map series for emotionally positive and for 
emotionally negative words shown in Figs. 12 and 13 were averaged into a 
grand-grandmean ERP map series (113 maps, Fig. 14). This grand-
grandmean ERP map series was used for microstate parsing. A detailed 
description of the rationale and the utilized procedure of the clustering 
approach for microstate identification was given in section 1.4.2. and 
illustrated in Fig. 5. In short, a microstate is defined as a series of successive 
maps with quasi-stable potential landscape; in the present case of ERP maps, 
polarity plays a major role. First, however, the member maps were clustered 
while disregarding polarity (class mean maps). Then, the optimal number of 
class mean maps to account for the data set was determined, testing the 
entire range from 1 class mean map to 12 class mean maps. The minimal 
cross validation index was found for 7 (polarity disregarding) class mean 
maps, with a cross validation index = 0.065. These 7 identified class mean 
maps ‘A’-’G’ are shown with arbitrary polarity in Fig. 15. 
Each of the 113 grand-grandmean ERP maps was assigned to the best-
fitting class mean map of the 7 class mean maps disregarding polarity. The 
grand-grandmean map series was thereby parsed into 13 ‘microstates’ as 
shown in Fig. 16. Note that now, even though only 7 class mean maps sorted 
the data, some of the 13 microstates belong to the same class mean map but 
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with reversed polarity. Only class mean map ‘D’ resulted in 2 microstates of 
the same polarity (#4 and #10), in addition to 1 microstate of reversed 
polarity (#7). The microstates represent the putative, functional steps of the 
emotion word processing (see section 1.4.).  
The start and end points of the microstates were set between the 
occurrence times of the neighbor maps that were assigned to different 
microstates.  
 
TANOVA tests for Global Map Dissimilarity 
For each of the identified 13 microstates, the contributing microstate 
maps evoked by the positive and by the negative emotion words for each 
subject were statistically tested for significance of global landscape 
difference, using  the TANOVA procedure developed by R.D. Pascual-
Marqui (Strick et al., 1998).  
TANOVA employs the Global Map Dissimilarity (Lehmann & 
Skrandies, 1980) as a global measure of ‘landscape distance’ between two 
maps, and a statistical randomization procedure to establish the exact 
probability of the observed ‘distance’ (Pitman, 1937).  
How does this procedure work? For each microstate, the ‘landscape 
distance’ between conditions (positive and negative emotion words) is 
given, in this case, by the Global Map Dissimilarity (GMD) between the 
mean map of positive emotion (P) and the mean map of negative emotion 
(N). Furthermore, the average is taken over all individual mean maps (21 
subjects), for each condition separately (P,N) . 
 
The probability distribution of the Global Map Dissimilarity under the 
hypothesis of ‘no difference between conditions’ can be estimated by 
generating samples where the conditions, and not the subjects, are randomly 
shuffled. When this process is repeated a large number of times (M), the set 
of values: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 2 2 3 3 M MGMD P , N ,GMD P ,N ,GMD P ,N ,....k....,GMD P , N  
  
gives the required probability distribution for ‘no difference between 
conditions’. If ‘k’ denotes the position of the original (non-shuffled) 
( )GMD P,N  in the ascending-ordered list of all randomized dissimilarities, 
then  
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P=1-k / (M+1)         (Formula 3) 
 
gives the exact probability for the significant difference test. If the actual 
dissimilarity ( )GMD P,N  is so large that there is no random sample with 
larger dissimilarity value, then the position of the actual dissimilarity in the 
list is at the very end (M+1), which gives P=0 corresponding to a very 
significant difference between conditions.  
The microstates where TANOVA showed significant results, i.e., the 
microstates that showed statistically relevant, global differences between the 
microstate ERP maps elicited by emotionally positive and negative words 
(‘significant microstates’), were further assessed using (a) map landscape 
descriptors, (b) parametric mapping, and (c) LORETA functional imaging. 
 
(a) Map Landscape Descriptors 
In significant microstates, the location of the positive and negative 
potential area centroids where tested for the two conditions: positive vs. 
negative words, using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with 
emotion (positive vs. negative words) and centroid polarity (positive vs. 
negative electric area centroid) as repeated measures, and the centroid 
locations on the left-right brain axis and on the anterior-posterior brain axis 
as dependent variables. In the case of a significant effect for emotion or a 
significant interaction between emotion and centroid polarity, for both 
dependent variables (the left-right and the anterior-posterior brain axes, 2-
way repeated measure ANOVA’s (emotion X centroid polarity) were 
calculated as follow-up tests). Note that a main effect of emotion means that 
the averaged location between the positive and negative polarity area 
centroids (which is in fact the electric gravity center) is located differently for 
positive and negative words. Note also that differences or no differences 
between the locations of the positive and negative area centroids are of no 
interest for the analysis, but that they provide the possibility to identify the 
interesting interactions between centroid locations and word classes. 
 
(b) Parametric Mapping 
In post-hoc testing, for each significant microstate and each electrode, 
the difference between voltages for emotion positive and emotion negative 
words were evaluated using paired t-tests.  
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(c) LORETA Functional Imaging 
Based on the rationale that a statistical significant difference between 
two scalp maps must have been caused by a difference in the three-
dimensional distribution of the generating, active neurons, Low Resolution 
Electromagnetic Tomography (LORETA, Pascual-Marqui et al., 1999; 
Pascual-Marqui et al., 1994) was applied as a post-hoc tool to the significant 
microstates between emotionally positive and negative words. For each 
subject, LORETA cortical images (3D maps, 7 mm resolution, 2394 voxels, 
see section 1.5.2.) were computed from the microstate map, i.e. the potential 
distribution map averaged within the time segments defined by the 
microstate parsing, for the two conditions. For each of the significant 
microstates, voxel-by-voxel t-tests with non-linear correction for multiple 
testing (Nichols & Holmes, 2002) were calculated in order to assess the 
different spatial activation patterns of sources elicited by the positive and 
the negative word classes. 
 
7.3. Results  
7.3.1. Judgement of Emotional Content 
The mean emotional rating of the words (mean and S.D. over subjects) is 
listed in APPENDIX 9. The emotional positive and negative words were 
judged, across subjects, as significantly different in a paired t-tests. (positive 
words: mean=6.07, S.D.=0.29; negative words: mean= 2.05, S.D.=0.34, df=19, 
P<0.0001).   
The present ratings correlated very significantly with the three previous 
ratings of the same words by independent subject groups (‘first rating’: 
r=0.980, P<0.0001; Esslen (1997): r=0.984, P<0.0001; Pizzagalli (1998): r= 0.984, 
P<0.0001).  
 
7.3.2. ERP Results 
7.3.2.1. Descriptive Statistics of the ERP map series 
The curves of the Global Field Power of the 113 ERP maps of the 
grandmean map series evoked by the positive and the negative words are 
shown in Fig. 17. The curve evoked by positive words shows a total of 6 
peaks, whereas the curve evoked by negative words shows only 5 peaks; the 
very last, small peak of the positive emotion words is missing. In sum, the 2 
curves showed a very high agreement (correlation coefficient r=0.96, df=111, 
P<0.0001). Maps at times of maximal Global Field Power imply an optimal 
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signal-to-noise ratio, and are typically associated with stable landscape 
configurations before and after the peak time. The first maximum occurred 
at 100 msec post-stimulus for both curves, the second maximum at 160 msec 
for the positive word condition and at 156 msec for the negative word 
condition. The later maxima showed smaller amplitudes and peaked at 232, 
296, 376 and 428 msec post-stimulus for the positive words and at 228, 348, 
and 372 msec post-stimulus for the negative words.  
Similarly, the trajectories of the map gravity centers (Fig. 18) and of the 
centroids of positive and negative potential areas (Figs. 19 and 20) of the 
grandmean maps showed very similar shapes on the anterior-posterior (A-
P) as well as on the left-right (L-R) brain axis. All trajectory shapes correlated 
highly significantly between positive and negative emotion words at 
P<0.0001 (df=111). The correlation coefficients were: gravity center: A-P: 0.90, 
L-R: 0.83. Positive area centroid: A-P: 0.98, L-R: 0.80. Negative area centroid: 
A-P: 0.98, L-R: 0.72. Inspecting the gravity centers in Fig. 18, one notices that 
along the anterior-posterior axis (Fig. 18, part A), the locations were over 
posterior brain areas during the entire analysis epoch. The centroids for 
positive (Fig. 19) and negative (Fig. 20) potential areas showed the usual, 
general inversion of the trajectories waveshapes. For example, at around 100 
msec, the positive centroid tended to a maximally posterior position 
whereas the negative centroid was maximally anterior, and at 180 msec, the 
opposite is observed.  
Figs. 17-20 also indicate the time frames when differences at P<0.1 were 
observed in the comparison of data for positive and negative emotion 
words. These P-values are merely descriptive; they are not corrected for 
multiple testing. Obviously, there are quite a few briefer or more extended 
epochs during which uncorrected P-values of <0.1 occurred, at differing 
times on the seven time series in Figs. 17-20. The observed frame-by-frame 
differences in these seven time series of course describe various extracted 
features of a single sequence of brain states in two conditions. The present 
analysis takes a holistic approach to a comprehensive analysis, aiming at 
identifying the putative building blocks of emotion processing in terms of 
global brain temporal microstates. Accordingly, the described frame-by-
frame differences in the seven extracted time series will not be examined 
further.  
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7.3.2.2. Microstate Analysis 
The topography, latency and duration of the 13 microstates are 
described in the following, and are summarized in Fig. 21. 
Microstate #1 (corresponding to class mean map A) starts at the begin of 
the analysis, i.e. at the onset of the stimulus presentation, and ends after 30 
msec. The map shows a central positive polarity and a lateral negative 
polarity, against the average reference.  
Microstate #2 (corresponding to class mean map B) starts at 30 msec and 
ends at 82 msec. It lasts 52 msec, and thus is the second longest of all 13 
microstates. Its scalp topography shows a central, posterior negative 
polarity, surrounded by positive polarity areas.  
Microstate #3 (corresponding to class mean map C) starts at 82 msec and 
ends at 106 msec, showing the typical P1 topography: positive polarity in the 
occipital area and negative polarity in the central and frontal regions. 
Microstate #3 corresponded to the ascending part of the Global Field Power 
peak at 100 msec, the P1 component (as seen in Fig. 16).  
Microstate #4 (corresponding to class mean map D) starts at 106 msec 
and ends 16 msec later, at 122 msec. Simliar to #3, this microstate showed 
positive polarity over occipital regions that, different from #3, extended to 
central regions. Microstate #4 corresponded to the descending part of the 
Global Field Power peak of the P1 component (as seen in Fig. 16).  
Microstate #5 (corresponding to class mean map E with inversed 
polarity) starts at 122 msec and lasts 16 msec, similar to the previous 
microstate. The topography of this microstate shows a posterior, negative 
polarity with an extension to electrode C3. 
Microstate #6 (corresponding to class mean map C with inversed 
polarity) starts at 138 msec and ends at 166 msec, showing the typical 
topography of the conventional ‘N1 ERP component’ with occipital 
negativity, i.e., a reversed compared to the P1 topography (i.e., to microstate 
#3).  
Microstate #7 (corresponding to class mean map D with inverse polarity) 
starts at 166 msec and ends at a198 msec. Also this microstate shows the 
reversed pattern similar to microstate #4. 
Microstate #8 (corresponding to the class mean map E, with inverse 
polarity) starts at 198 msec and ends at 230 msec and shows again the 
curious topography that was described after the two P1 components, but 
with reversed pattern.  
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Microstate #9 (corresponding to class mean map F) starts at 230 msec 
and ends 44 msec later, at 274 msec. The positive polarity is posterior located 
and the negative polarity anterior, similar to class mean maps C and D, but 
with a more anterior located gravity center. The topography of this 
microstate appears here for the first time during the time line of the 
analyzed epoch.  
Microstate #10 (corresponding to class mean map D) starts at 274 msec 
and ends at 318 msec. The topography and the polarity of this microstate is 
identical to that of microstate #4. However, it differs strongly in duration: 
microstate #10 is more than 3 times longer than microstate #4.    
Microstate #11 (corresponding to class mean map G) starts at 318 msec 
and ends at 342 msec. The topography of this microstate shows a negative 
polarity in posterior and central areas and a positive polarity in anterior 
areas, with a brain axis rotated to the right. 
Microstate #12 (corresponding to class mean map F with inversed 
polarity) is the longest microstate of the analyzed epoch, starting at 342 msec 
and ending at 410 msec, i.e. lasting for 68 msec. It corresponds to the third 
higher peak of the global field power curve, and its topography is the same 
as that of microstate #9, but with reversed polarity.  
Microstate #13 (corresponding to class mean map G with inversed 
polarity) starts at 410 msec and ends at 448 msec, covering the final part of 
the analyzed epoch. The topography of this microstate is the same as the 
topography of the microstate #11, but with reversed polarity.  
Fig. 16 demonstrates that the sequence of class mean maps C, D, E of the 
microstates #3, #4, #5 was repeated, but with inverted polarity and longer 
durations, as microstates #6, #7, #8. 
The mean duration of all microstates was 34.5 msec (S.D.= 14.7). 
 
Global Topographical Comparison (TANOVA) of the 13 Microstates 
The topography of the ERP microstate maps was compared between 
positive and negative emotion words using TANOVA. Significant, global 
topographical differences between positive and negative word-evoked ERPs 
were found in three microstates (Table 3); microstate #4, #6 and #7 yielded P-
values of <0.001, <0.30 and <0.026, respectively. The grandmean ERP 
potential distribution maps for positive and for negative words during the 
three significantly different microstates are illustrated in Fig. 22.  
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(a) Comparing the Three Significant Microstates Between Word Classes 
with Surface Map Descriptors 
MANOVA of the extracted map parameters (2 emotions x 2 centroid 
polarities, Table 4) showed no main effect for emotion. Computation of the 
main effect emotion implies collapsing of the values for the 2 centroid 
polarities. Since the mean location of the two area centroids is the location of 
the field center of gravity, the conclusion is that this latter, most reductive 
descriptor of the mapped fields did not differ significantly between 
emotions.  
The more sophisticated descriptors of the mapped fields are the 
locations of potential area centroids. Fig. 23 shows these measurements for 
the three significant microstates. MANOVA (2 emotions x 2 centroid 
polarities, Table 4) for microstate #4 (106-122 msec) revealed a significant 
emotion X centroid polarity interaction (P<0.001). The follow-up, axis-
separating ANOVA’s (2 emotions x 2 centroid polarities) showed, for the 
left-right axis, a significant (P<0.001) emotion X centroid polarity interaction: 
for words with positive valence, the positive centroid location was more to 
the right (P<0.002; observed in 17 of the 21 subjects) and the negative 
centroid location more to the left (P<0.002; observed in 18 of the 21 subjects) 
than for words of negative valence (Fig. 23). 
 For microstate #6 (138-166 msec), MANOVA (2 emotions x 2 centroid 
polarities, Table 4) showed a significant emotion X centroid polarity interaction 
(P<0.00001). Also in this case, the follow-up, axis-separating ANOVA’s (2 
emotions x 2 centroid polarities) showed a significant emotion X centroid 
polarity interaction along the left-right axis (P<0.037): words with positive 
valence were associated with a more left-located positive centroid (P<0.031; 
observed in 16 of the 21 subjects) than negative valence words (Fig. 23).  
For microstate #7 (166-198 msec), MANOVA (2 emotions x 2 centroid 
polarities, Table 4) resulted in P<0.13 for the interaction emotion X centroid 
polarity. Following up on this indication, the axis-separating ANOVA’s 
yielded a significant difference along the left-right axis (P<0.04): positive 
words were associated with a more left-located negative centroid (P<0.01; 
observed in 15 of 21 subjects) than negative valence words.  
 
(b) Comparing the Three Significant Microstates between Word Classes 
with Parametric Mapping  
For each of the three significant microstates, maps were computed (Fig. 
24) that show, at each electrode position, the statistical significance of the 
 94
absolute potential differences in the maps evoked by emotionally positive 
and negative words. As these tests are not corrected for multiple testing, the 
results in Fig. 24 are descriptive.  
In Fig. 24, P-values are indicated at the 10% and 5% level. In the 
following description, reported locations were significant at P<0.05; if P<0.1, 
an asterisk (*) marks the reported location. 
In microstate #4 (106-122 msec), the positive words showed stronger 
activity at right central-posterior areas (C4, T8, CP6, P4, P8, PO4), and 
negative words elicited significant stronger activity than positive words at 
left central lateral to frontal areas (Fp1, Fpz*, F7, FC5, FC1, T7, C3, Cz, CP1*).  
In microstate #6 (138-166 msec), the positive words elicited stronger 
activity at anterior locations (Fp1*, Fpz*, AF3*, F7, Fz*, FC5, FC1, FC2*, FC6, 
C3*, Cz) and the negative words elicited stronger activity at five posterior 
locations (P7, P4, P8, O1, O2).  
At the microstate #7 (166-198 msec), the positive words elicited stronger 
activity at the central anterior locations (FP1*, AF3, AF4*, F7, F3. Fz, F4, F8*, 
FC5, FC1, FC2, FC6, C3, Cz, C4*) and the negative words showed stronger 
activity at posterior locations (P7, P3, P4, P8*, PO3, PO4, O1, Oz*, O2). 
 
(c) Comparing the Three Significant Microstates between Word Classes 
with LORETA 
As discussed in the earlier sections, the scalp distribution of the brain 
electric field does not offer direct conclusions about the intracerebral 
localization of the field-generating neuronal assemblies. As discussed, the 
present study applied LORETA, a particularly suitable, advanced method 
for 3-D-source estimations. 
The LORETA functional images evoked by positive and negative words 
and computed for the three significant microstates were statistically 
compared using voxel-by-voxel t-statistics with non-linear corrections for 
multiple testing. The best 20% of the voxels showing an increase of activity 
during the presentation of emotionally positive words, as well as the best 
20% of the voxels showing an increase of electrical activity during the 
presentation of emotionally negative words, are shown in Figs. 25-27, and 
are discussed in the following. 
In microstate #4 (106-122 msec), the horizontal slices in Fig. 25 illustrate 
a trend (P=0.10) for a predominance of activity for emotionally positive than 
negative words in right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47). The emotionally 
negative words showed stronger activation than positive words in left 
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superior temporal gyrus (BA 22), left insula (BA 13), left precentral gyrus 
(BA 44, 4, 6), and left superior parietal lobe (BA 7).  
In microstate #6 (138-166 msec), emotionally positive words activated 
more than negative words (Fig. 26) the left superior temporal gyrus (BA 38, 
9, 10), and left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47). There was a predominance for 
activity generated by negative words in left middle temporal gyrus (BA 22), 
left superior temporal gyrus (BA 39), left precuneus (BA1 19), and in right 
frontal lobe (BA 6).  
In microstate #7 (166-198 msec), a predominance of activity generated by 
emotionally positive words (Fig. 27) was found in right superior frontal 
gyrus (BA 11), and in the right middle frontal gyrus (BA 9, 8), in left middle 
frontal gyrus (BA 46), in left superior temporal gyrus (BA 29), and in left 
insula (BA 13). The difference in the right middle frontal gyrus reached a 
statistical significant difference (P=0.03). A predominance for activity 
produced by negative words, however, was found in the right uncus (BA 36, 
38), in right parahippocampal gyrus (BA 35), in right precuneus (BA 19, 7), 
in left precentral gyrus (BA 44), and in the cingulate gyrus (BA 23). 
 
7.4. Discussion 
This study explored differences in electric brain activity using an event-
related design when reading emotional words, i.e., words with different 
semantic content. In contrast to many earlier event-related potential studies, 
we utilized analysis techniques that aim to assess differences in the spatial 
configuration of the ERP scalp fields rather than to describe differences in 
the ERP potential waveshapes at individual electrode positions. In addition, 
the final analysis applied a comprehensive approach, microstate analysis, 
that reduces the stream of event-related brain activity into temporal epochs 
which reflect different modes or steps of brain activity and accordingly, 
different modes or steps of brain information processing. The underlying 
argument for this approach is the fact that different brain electric field 
configurations on the scalp must have been caused by neuronal activity of 
different neuronal assemblies in the brain. In our design, different scalp 
fields must have been produced by the different emotional load of the 
presented words.  
In a further step of the analyses, the measured electric field maps were 
used for a computational estimation of the localization of the putative 
generators in specific brain areas. After a long history of single or multiple, 
intracerebral dipole source modeling that can only produce localizations of 
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mean tendencies, algorithms for source computations in full three-
dimensional space have become available recently. LORETA, the method 
employed in the present our study is an original and most widely used 
strategy of this class (see also section 1.5.).  
Thus, the interpretation of the results is based on the statistically 
significant differences, between the two emotion conditions, in the scalp-
measured brain electric ERP fields, analyzed as steps of information 
processing, and referring them back to their intracerebral generators.  
 
Judgement of Emotional Content 
Our group of subjects judged the emotion content of the used 
stimulation words extremely similar to three other subject groups. The 
important conclusion is that commonly recognized, emotional content was 
measured in our study.   
 
ERP results 
Descriptive Statistics of the Mapped ERP Fields 
As stated initially, the relevant analyses in this experiment was based on 
the microstate segmentation approach. However, the assessment of the ERP 
field configurations with more conventional strategies will be shortly 
discussed here in order to demonstrate the good agreement of the present 
data set with reported, comparable data sets in the literature, and to point to 
specific observations related to the theories of emotion processing by the 
brain.  
The shapes of the present Global Field Power curves with their first 
maximum at 100/100 msec (for positive as well as for negative words, the 
second at 160/156 msec and the third at 232/228 msec were very similar to 
those of other visual evoked potential studies: for example, Skrandies (1998), 
in a similar experiment, studied visually evoked potential correlates of 
semantic meaning. Words were presented for 1000 msec each. The authors 
identified ERP components by means of the maxima of the Global Field 
Power curve. The first maximum peaked at 108 msec post-stimulus, the 
second maximum occurred after 160 msec and the third after 223 msec after 
stimulus onset. In a replication of this study with Chinese subjects, 
Skrandies & Chiu (2003) found the first maximum of the Global Field Power 
curve at 107 msec after stimulus onset, the second one at 170 msec. In this 
study, the authors reported findings only about the first two components. 
Vitacco et al. (2002) in a combined EEG/fMRI study presented words for 400 
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msec. They defined microstates by means of Global Field Power maxima 
and of Global Map Dissimilarity minima. No latencies for the maxima of 
Global Field Power were given, but our first Global Field Power maximum 
fell into the middle of their first microstate, and the our second maximum 
into the middle of their second microstate. In sum, our Global Field Power 
results were in good agreement with previous findings in word-evoked 
visual potential studies. 
The electric gravity centers that are the most conservative, basic 
descriptors of the mapped ERP fields were located over posterior head areas 
during the whole analysis epoch. This is important in view of the utilized 
stimulus paradigm: since the words were presented visually, one indeed 
expects that the strongest cortical activity should occur in occipital areas; the 
observed posterior localization of the gravity centers supports this.  
Incidentally, in view of the valence hypotheses of emotional processing 
we note that the gravity centers to positive compared to negative words 
showed a single epoch of significant left lateralization from 220 to 232 msec 
post-stimulus (Fig. 18B). We also note that during this epoch, both gravity 
centers were located over the right hemisphere, in agreement with the right-
hemispheric hypothesis of emotional processing. Hence, this brief period 
agreed with both of the classical hypotheses. 
 
Microstate analysis 
This Experiment II studied the brain activity during the time periods 
when processing of emotional positive and negative words involved 
different neuronal networks in the brain. In our results, such differences first 
occurred as early as 106 msec after stimulus onset.  
At first sight, considering the literature, early semantic effects in the 
order of 100 msec may come as a surprise since most electrophysiological 
experiments on language processing have reported much longer latencies 
(see sections 3.2.3. and 3.2.4.). On the other hand, it is clear that language 
processing must be a very rapid process. Rubin & Turano (1992) for 
eaxample showed that subjects are able to read and comprehend more than 
300 words/min, corresponding to about 200 msec per word. This rate could 
be increased to more than 1000 words/min (corresponding to 17 words/sec) 
when words were presented in serial, visual presentation modus, i.e. when 
the text was presented sequentially, one word at at time at the same location 
in the visual field.  
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In general, conduction times and information processing in the brain are 
very fast, in fractions of seconds. For example, single channel evoked 
potentials to unstructured, intensive light flashes are known to produce the 
earliest, scalp-detectable components after 28 msec over occipital regions of 
the head (Cigánek, 1961). Recent high-density (128 electrodes) ERP mapping 
(Foxe & Simpson, 2002) confirmed this early latency of evoked activity over 
cortical areas at 30 msec after stimulus onset, somewhat later over other 
areas. 
Basic, additional processing demands only little additional time. In 
intracranial recording studies in humans, Halgren et al. (1994) used a 
declarative memory recognition task, and showed that by about 75 msec, in 
BA 17, the recorded component distinguished between familiar and novel 
faces. Seeck et al. (1997) showed differential response to repeated and non-
repeated faces in human intracranial and surface evoked potentials as early 
as 50-90 msec post-stimulus. Similar values from intracranial recordings 
have been reported for visual motion input into area V5 of human cerebral 
cortex (ffytche et al., 1995).  
Generally, scalp ERP components with latencies in the order of 100 have 
been reported to reflect cortical perceptual processes. This was 
demonstrated by studies using dynamic random dot stereograms which are 
processed only after binocular fusion in the human visual cortex (Lehmann 
& Julesz, 1978; Skrandies, 1991; 1995). Components with latencies in the 
order of 100 msec have been also demonstrated to be sensitive to task 
relevance and stimulus type (Skrandies et al., 1984). Schendan et al. (1998) 
reported differences in ERPs to written words and to objects that began at 90 
msec. Thorpe et al. (1996) used 4000 unique photographs, half of which 
portrayed animals as target, in a go/no-go task. They found a frontal 
negativity in the no-go trials at 150 msec post-stimulus. They contended that 
this represented a point in time before which the visual processing required 
by the stimuli was completed. Curran et al. (2002) recorded ERPs during 
categorization and recognition tasks. The results revealed that the N1 
component (156-200 msec) was sensitive to category membership. Hopf et al. 
(2002) found in a target discrimination task that the N1 component 
(beginning within 150 msec of stimulus onset) discriminated between target 
and non-target. Pulvermüller et al. (2001) studied magnetic brain responses 
to words belonging to different grammatical and semantic categories. In a 
single-case study, using a 148-channel whole-head magnetometer, the ERP 
recording showed that 100 msec after stimulus onset, significantly stronger 
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neuromagnetic responses were elicited by words with strong multimodal 
semantic associations than by other word material.  
Particularly early signs of brain distinction between different classes of 
incoming information are to be expected when recognition is involved. In 
the present study, since each word was presented eight times, the relevant 
memory trace for a given word was most probably already active when the 
same word stimulus arrived once more (active memory; Fuster, 1997); 
therefore, less time would have been necessary to handle the repeated 
stimuli. As we did not separate first and repeat presentations of the stimuli 
words in the ERP analysis, relatively short mean latencies are to be expected.  
One may argue that not the semantic content of the words, in our 
specific case the emotional content, but an additional unknown property of 
the words may have been responsible for the early brain response to the two 
word classes. However, we demonstrated in section 7.2.1. that the words 
were carefully matched for important psycholinguistic variables, including 
word length (number of letters and number of syllables) and word 
frequency, which rules them out as possible confounds. In addition, the 
words’ concreteness cannot account for the differences, because all selected 
nouns were rated as equally concrete. Therefore, concreteness alone also 
would not allow distinction between the positive and the negative word 
classes.   
In sum, it seems that the only variable accounting for the early 
difference in electrophysiological responses appears to be the emotional 
content of the two word classes. 
Our latency results in the microstatste #4 are in line with other reports of 
very early differences between emotionally loaded words. Begleiter & Platz 
(1969) demonstrated the influence of affective meaning at ERP component 
latencies between 95 and 170 msec. This study was done with only one 
electrode pair (O2 referenced to ear lobes). In an ERP study with 30 
channels, Skrandies (1998) found significant differences between positive 
and negative emotion words in a first ERP component from 80 to 130 msec 
(maximal amplitude of Global Field Power 108 msec). This result was 
replicated in a later study by Skrandies & Chiu (2003), where the ERPs 
showed first, significant differences between positive and negative emotion 
words again at 80 msec post-stimulus. In both studies (Skrandies, 1998; 
Skrandies & Chiu, 2003), the topography of the first discriminative 
component corresponded to the topography of our microstate #4 (so-called 
P1 component). Moreover, similar with our results, the positive potential 
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centroid (posterior located) of positive emotion words were more right 
compared to that of negative emotion words; the negative potential centroid 
(anterior located) of positive words was more left compared to that of 
negative words. 
This very early valence-dependent emotional processing was also 
described in an ERP study by Pizzagalli et al. (1999b), where liked and 
disliked faces were hemifield-presented. The authors found that after 
stimulation of either hemisphere, personal affective judgments of face 
images significantly modulated ERP responses at an early microstate, 
covering 80-116 msec after right hemisphere stimulation, and 104-160 msec 
after left hemisphere stimulation.  Esslen (2002) replicated this result in a 
ERP study where pictures of different emotional and neutral faces were 
presented. The results showed that significant difference began as early as 
108 msec after stimulus onset in the condition of sadness.  
Parametric Mapping showed that positive emotion words compared to 
negative emotion words elicited more activity in right-posterior areas, 
whereas negative emotion words compared to positive emotion words 
produced stronger activity over left central areas. Indeed, the scalp gravity 
centers (Fig. 18) for positive compared to negative emotion words were 
more right and more posterior located, but this difference did not reach 
significance.  
The right-hemisphericity of the positive emotion words as well as the 
left-hemisphericity of the negative emotion words was supported by the 
intracortical LORETA functional images (Fig. 25) that showed a trend for 
more activity elicited by positive emotion words in the right inferior frontal 
gyrus, whereas negative emotion words displayed more activity in the left 
superior temporal gyrus , in the left insula, in the left precentral gyrus and in 
the left superior parietal lobe, altogether somewhat more posterior than 
positive words. 
In sum, in microstate #4, the first identified step of valence-dependent 
information processing, Parametric Mapping and LORETA showed a 
comparable pattern of lateralization, but a pattern that is not in agreement 
with the valence-hypothesis that would have predicted the reversed 
lateralization. 
Begleiter et al. (1979) found in an ERP study with 6 electrodes (F3/4, 
C3/4, P3/4) significant amplitude differences between ERPs evoked by 
emotionally positive, negative and neutral words during the N1-P2 ERP 
component (140-200 msec). This range corresponds to the latency of our 
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microstates #6 and #7 (138-166 and 166-198 msec, respectively). In a previous 
study in our laboratory, using microstate analysis, Esslen (1997) found 
significant differences between positive and negative words in a microstate 
between 122 and 182 msec after stimulus onset. The topography and the 
latency of this microstate are very similar to the topography and the latency 
of our microstates #6 and #7, showing the typical N1 topography with 
occipital negativity. In Esslen’s study, the global topographical descriptors 
were not further analyzed. In a later study also done in our laboratory, 
Pizzagalli (1998) found significant ERP differences between positive and 
negative emotion word in a microstate from 116 to 188 msec, and described 
the topographical differences between the two ERPs by means of centroid 
locations. The topography of this microstate corresponded to the 
topography of our microstates #6 and #7. Since Pizzagalli (1998) used a 
hemifield presentation paradigm, a direct comparison with our results of the 
differences in location of the potential area centroids between positive and 
negative words is not possible.  
Parametric Mapping of microstates #6 and #7 showed that positive 
emotion words elicited stronger activity than negative emotion words over 
the anterior areas (left-predominant in #6), and the opposite was found over 
posterior areas. On the lateral dimension, in addition to the left-predominant 
scalp differences in #6, the involved scalp gravity centers in Fig. 18 
consistently showed a left-lateralization for positive emotion words in both 
microstates, but without significance.   
LORETA functional images reflected the results above on a descriptive 
level; they showed in both of these microstates that positive emotion words 
elicited more activity than negative words in frontal areas, with a left 
predominance in microstate #6 and a right predominance in microstate #7. 
Negative emotion words produced stronger activity than positive words in 
microstate #6 in posterior areas with some left accentuation; in microstate #7, 
negative words showed stronger activity than positive words mainly in 
central areas with right predominance.  
Overviewing the distribution differences in these two significant 
microstates, we note that positive emotion-related activity tended to more 
anterior localizations than negative emotion activity. This shift to the 
anterior for positive emotion compared to negative emotions was also 
observed in other studies. Pizzagalli et al. (1998) reported a shift to the 
anterior in ERPs to emotionally positive (‘liked’) faces compared to ‘disliked’ 
faces. In another study Pizzagalli et al. (1999a), the gravity center of the 
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functional excitatory EEG beta2 frequency band was found more anterior in 
subjects with positive attitude, compared with subjects with negative 
attitude. In a EEG study where positive and negative emotions were 
induced under hypnosis, Lehmann et al. (1999) found that in the EEG beta2 
band the brain electric source during suggested joy was more anterior 
compared to the source during suggested sadness.  
It is interesting to note that the three previous studies that showed 
emotion processing differences in the time range of our microstates #6 and 
#7 (Begleiter et al., 1979; Esslen, 1997; Pizzagalli, 1998) dealt with a single 
component, N1, whereas our analysis differentiated this epoch into 2 
microstates, even though of related map topographies. Thus, it seems that 
the present microstate analysis strategy was more sensitive than the 
approaches used in the previous studies.  
Moreover, if one inspects carefully the curve of Global Field Power of 
the grand-grandmean (Fig. 16), three interesting considerations come to 
mind:  
(1) In relation to the curve of Global Field Power, microstate #6 clearly 
covers the ascending part of its second peak, and microstate #7 with its 
somewhat different topography covers the descending part of this second 
peak.  
(2) The same happened around the first Global Field Power peak at 100 
msec post-stimulus and around the third peak at 230 msec post-stimulus: 
two different even though related microstates covered the ascending and the 
descending parts of the peaks, respectively.  
(3) The sequence of microstates covering the ascending part, the 
descending part, as well as the following trough of the first peak is repeated 
with reversed polarity around the second peak of the Global Field Power 
curve.  
 
In conclusion, our two initial hypotheses were supported by the present 
ERP results. With this Experiment II we demonstrated that different 
semantic categories, in our case positive and negative emotion words, 
activated different neural populations in the brain during word processing, 
and that these differences were detected as changes in the functional 
microstates of the brain.  
Moreover, the results demonstrated that the human brain differentiates 
between positive and negative stimuli earlier than traditionally thought. The 
present and other recent ERP results (Begleiter & Platz, 1969; Esslen, 2002; 
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Pizzagalli et al., 1999b; Skrandies, 1998; 2002) clearly challenge the 
traditional distinction between early exogenouos and late endogenous ERP 
responses, the former such as P1 considered as ‘manifestation of primitive 
sensory processes insensitive to psychological factors (Coles et al., 1991, p. 
434-435), the latter considered as characterized by ‘the nature of the 
interaction between the subject and the event’ (Coles et al., 1991, p. 414). 
That latter definition would certainly apply also to our first significant 
microstate at 106-122 msec. 
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8. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Belief in the Paranormal and Affectivity 
This section takes up the intriguing question that was triggered by the 
results of Experiment I, and formulated in section 6.4.: Why were our 
believers less negative in their general affective attitude than our skeptics?   
As reviewed in section 2.6., two idiosyncratic lines of arguments about 
affective aspects of belief in the paranormal were controversially debated in 
the literature: (1) there are authors who described believers in the 
paranormal as being more positive in their affect than skeptics, and (2) there 
are others who reported the opposite, i.e. that believers are more negative in 
their affect.   
A hint to a third solution can be found in two studies by Thalbourne et 
al. (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994; Thalbourne & French, 1995) who reported 
believers scored higher on a manic experience scale, but also scored higher 
on a depressive experience scale than skeptics; believers were more extreme 
on both scales. 
Re-analysis (Fig. 28) of the subjective rating of the stimulus material 
(emotional words) of our Experiment II (section 7.2.1) in fact agreed with 
Thalbourne et al.’s reports. The believers rated the 27 negative words 
significantly more negative than the skeptics (believers: mean=1.98, 
S.D.=0.50; skeptics: mean=2.17, S.D.=0.47; t=-3.31; df=26; P<0.003), but also, 
the believers rated the 27 positive words significantly more positive than the 
skeptics (believers: mean=6.18, S.D.=0.52; skeptics: mean=5.90, S.D.=0.57; t=-
4.38; df=26; P<0.0002). No difference was found when the subjects rated the 
neutral words (believers: mean= 4.04, S.D.=0.33; skeptics: mean=3.99, 
S.D.=0.21; t=0.98; df=19; ns). These behavioral results obviously demonstrate 
that believers, when confronted with positive emotional stimuli, react more 
positively than skeptics. But also, when believers are confronted with 
negative stimuli, they react more negatively than skeptics.  
Based on these present data we propose a third, challenging line: 
believers in the paranormal might be more extreme in regard to emotionality 
than skeptics, in the positive as well as in the negative direction. The results 
would be accounted for by the assumption that there is a much stronger 
ability in believers than in skeptics to empathize with the emotional/affective 
influence of received information.  
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This hypothesis offers a pivoting point which accommodates the 
reviewed, two idiosyncratic lines of arguments about affective aspects of 
belief or disbelief in the paranormal.   
Our hypothesis would not contradict the two different points of view 
(believers more positive in their affect vs. believers more negative in their 
affect). Contrary, the proposed hypothesis contains both points of view. The 
crucial aspect is that there is no uni-directional relationship in one or the 
other direction, i.e. that with stronger belief in the paranormal there is more 
positive (or more negative) emotionality.  
If our hypothesis is true, what may have caused the present believers to 
be less negative in their reported affectivity, compared to other studies? It 
appears plausible that the differences in general affective attitude may have 
been produced by the setting of the experiment. As described by Lewin 
(1986), the attitude of the investigator is of considerable influence on the 
behavior and emotional attitude of the subjects. This attitude of the 
investigator, known as ‘investigator’s effect’, might reflect the investigator’s 
expectancy, but also, in a more general way, the investigator’s approach to 
the subject. Due to the hypothesized, much stronger ability of the believers 
to empathize with the emotional/affective influence of the surround, one can 
therefore speculate that the investigator’s effect could account for the 
reported differences in the emotionality of the two groups.  
 
Brain Electric Microstates and Emotion Processing 
A second issue that we would like to emphasize in this final section is 
the finding that during presentation of emotional words (Experiment II) 
three emotional valence-dependent microstates were identified. Thus, the 
processing of the information about the emotional content of the words was 
done in three successive steps. An important observation is that these three 
steps are different, as illustrated on the scalp by the locations of the potential 
area centroids and by the Parametric Mapping and as clarified with 
LORETA functional imaging. A second important observation is that not all 
three steps were directly successive. In fact, between microstate #4 and 
microstate #6, there is a step (microstate #5) which did not differentiate 
between emotional positive and negative words.  
Summing up, during word processing, the brain extracted at three times 
information about the emotional content of the words. Why? A possible 
explanation could be that the variety of brain processes that are parallel 
involved in the processing of reading words (from visual letter identification 
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to the comprehension of the content and context of the written word) need at 
different latencies to encode the information about the emotional content of 
the words. We hypothesize that the repeated processing steps that 
distinguish words according to valence serve as primary categorizations that 
are followed by different, secondary categorizations in the three microstates. 
Further experimentation will have to clarify the involved secondary 
categories of words. 
The present findings about ERP brain fields during emotion processing 
have identified valence-dependent activation of different brain areas at 
different times after stimulus onset. The discussed results made it obvious 
that nor simple, one-dimensional rules as to lateralization, anteriorization, or 
better, localization in general would hold for all times during which 
differentiation of valence was found to be reflected in the measured brain 
electric activity. Obviously, we are dealing with dynamic processes of high 
organizational complexity that unfold very rapidly over time and engage 
different brain areas and thereby set into motion different brain 
mechanisms. One-dimensional concepts such as lateralization or even 
hemisphericity cannot do justice to the quickly changing cooperativity of the 
participating, distributed neuronal network (Mesulam, 1990).  
 
Brain Fields, Belief and Emotionality: Brain Electric Signatures of Information 
This study did find brain electric signatures for affectivity and emotion 
valence, in an intricate way interrelated with personality, setting and time. It 
was discussed that in microstate #4, the emotional positive words showed a 
counter-clockwise rotation of the brain field orientation compared to the 
emotional negative words (Fig. 23). The same tendency was found in 
microstate #6; microstate #7, however, showed the opposite rotation 
tendency. Considering at present only the result of microstate #4, we 
observed a comparable rotation of the field orientation of spontaneous EEG 
in Experiment I between believers and skeptics, where the field orientation 
of the believers resembled the orientation of ERP microstate #4 fields to 
emotional positive words, and that of skeptics resembled that of the ERP 
fields to emotional negative words. The results in this microstate #4 are in 
line with the PANAS results, where believers showed less negative attitude 
than skeptics during resting. Studies on brain electric representation of other 
properties of treated informations come to mind that used related brain field 
assessment techniques:    
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In an ERP microstate study, Koenig et al. (1998) showed that the field 
orientation to words with visual meaning was more counter-clockwise 
rotated compared to the field orientations to words with abstract meaning. 
Related results were obtained  in a resting EEG study during free 
associations (Lehmann et al., 1998). Prompted reports of recall of 
spontaneous, conscious experiences were collected. The mentation reports 
were classified into visual imagery and abstract thought. The microstates 
immediately preceding the prompts showed, for visual thought (compared 
to abstract imagery), a counter-clockwise rotation of the field axis. 
Considering this single dimension of more or less rotation of the field 
orientation, obviously, all conceivable informations should have a location 
on the available 360 degrees. Hence, only if the experimental question is 
constrained to the utmost (e.g., to 2 types of information) will it be expected 
that the different types of information can be distinguished on this single 
dimension. Independent distinctions of 2 or 3 characteristics in separate 
experiments could well work, as e.g. in the present study. The general, 
common conclusion is that the differentiation of a larger number of items 
will require the utilization of a larger-dimensional classification space. In our 
studies of brain electric fields for example the combination of gravity center 
locations, field orientation, LORETA localization, and, in the case of ERP 
paradigms, latency definitely is needed as shown. This catalogue likely will 
have to be much extended for real-life experimentation that wants to grasp 
the full width of possible human experience.  
We would like to re-emphasize that our ERP field orientation differences 
cannot have been caused by differences of the stimulus words on the 
abstract-visual dimension, because the positive and negative emotion words 
were carefully matched in regard to this psycholinguistic variable of 
concreteness and abstractness.  
One could think of a hierarchical system of information representation 
in orientation angles, recognizing for example, within emotion positive 
informations as well as within emotion negative informations subtypes that 
are of the visual imagery-type and of the abstract-type, reflected in turn by 
their specific deviations in field orientation.   
However, as we saw, the crucial or the optimally discriminating 
measurement parameters for brain electric data and subjective percepts are 
not clear. For example, we saw that besides hemisphericity or lateralization, 
our data also showed tendencies in anterior-posterior brain functional 
organization for representation of emotions, and definitely a world of 
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complexity when intracortical localizations as function of time were 
examined.  
Of overarching interest in these considerations is the fact that, as stated at 
the beginning, a given feature such as the orientation of the ERP fields was 
not consistent over time, through the significant microstates: it even 
reversed itself in microstate #7 as opposed to #4 and #6. This should caution 
us to draw any generalizing rules from data constellations observed in single 
microstates during processing of some specific information: it is clear that 
we are only at a first, very modest beginning of work towards the 
establishment of a knowledge base that eventually might enable us to 
describe the psychophysiological building blocks or ‘atoms’ of human brain 
information processing in a dictionary that associates brain electric field 
characteristics with information processing steps and subjective experience. 
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Method Analysis 
Time after stimulus 
onset (msec) First author Year 
E M IR W M S P 
Only 
      
SEMANTIC 
Brandeis 1986 X    X          
Halgren 1994   X            
Koenig 1998 X    X          
Posner 1998 X   X           
Kateb 1999 X    X X         
Martin-
Loeches 
1999 X   X  X  RP   
 
   
Cohen 2000 X   X           
Federmeier 2000 X   X           
West 2000 X   X           
Hinojosa 2001b X   X    RP       
Martin-
Loeches 
2001 X   X  X  RP   
 
   
Pulvermüller 2001  X  X           
GRAMMAR 
Koenig 1996 X    X          
Federmeier 2000 X   X           
Hinojosa 2001a X   X    RP       
Pulvermüller 2001  X  X           
Takashima 2001 X   X    
P2+
N4 
 
 
    
 
Table 1: Resume of the literature about the time course of language processing discussed 
in the present study. First column: first author; second column: year; third column: 
E=electric evoked potential, M=magnetic evoked potential, IR=intracranial recording; 
fourth column: W=waveshape analysis; M=microstate analysis; S=source localization 
analysis; P=principal component analysis; fifth column: analysis restricted to SW=slow 
waves, RP=response potential, P2=P200, N4=N400, P3=P300; last column: bars indicate 
the involved latencies. Note that only the first identified significant difference is indicated. 
500400300200100
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Method Analysis 
Time after stimulus 
onset (msec) First author Year 
E M IR W M S P 
Only 
      
EMOTIONS 
Begleiter 1969 X   X           
Begleiter 1979 X   X           
Chapman 1980 X      X        
Kostandov 1986 X   X           
Naumann 1992 X   X    
P3+ 
SW 
   
 
  
Esslen 1997 X    X          
Pizzagalli 1998 X    X          
Skrandies 1998 X    X          
Skrandies press X    X          
PHONOLOGY 
Halgren 1994   X            
SEMANTIC vs. PHONOLOGY 
Khateb 2001 X    X X         
WORD vs. PICTURE 
Schendan 1998 X   X           
Hinojosa 2000 X   X    RP       
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 Believers  Skeptics P-value 
Paranormal belief score (a) 17.2±1.0 2.7±1.8 P<0.0001 
Age (years) 21.7±1.3 23.6±3.9 ns 
Educational level (years) 13.6±1.4 14.9±2.0 ns 
Handedness score (b) 14.8±1,2 14.2±1.7 ns 
Magical Ideation score (c) 17.4±5.1 6.5±3.5 P<0.0001 
PANAS PA (d) 34.0±5.4 34.5±4.1 ns 
PANAS NA (d) 17.0±3.2 21.9±6.3 P<0.05 
 
 
 
 
(a) Six-item questionnaire assessing belief in and experience of paranormal  
      phenomena (Mischo et al., 1993; possible range: 0-18; see APPENDIX 1) 
(b) Chapman & Chapman (1987; possible score: 13-39; APPENDIX 2) 
(c) Magical Ideation score (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; possible score: 0-30,  
      see APPENDIX 3) 
(d) Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PA: Positive Affect, possible score:  
       10-50; NA: Negative Affect, possible score: 10-50; trait form; Watson et  
       al., 1988; see APPENDIX 4) 
Table 2: Demographic and self-report data (mean ± S.D.) for believers (n=10) and 
skeptics (n=13) in paranormal phenomena. 
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Microstate TANOVA 
P-values 
#1 0.909 
#2 0.527 
#3 0.422 
#4        0.001*  
#5 0.394 
#6  0.030* 
#7  0.026* 
#8 0.498 
#9 0.514 
#10 0.468 
#11 0.248 
#12 0.908 
#13 0.354 
Table 3: Global topographical comparison of the scalp field distributions of the 13 
microstates (#1-#13), and their P-values of the TANOVA analysis (emotional 
positive vs. negative words).  
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Microstate 
(msec) 
 
 
positive 
emotion 
words 
negative 
emotion 
words 
MANOVA 
 
emotion (E) 
centroid (C) 
 
2-way ANOVA
 
emotion (E) 
centroid (C) 
 
 axis Centroid  mean location (S.D.) F-valuesa F-valuesb 
  pos. neg. pos. neg.  
L-R 5.36   
 (1.01) 
4.76  
 (0.75) 
5.00  
  (1.03) 
5.06  
 (0.67) #4 
(106-122) A-P 6.83  
 (1.19) 
4.65  
 (1.68) 
6.95  
  (1.16) 
4.42  
 (1.36) 
E:   
     0.45 
E x C:    
     7.20** 
E x C:  
L-R: 15.16**  
A-P: 1.50  
        
L-R 5.14  
 (0.50) 
4.89  
 (0.85) 
5.33  
  (0.58) 
4.77  
 (0.75) #6 
(138-166) A-P 4.16  
 (1.04) 
7.51  
 (0.75) 
3.97  
  (0.79) 
7.68  
 (0.50) 
E:  
    0.74 
E x C:  
    3.47** 
E x C:  
L-R: 5.00** 
A-P: 1.81 
        
L-R 4.76       
 (0.64) 
4.98  
 (0.98) 
4.66  
  (0.59) 
5.19  
 (0.86) #7 
(166-198) A-P 4.24  
 (1.31) 
7.07  
 (1.08) 
4.32  
  (1.28) 
7.01  
 (1.06) 
E:  
    0.94 
E x C:  
    2.27* 
E x C:  
L-R: 4.78** 
A-P: 0.54 
Table 4: Mean locations (and S.D.; n=21 subjects) of spatial descriptors 
characterizing microstates #4, #6, and #7, for emotional positive and negative 
words. Locations of positive (pos.) and negative (neg.) potential area centroids given 
by electrode positions along the left-right (L-R) and the anterior-posterior (A-P) 
brain axis. For each microstate, MANOVA (2 emotions x 2 centroid polarity) 
results are shown (aF(2,19); **=P<0.05; *=0.15<P<0.05). 2-way ANOVA results (2 
emotions x 2 centroid polarity) for the two brain axes are reported (bF(1,20); 
**=P<0.05). E=main effect emotion (positive; negative), E x C=interaction between 
emotion and centroid polarity (positive, negative potential). 
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Fig. 1: Schematic overview of the utilized 33 electrode positions (circles). The 
electrode positions described in the ‘10/10 system’ (cf. Fig. 7) were projected into a 
9 x 9 rectangular array (grey). The vertical and horizontal axes represent the 
anterior-posterior and the left-right head axes, respectively. Using the vertical and 
horizontal axes of the coordinate system, each electrode position is defined by 2 
numbers. A head outline is shown as background of the rectangular grid pattern, 
viewed from above, nose up, left ear left. The ‘10/10 system’ identifications of the 
electrode are indicated: Fp=frontal pole; F=frontal; Z=‘zentral’, i.e. midline; 
C=central; T=temporal; P=parietal; O=occipital.  
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Fig. 2: Example of EEG waveshapes (500 msec) in 19 channels and corresponding 
topographic maps. Upper part: the waveshapes. Lower part: the data between 300 
and 388 msec shown as topographic potential distribution maps, at time intervals of 
4 msec. Head seen from above, left ear left, electrode Cz at center (black in inset 
schema); red=areas of positive potential, blue=areas of negative potential against 
average reference. Linearly interpolated isopotential contour areas are displayed in 
steps of 1.4 microVolts. Time during the illustrated epoch in msec, indicated by the 
numbers under the maps. Inset: schematic electrode array seen from above.  
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 Fig. 3: Descriptions and descriptors of potentials maps. Vertical axes: numbers 
indicate electrode positions as described in Fig. 1. A, B: Trajectories of the map 
gravity center over time (x-axis) along the left-right (A) and anterior-posterior (B) 
axis. C, D: Trajectories of the positive (red line) and negative (blue line) potential 
area centroids over time (x-axis) along the left-right (C) and anterior-posterior (D) 
axis. E, F: Trajectories of the maximal (red line) and minimal (blue line) potential 
values over time (x-axis) along the left-right (E) and anterior-posterior (F) axis. 
Maps on the right: an example of map descriptors extracted from the potential 
distribution map at 140 msec (vertical line), shown with linearly interpolated 
isopotential areas in steps of 1.4 microVolts; positive potential areas in red, negative 
in blue, against average reference; darker hue=more extreme potential values. G: 
asterisk symbol marks the location of the mapped scalp field’s electric gravity center. 
H: positive and negative symbols mark the locations of the mapped scalp field’s 
centroids for the positive and the negative potential areas. I: positive and negative 
symbols mark the locations (electrode positions) of the mapped scalp field’s maximal 
and minimal field potential values, i.e. of the positive and negative extreme 
potentials. Note that locations of gravity center and centroids need not coincide 
with electrode positions.  
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Fig. 4: Example of a 33-channel ERP evoked by word reading (presentation for 450 
msec). Upper part: Curve of Global Field Power (GFP, y-axis) over time (x-axis). 
Selected time points (A-F) are marked by vertical lines. ‘A’, ‘C’ and ‘E’ show high 
GFP values, ‘B’, ‘D’ and ‘F’ low GFP values. Lower part: ERP maps at 8 msec 
intervals. Head seen from above, nose up; positive potential areas red, negative blue 
versus  average reference; darker color=more extreme values; isopotential areas in 
steps of 1.4 microVolts. Maps between 40 and 224 msec after stimulus onset are 
shown. Three grossly differing map landscapes (potential configurations) are 
observed: after ‘A’: anterior positive / posterior negative areas; before and after ‘C’: 
anterior negative / posterior positive; before and after ‘E’: anterior positive / 
posterior negative. The high GFP values of maps at ‘A’, ‘C’ and ‘E’ imply large 
potential differences between potential peaks and troughs of the maps. Landscape 
changes are most pronounced around ‘B’, ‘D’ and ‘F’. 
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Fig. 5 (modified from T. Koenig, 1999): Example of clustering a sequence of 10 momentary 
maps into 2 class mean maps. First box: the maps (normalized potential maps with 
equidistant contour lines; nose up, left ear left, blue areas = negative against average 
reference). Two randomly selected, starting prototype maps are labeled A (black) and B 
(white). Second box: first run; similarity of spatial configuration of each prototype map 
with each of the 10 maps is computed using the squared correlation coefficient to omit the 
maps’ polarities; the highest value determines the assignment, shown by black (similarity to 
A) or white (similarity to B) symbols. Separately for each class, the prototype maps are 
updated combining all assigned maps, by computing the first spatial principal component 
of the maps and thereby maximizing the common variance while disregarding map polarity 
(right: updated maps). Third box: this is repeated in the second and later runs until no 
further changes in assignment occur, and thus 2 prototypes are established as 2 class mean 
maps (final run, last box). Eventually, the percentage of the variance of the data explained 
by the 2 class mean maps is determined. Explained variance might change depending on 
selected starting prototype maps. To find the solution with maximal explained variance, the 
entire procedure was repeated 20 times with newly randomly selected starting prototype 
maps.    
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Fig. 6: Resolution in time and space of brain physiologic measurements: EEG, MEG, 
fMRI, PET and SPECT. Time (horizontal), space (vertical); invasive methods (grey), 
non-invasive methods (white). 
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 Fig. 7: The ‘10/10 system’ (Nuwer et al., 1998) of electrode placement on the scalp. 
The head is viewed from above, nose up, left ear left. The measurement technique is 
based on standard landmarks of the skull. Namely, the nasion, inion, and the left 
and right preauricular points. The first measurement is in the anterior-posterior 
distance in the midline (via the vertex) from nasion to inion (=100%). Fpz is at 
10%, Fz is at 30%, Cz at 50%, Pz at 70% and Oz at 90% of the nasion-inion 
distance. Lateral measurements start at the left preauricular point through Cz 
(vertex) to the right preauricular point. Marks are placed at 10% of this left-right 
preauricular distance and labeled T7 (left) and T8 (right). Marks at additiomal 20% 
are labeled C3 (left) and C4 (right). With these first 9 cardinal marks all other marks 
are constructed. The circles with thick lines and with grey background correspond 
to the 35 electrodes recorded in the present study (O9 and O10 were omitted from 
analysis). The identification labels of all used electrodes are given. Fp=frontal pole; 
F=frontal; Z=‘zentral’, i.e. midline; C=central; T=temporal; P=parietal; O=occipital. 
Three additional electrodes (not shown in this schema) were used for the detection of 
horizontal and vertical eye movements: Two electrodes at the outer left and right 
canthus and an electrode at the left infraorbital site. 
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Fig. 8: Single model maps of the resting EEGs of the 10 believers (A) and 13 
skeptics (B). Head seen from above, nose up, left ear left. Red and blue indicate map 
areas of opposite polarity, deeper hue=higher potential values; note that the analysis 
procedure omitted absolute polarity, thereby revealing the configuration of the 
potential landscapes on the scalp. Dots and squares=locations of area centroids of 
opposite potential, connected by a straight line that indicates the orientation of the 
electric field of the model map. Open symbols for believers, filled for skeptics. Insets: 
mean model maps across subjects of each group.   
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Fig. 9: Locations of the anterior (ovals) and posterior (rectangles) located potential 
centroids for the believers (open areas; n=10) and the skeptics (filled areas; n=13) 
during resting EEG. The extensions of the ovals and rectangles indicate ± 1 S.E. 
from the mean. The illustrated square area displays a narrow, rectangular area on 
the scalp (i.e., the white rectangle in the inset head, top left) which was magnified in 
the left-right direction in order to visualize the relevant left-right differences of the 
centroid locations. Numbers along the axis indicate electrode positions: the 
horizontal (left-right) axis covers electrode positions 4.6 to 5.6; the vertical axis 
(anterior-posterior) positions 2.0 to 9.0.  ** = P-values of P<0.05. 
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Fig. 10: Mean locations of the LORETA gravity centers for skeptics (black squares; 
n=10 and believers (open circles; n=13) for the seven independent EEG frequency 
bands on the left-right and anterior-posterior head axes. Head seen from above, nose 
up. The illustrated area displays a narrow, rectangular head area (i.e., the white 
rectangle in the inset head, top left) which was magnified in the left-right direction 
in order to visualize the relevant, lateral differences of the gravity center locations. 
Tickmarks at distances of 5 mm on the anterior-posterior axis and of 1 mm on the 
left-right axis; the vertical line through the display is the head midline.  
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Fig. 11: LORETA functional images of the difference in current density between 
believers (n=10) minus skeptics (n=13) in the beta2 band. A: Red are voxels with 
stronger activity in believers than skeptics; B: vice versa, stronger in skeptics than 
believers. A and B: 15 axial brain slices in Talairach space, at 7 mm distance from 
most inferior (z = -41 mm) to most superior (z = 57 mm), viewed from above. X axis 
from left (L) to right (R); Y axis from posterior to anterior; Z axis from inferior to 
superior. Structural anatomy is shown in gray scale.  
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Fig. 15: The scalp potential distribution map of the 7 class mean maps (A-G) 
identified by the global microstate analysis of the grand-grandmean ERP map series 
(n=113 timeframes) during visual word presentation. Head seen from above, nose 
up, left ear left; isopotential contour areas in steps of 1.4 microVolts. Red and blue 
colors identify areas of opposite polarity; note that these class mean maps identify 
the spatial configuration of the potential distributions while disregarding polarity, 
i.e., two identical maps of inverted polarity constitute a given class mean map. 
“Original Polarity” is shown in this figure, i.e., red=positive, blue=negative.  
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Fig. 17: Curves of Global Field Power (GFP, microVolts) over time (x-axis, msec) for 
the grandmean ERP map series evoked by emotional positive (open diamonds) and
negative words (solid diamonds). The two series consist each of a total of 113 maps 
(=frames).  
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Fig. 18: Trajectory of the locations of the electric gravity center over time (x-axis) 
along the anterior-posterior (vertical, A) and left-right (vertical, B) axis, for the 
grandmean ERP map series evoked by emotional positive (open triangles) and 
negative words (solid triangles). The numbers along the y-axis represent electrode 
positions according to the international ‘10/10 system’ as described in Fig. 1. On 
the bottom of the figures, P-values (between 0.10 and 0.00) of t-tests comparing 
locations for positive and negative emotion words are illustrated for each time frame.
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Fig. 19: Trajectory of the locations of the positive potential area centroid over time 
(x-axis) along the anterior-posterior (vertical, A) and left-right (vertical, B) axis, for 
the grandmean ERP map series evoked by emotional positive (open circles) and 
negative words (solid circles). The numbers along the y-axis represent electrode 
positions according to the international ‘10/10 system’ as described in Fig. 1. On 
the bottom of the figures, P-values (between 0.10 and 0.00) of t-tests comparing 
locations for positive and negative emotion words are illustrated for each time 
frame. 
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Fig. 20: Trajectory of the locations of the negative potential area centroid over time 
(x-axis) along the anterior-posterior (vertical, A) and left-right (vertical, B) axis, for 
the grandmean ERP map series evoked by emotional positive (open rectangles) and 
negative words (solid rectangles). The numbers along the y-axis represent electrode 
positions according to the international ‘10/10 system’ as described in Fig. 1. On 
the bottom of the figures, P-values (between 0.10 and 0.00) of t-tests comparing 
locations for positive and negative emotion words are illustrated for each time 
frame. 
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Fig. 21: Potential distribution maps of the 13 microstates. The latencies (time after 
stimulus onset in msec) of each microstate’s start and end is displayed, as well as its 
duration (in msec). For further explanation of the maps see Fig. 12.  
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Fig. 22: The grandmean ERP potential distribution maps across subjects, for 
emotional positive words (above) and for negative words (below), of the three 
significant microstates (#4, #6 and #7). For further explanations of the maps see Fig. 
12.   
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Fig. 23: Mean location of the positive (circle) and negative (square) potential area 
centroids in the three significant microstates. Head seen from above, nose up, left ear 
left. Open symbols and filled symbols show the centroid locations for emotionally 
positive and negative words, respectively. The numbers along the horizontal (left-
right) x-axis and the vertical (anterior-posterior) y-axis indicate electrode positions 
of the 10-10 system as described in Fig. 1 (left=1, right=9; Cz=5; anterior=1; 
posterior=9; Cz=5). Red double-headed arrows indicate statistically significant 
differences of the centroid locations. **= P<0.01; *=0.01<P<0.05.  
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Fig. 24: Electrode-by-electrode t-statistics between word classes in the three 
significant microstates (#4, #6 and #7). Grandmean ERP potential distribution 
maps evoked by positive and negative words were compared at each electrode. The 
map on top shows the identification labels of the electrode positions. White circles 
mark electrodes that show significant (thick line) or a trend (thin line) for more 
activity evoked by positive compared to negative words. Grey circles correspond to 
electrodes that show significant (thick line) or a trend (thin line) for more activity 
evoked by negative compared to positive words.  
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B
 
 
 Fig. 25: Statistical LORETA functional images for the comparison emotional 
positive vs emotional negative words during the microstate #4 (106-122 msec). The 
best 20% of the voxels showing more activity in (A) emotional positive than 
negative or in (B) emotional negative than positive words are marked in red. 
Displayed are 15 axial brain slices in Talairach space, at 7 mm intervals, from the 
most inferior level (z = -41 mm) to the most superior level (z = 57 mm), viewed from 
the above (X axis from left (L) to right (R); Y axis from posterior to anterior; Z axis 
from inferior to superior). Structural anatomy is shown in gray scale. Open arrow 
points to areas that reached P-values: 0.05<P<0.10  
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 Fig. 26: Statistical LORETA functional images for the comparison emotional 
positive vs emotional negative words during the microstate #6 (138-166 msec). The 
best 20% of the voxels showing more activity in (A) emotional positive than 
negative or in (B) emotional negative than positive words are marked in red. 
Displayed are 15 axial brain slices in Talairach space, at 7 mm intervals, from the 
most inferior level (z = -41 mm) to the most superior level (z = 57 mm), viewed from 
the above (X axis from left (L) to right (R); Y axis from posterior to anterior; Z axis 
from inferior to superior). Structural anatomy is shown in gray scale.  
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 Fig. 27: Statistical LORETA functional images for the comparison emotional positive vs emotional negative words during the microstate #7 (166-198 msec). The 
best 20% of the voxels showing more activity in (A) emotional positive than 
negative or in (B) emotional negative than positive words are marked in red. 
Displayed are 15 axial brain slices in Talairach space, at 7 mm intervals, from the 
most inferior level (z = -41 mm) to the most superior level (z = 57 mm), viewed from 
the above (X axis from left (L) to right (R); Y axis from posterior to anterior; Z axis 
from inferior to superior). Structural anatomy is shown in gray scale. Solid arrow 
points to areas that reached P<0.05. Open arrow points to areas that reached P-
values: 0.05<P<0.10  
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Fig. 28: Rating of the emotional content of the three words classes. Horizontal axis: 
words classes. Vertical axis: Mean (+1 S.E.) of the rating of the emotional content of 
the 74 words on a 7-point scale, separately, for believers (n=10; white columns) and 
skeptics (n=13; black columns). The rating scale was labeled on one extreme with: 
“very negative word” (position 1) and on the other extreme: “very positive word” 
(position 7). In the middle of the scale, i.e. at the position “4”, there was the label 
“neutral word”. 
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APPENDIX 1: Six-item questionnaire assessing belief in and experience of 
paranormal phenomena (Mischo et al., 1993).  
 
 
 
 
Tr
if
ft
 k
la
r 
zu
   
Tr
if
ft
 k
la
r 
ni
ch
t z
u 
- Ich habe mindestens ein telepathisches 
Erlebnis zwischen mir und einem anderen 
Menschen gehabt. 
   
- Ich habe noch nie eine Aussersinnliche 
Wahrnehmung bei mir selbst erlebt.    
- Ich hatte wenigstens einmal eine Vorahnung, 
die sich erfüllte und von der ich annahm, 
dass sie kein Zufall war. 
   
- Ich glaube, es gibt so etwas wie 
Gedankenübertragung.    
- Manche Träume weisen auf zukünftige 
Erlebnisse hin, von denen man vorher nichts 
wissen kann. 
   
- Ich hatte mindestens einen Traum, der sich 
auf die Zukunft bezog und sich so exakt 
erfüllte, dass ich glaube, dass das kein Zufall 
war. 
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APPENDIX 2: The German version of the ‘Magical Ideation Sscale’ as introduced 
by Eckblad & Chapman (1983). 
 
Bitte beantworten Sie folgende Fragen, indem Sie entweder “stimmt” (S) 
oder “stimmt nicht” (SN) umkreisen: 
 
1) Es gibt Leute, bei denen ich spüre, wenn sie an mich denken S SN 
2) 
Ich kenne das flüchtige Gefühl, etwas anderes als ein 
Mensch zu sein S SN 
3) 
Auf Gehsteigen versuche ich manchmal zu vermeiden, auf 
Fugen zu treten oder aber die Fugen bewusst nicht zu 
übergehen 
S SN 
4) 
Ich glaube, ich könnte lernen, die Gedanken anderer zu 
lesen, wenn ich nur wollte 
S SN 
5) 
Horoskope sind öfters zutreffend als der Zufall erwarten 
liesse 
S SN 
6) 
Wenn ich nach Hause komme, sind bestimmte Gegenstände 
manchmal an einem anderen Platz, obschon niemand 
zugegen war 
S SN 
7) 
Zahlen wie ‘13’ oder ‘7’ haben keinerlei spezielle Bedeutung 
für mich 
S SN 
8) 
Ich kenne das belustigende Gefühl, Radio- oder TV-
Sprecher wüssten, dass ich ihnen zuhörte 
S SN 
9) 
Ich war schon mal besorgt darüber, dass Wesen von 
anderen Planeten Geschehnisse auf der Erde beeinflussen 
könnten 
S SN 
10) 
Die Regierungen behalten uns Informationen über UFOs 
vor 
S SN 
11) 
Es ist schon vorgekommen, dass die scheinbar zufällige 
Anordnung von irgendwelchen Gegenständen mir als 
Zeichen gedient hat 
S SN 
12) 
Ich habe niemals daran gezweifelt, dass Träume das 
Produkt meiner eigenen Psyche sind 
S SN 
13) 
Abgesehen von möglicher Suggestivwirkung, taugen 
Glückbringer zu nichts 
S SN 
14) 
Beim Anhören von Schallplatten- oder Tonbandaufnahmen 
habe ich schon Klänge wahrgenommen, die bei anderer 
Gelegenheit nicht zu hören waren 
S SN 
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15) 
Scheinbar absichtslose Handbewegungen irgendwelcher 
Leute haben manchmal einen Einfluss auf mich 
S SN 
16) 
Ich träume nie oder fast nie von Ereignissen, die sich erst 
später ereignen 
S SN 
17) 
Ich kenne das Gefühl, dass eine mir bekannte Person 
vorübergehend durch eine mir fremde ersetzt erscheint 
S SN 
18) 
Es ist nicht möglich, anderen Leuten zu schaden, indem 
man lediglich böse gedanken über sie hegt 
S SN 
19) 
Auch wenn ich allein bin, fühle ich manchmal die 
Anwesenheit einer Person oder eines fremden Wesens 
S SN 
20) 
Wenn bestimmte Leute mich ansehen oder mich berühren, 
habe ich manchmal das Gefühl Energie zu gewinnen oder 
zu verlieren 
S SN 
21) 
Ich habe manchmal den flüchtigen Gedanken, mir fremde 
Leute könnten in mich verliebt sein 
S SN 
22) 
Ich hatte nie das Gefühl, meine Gedanken würden in 
Wirklichkeit von jemand anders stammen 
S SN 
23) 
Es kommt praktisch nie vor, dass ich das Gefühl habe, eine 
Person schon zu kennen, wenn diese mir neu vorgestellt 
wird 
S SN 
24) Ich glaube an eine Wiedergeburt S SN 
25) 
Bisweilen erscheint das Benehmen gewisser Leute so 
unwirklich, dass man meinen könnte, ihr Auftreten sei 
inszeniert 
S SN 
26) 
Ich vollziehe ab und zu kleine Rituale, um ungünstige 
Ereignisse abzuwenden 
S SN 
27) 
Ich habe schon befürchtet, ein Geschehnis könnte eintreten, 
wenn ich ständig an es denke 
S SN 
28) 
Ich habe mich schon gefragt, ob die Geister von 
Verstorbenen einen Einfluss auf uns Lebende haben 
S SN 
29) 
Es gab Momente, da habe ich gefühlt, dass eine öffentliche 
Ansprache oder Vorlesung ganz speziell an mich gerichtet 
a
S SN 
30) Ich habe schon gespürt, wie Fremde meine Gedanken lesen S SN 
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APPENDIX 3: The German version of the Handedness Inventory (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1987). 
 
Bitte geben Sie an, mit welcher Hand Sie für gewöhnlich folgende 
Tätigkeiten ausüben (Sie können mit ‘linke’, ‘rechte’ oder ‘beide Hände 
gleichermassen’ antworten). 
 
 
Mit welcher Hand              (3Pte.)  (1Pt.)  (2Pte.) 
 
- zeichnen Sie?    linke  rechte  beide 
 
- schreiben Sie?    linke  rechte  beide 
 
- benutzen Sie einen Flaschenöffner? linke  rechte  beide 
 
- werfen Sie einen Schneeball?  linke  rechte  beide 
 
- benutzen Sie einen Hammer?  linke  rechte  beide 
 
- eine Zahnbürste?    linke  rechte  beide 
 
- einen Schraubenzieher?   linke  rechte  beide 
 
- einen Radiergummi?   linke  rechte  beide 
 
- einen Tennisschläger?   linke  rechte  beide 
 
- eine Schere?     linke  rechte  beide 
 
- zünden Sie ein Streichholz an?  linke  rechte  beide 
 
- rühren Sie mit einer Kelle?   linke  rechte  beide 
  
- auf welcher Schulter ruht der Schläger 
  beim Baseball / Hornussen etc.?  linke  rechte  beide 
     
 
 
Anzahl Punkte:     ______              ______   ______ 
 
 
   TOTAL:  
      =========== 
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APPENDIX 4: The German version of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). 
 
 
Dieser Fragebogen enthält eine Reihe von Wörtern, die unterschiedliche 
Gefühle und Empfindungen beschreiben. Lesen Sie jedes Wort und tragen 
Sie dann in die Skala neben jedem Wort die Intensität ein. Sie haben die 
Möglichkeit, zwischen fünf Abstufungen zu wählen: 
 
1. ganz wenig oder gar nicht   2. ein bisschen   3. einigermassen   4. erheblich   
5. äusserst 
 
Geben Sie bitte an, wie Sie sich im allgemeinen fühlen. 
 
 ganz wenig 
      oder     einiger-   
   gar nicht      ein bisschen  massen erheblich äusserst 
 
aktiv                          O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
bekümmert              O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
interessiert  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
freudig erregt  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
verärgert  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
stark  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
schuldig  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
erschrocken  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
feindselig  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
angeregt  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
stolz  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
gereizt  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
begeistert  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
beschämt  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
wach  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
nervös  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
entschlossen  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
aufmerksam  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
durcheinander  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
ängstlich  O---------------O---------------O---------------O---------------O 
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APPENDIX 5: Complete list of the stimuli with English translation. 
 
 
 
Positive words (n=27) Negative words (n=27) Neutral words (n=20) 
German English German English German English 
Freude joy Ärger irritation Bein  leg 
Freund friend Angst angst Blatt sheet 
Friede peace Armut poverty Blech plate 
Glück luck Elend misery Ebene level 
Güte goodness Flucht flight Ecke corner 
Herz hearth Furcht fear Format format 
Idee idea Gift poison Forum forum 
Kuss kiss Grab tomb Gebiet field 
Lachen laugh Haft detention Kugel sphere 
Leben life Härte toughness Länge length 
Licht light Hass hate Pfeife pipe 
Liebe love Hunger hunger Phase phase 
Lust lust Kälte coldness Regel rule 
Musik music Klage plaint Rest balance 
Mutter mother Krieg war Sitte custom 
Nähe closeness Last encumbrance Umbau reconstruction 
Ofen oven Leiche cadaver Vieh livestock 
Rose rose Mord murder Wage balance 
Sinn sense Panik panic Woche week 
Sommer summer Sarg coffin Zitat quotation 
Sonne sun Schalg stroke   
Spass fun Stich sting   
Spiel game Strafe punishment   
Wald wood Streit dispute   
Wärme geat Tadel reproach   
Weite width Tod death   
Wonne delight Zwang compulsion   
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APPENDIX 6: Averaged data of the emotional content after the first rating, during 
the creaton of the 3 lists of the word classes (preparation of the word list, word 
selection and matching by Esslen & Koenig; see also Esslen, 1997), and after the 2 
previous studies, which used the same words (Esslen, 1997; Pizzagalli, 1998). 
Listing of the words used in the present investigation, divided according to the three 
word classes (emotional positive words: left; emotional negative words: middle; 
emotional neutral words: right). The rating was done on a 7-point scale. The scale 
was labelled on an extreme with: ‘very negative word’ (position ‘1’) and on the other 
extreme: ‘very positive word’ (position ‘7’). In the middle of the scale, i.e. by the 
position ‘4’, there was the label ‘neutral word’. Means and standard deviations of 
the rating are provided for each word and for each subjects group. On the bottom of 
the table, the mean and standard deviation (across words) of the rating for each word 
class and for each subjects group are listed.  
 
 
 
Positive words (n=27) Negative words (n=27) Neutral words (n=20) 
 
Fi
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t r
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g 
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Pi
zz
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li 
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t r
at
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g 
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sl
en
  
Pi
zz
ag
al
li 
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at
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Es
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Freude 6.7 
±0.6 
6.6 
±0.6 
6.7 
±0.6 
Ärger 2.5 
±1.1
2.3 
±1.0
2.2 
±0.7
Bein  4.3 
±0.8 
4.3 
±1.1 
4.4 
±0.9
Freund 6.6 
±0.5 
6.5 
±0.7 
6.7 
±0.5 
Angst 2.2 
±0.9
1.7 
±1.1
2.1 
±0.9
Blatt 4.6 
±1.0 
4.6 
±1.0 
4.9 
±1.1
Friede 6.1 
±0.8 
6.4 
±0.8 
6.5 
±0.9 
Armut 1.9 
±0.6
1.9 
±0.7
2.1 
±1.1
Blech 3.6 
±0.7 
3.6 
±0.8 
3.9 
±0.8
Glück 6.7 
±0.6 
6.5 
±0.6 
6.8 
±0.4 
Elend 2.1 
±1.6
1.4 
±0.5
1.5 
±0.5
Ebene 4.3 
±0.9 
4.3 
±0.7 
4.8 
±0.9
Güte 5.5 
±1.1 
5.2 
±1.1 
5.9 
±1.0 
Flucht 2.5 
±0.7
2.3 
±0.9
2.4 
±1.0
Ecke 3.9 
±0.6 
3.7 
±0.8 
3.4 
±0.9
Herz 5.9 
±1.1 
6.0 
±0.9 
6.0 
±1.1 
Furcht 2.6 
±1.2
2.1 
±1.0
2.1 
±0.5
Format 4.1 
±0.3 
3.8 
±0.5 
3.9 
±0.7
Idee 6.1 
±1.0 
5.7 
±1.1 
5.9 
±0.9 
Gift 2.0 
±1.2
2.2 
±1.0
1.7 
±0.9
Forum 4.3 
±0.5 
4.0 
±0.4 
4.2 
±0.7
Kuss 6.4 
±0.7 
6.7 
±0.5 
6.7 
±0.6 
Grab 2.1 
±0.9
2.4 
±1.1
2.1 
±1.1
Gebiet 4.0 
±0.0 
4.3 
±0.7 
4.1 
±0.5
Lachen 6.3 
±1.0 
6.6 
±0.7 
6.5 
±0.5 
Härte  2.5 
±0.7
2.8 
±1.2
2.4 
±1.1
Kugel 4.1 
±1.4 
4.3 
±1.3 
4.2 
±1.6
Leben 6.2 
±0.9 
6.3 
±0.8 
6.3 
±0.7 
Haft 1.6 
±0.7
2.0 
±1.2
1.9 
±1.7
Länge 4.1 
±0.3 
4.2 
±1.0 
4.0 
±0.7
Licht 6.1 
±0.8 
6.5 
±0.8 
6.6 
±0.6 
Hass 1.7 
±0.8
1.6 
±1.1
1.4 
±0.7
Pfeife 3.7 
±0.9 
3.8 
±0.9 
3.8 
±1.1
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Liebe 6.8 
±0.4 
6.8 
±0.5 
6.7 
±0.6 
Hunger 2.5 
±1.4
2.4 
±1.0
2.6 
±1.5
Phase 4.3 
±0.9 
4.0 
±0.5 
4.1 
±0.7
Lust 6.2 
±1.3 
6.4 
±1.1 
6.4 
±0.7 
Kälte 2.4 
±0.7
2.6 
±1.4
3.3 
±1.5
Regel 3.9 
±1.2 
3.6 
±0.8 
3.3 
±0.8
Musik 6.1 
±0.8 
6.5 
±0.6 
6.6 
±0.6 
Klage 2.6 
±0.7
2.9 
±0.9
2.4 
±0.8
Rest 3.6 
±0.8 
3.5 
±0.6 
3.6 
±0.7
Mutter 5.5 
±1.3 
5.2 
±1.5 
5.8 
±0.9 
Krieg 1.2 
±0.4
1.3 
±0.8
1.1 
±0.3
Sitte 3.6 
±0.7 
3.9 
±1.2 
3.4 
±1.2
Nähe 5.7 
±0.8 
5.4 
±0.8 
5.5 
±1.0 
Last 2.3 
±1.0
2.4 
±0.8
2.2 
±0.7
Umbau 4.2 
±1.3 
4.0 
±0.8 
4.2 
±1.3
Ofen 5.7 
±1.0 
4.6 
±0.7 
5.0 
±1.3 
Leiche 1.8 
±0.9
1.7 
±0.9
1.5 
±1.0
Vieh 4.1 
±0.9 
4.2 
±1.1 
4.4 
±0.9
Rose 6.0 
±0.9 
6.1 
±1.1 
6.0 
±1.1 
Mord 1.5 
±0.5
1.5 
±1.0
1.2 
±0.5
Wage 4.6 
±1.2 
4.1 
±0.5 
4.3 
±0.7
Sinn 6.0 
±1.0 
5.3 
±1.2 
5.4 
±1.0 
Panik 1.2 
±0.6
1.6 
±0.8
1.4 
±0.6
Woche 4.1 
±0.3 
4.1 
±0.2 
4.1 
±1.6
Sommer 6.3 
±0.7 
6.5 
±0.7 
6.0 
±0.7 
Sarg 2.2 
±1.5
2.2 
±1.2
1.6 
±0.9
Zitat 4.1 
±0.4 
4.1 
±0.7 
4.3 
±0.9
Sonne 6.3 
±0.7 
6.6 
±0.7 
6.8 
±0.4 
Schlag 2.4 
±1.2
2.7 
±0.8
2.1 
±1.2
    
Spass 5.9 
±1.0 
6.0 
±1.2 
6.3 
±0.6 
Stich 2.7 
±1.2
3.0 
±1.0
2.4 
±0.7
    
Spiel 5.9 
±0.8 
5.7 
±0.8 
6.0 
±0.7 
Strafe 2.1 
±1.0
2.0 
±1.5
1.9 
±0.7
    
Wald 5.7 
±0.7 
6.4 
±0.7 
6.4 
±0.6 
Streit 2.9 
±1.4
2.5 
±1.1
2.3 
±0.9
    
Wärme 6.2 
±0.8 
6.4 
±0.7 
6.3 
±0.9 
Tadel 2.6 
±0.8
2.1 
±0.5
2.5 
±0.8
    
Weite 5.6 
±0.7 
5.6 
±1.0 
5.9 
±1.1 
Tod 2.3 
±1.1
2.7 
±1.6
2.3 
±1.2
    
Wonne 5.9 
±0.9 
6.2 
±1.1 
6.1 
±0.9 
Zwang 1.7 
±0.8
1.5 
±0.6
1.3 
±0.6
    
mean 
  ±SD 
6.1 
±0.4 
6.1 
±0.6 
6.2 
±0.5 
 2.2 
±0.5
2.1 
±0.5
2.0 
±0.5
 4.1 
±0.3 
4.0 
±0.3 
4.1 
±0.4
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APPENDIX 7: Word length measured in number of syllables, number of letters and 
in cm of the printed words. Listing of the words used in the present investigation, 
divided according to the three word classes (emotional positive words: left; emotional 
negative words: middle; emotional neutral words: right). On the bottom of the table, 
the mean and standard deviation (across words) of the length for each word class.  
 
 
 
Positive words (n=27) Negative words (n=27) Neutral words (n=20) 
w
or
d 
sy
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es
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rs
 
cm
 
w
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bl
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w
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cm
 
Freude 2 6 8.1 Ärger 2 5 7.9 Bein 1 4 4.9 
Freund 1 6 8.0 Angst 1 5 6.7 Blatt 1 5 5.0 
Friede 2 6 7.2 Armut 2 5 7.1 Blech 1 5 6.3 
Glück 1 5 6.6 Elend 2 6 6.4 Ebene 3 5 7.3 
Güte 2 4 5.4 Flucht 1 6 7.1 Ecke 1 4 5.6 
Herz 1 4 5.3 Furcht 1 6 7.9 Format 2 6 8.3 
Idee 1 4 4.7 Gift 1 4 3.9 Forum 2 5 7.5 
Kuss 1 4 5.5 Grab 1 4 5.7 Gebiet 2 6 7.1 
Lachen 2 6 8.2 Haft 1 4 4.5 Kugel 2 5 6.4 
Leben 2 5 6.9 Härte 2 5 6.1 Länge 2 5 7.0 
Licht 1 5 5.4 Hass 1 4 5.6 Pfeife 2 6 6.1 
Liebe 2 5 6.0 Hunger 2 6 8.5 Phase 2 5 7.0 
Lust 1 4 4.7 Kälte 2 5 5.5 Regel 2 5 6.2 
Musik 2 5 6.6 Klage 2 5 6.4 Rest 1 4 5.0 
Mutter 2 6 7.2 Krieg 1 5 5.8 Sitte 2 5 5.0 
Nähe 1 4 5.8 Last 1 4 4.7 Umbau 2 5 8.2 
Ofen 2 4 5.4 Leiche 2 6 7.4 Vieh 1 4 4.9 
Rose 2 4 5.7 Mord 1 4 6.8 Waage 2 5 8.0 
Sinn 1 4 5.1 Panik 2 5 6.2 Woche 2 5 8.1 
Sommer 2 6 10.0 Sarg 1 4 5.4 Zitat 2 5 5.0 
Sonne 2 5 7.5 Schlag 1 6 7.9      
Spass 1 5 7.2 Stich 1 5 5.7      
Spiel  1 5 5.6 Strafe 2 6 6.8      
Wald 1 4 5.8 Streit 1 6 6.0      
Wärme 2 5 8.3 Tadel 2 5 6.2      
Weite 2 5 6.5 Tod 1 3 4.5      
Wonne 2 5 8.2 Zwang 1 5 7.7      
               
mean 1.6 4.9 6.6   1.4 5 6.3   1.8 5 6.4 
SD 0.5 0.8 1.3   0.5 0.9 1.2   0.6 0.6 1.2 
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APPENDIX 8: Frequency of occurrence in German texts (Rosengren, 1977) and 
visual-abstract meaning. Listing of the words (n=74) used in the present 
investigation, divided according to the three word classes (emotional positive words: 
left; emotional negative words: middle; emotional neutral words: right). On the 
bottom of the table, the mean and standard deviation (across words) of the frequency 
of occurrence and visual-abstract meaning for each word class is given. 
 
Positive words (n=27) Negative words (n=27) Neutral words (n=20) 
w
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Freude 108 5.0±1.7 Ärger 46 4.2±1.6 Bein 17 6.8±0.4 
Freund 136 5.8±1.2 Angst 136 4.3±1.8 Blatt 102 6.4±1.3 
Friede 12 3.1±1.6 Armut 32 4.7±2.0 Blech 9 6.1±1.0 
Glück 97 3.8±1.6 Elend 23 4.7±1.6 Ebene 82 6.3±0.6 
Güte 11 3.1±1.8 Flucht 81 5.4±0.9 Ecke 31 6.3±0.9 
Herz 82 6.7±0.6 Furcht 85 3.6±1.8 Format 21 2.3±1.4 
Idee 144 2.3±1.3 Gift 11 4.9±1.9 Forum 39 3.1±2.0 
Kuss 2 6.7±1.5 Grab 23 6.6±0.6 Gebiet 459 4.5±1.6 
Lachen 14 6.3±0.7 Haft 35 5.2±1.2 Kugel 11 6.7±0.6 
Leben 215 4.1±1.3 Härte 37 4.1±1.8 Länge 39 3.8±2.1 
Licht 158 6.1±0.8 Hass 38 3.7±1.9 Pfeife 5 6.7±0.8 
Liebe 159 5.0±1.6 Hunger 27 4.6±1.7 Phase 138 2.1±1.3 
Lust 51 5.2±1.7 Kälte 26 4.4±1.8 Regel 12 2.4±1.4 
Musik 310 5.1±1.8 Klage 62 3.3±1.4 Rest 137 3.8±1.6 
Mutter 124 6.4±0.8 Krieg 424 6.3±0.4 Sitte 15 1.8±0.9 
Nähe 125 4.5±1.7 Last 69 5.2±1.4 Umbau 15 5.8±1.5 
Ofen 3 6.8±0.5 Leiche 35 6.5±0.7 Vieh 8 5.9±1.6 
Rose 9 6.9±0.3 Mord 54 5.0±1.8 Waage 28 6.4±1.0 
Sinn 216 1.8±1.1 Panik 25 4.9±1.7 Woche 511 2.8±1.3 
Sommer 192 6.1±1.5 Sarg 41 6.6±0.6 Zitat 14 3.3±1.8 
Sonne 70 6.9±0.5 Schlag 55 5.1±1.8     
Spass 41 4.1±1.7 Stich 20 5.3±1.8     
Spiel  216 5.5±1.4 Strafe 53 4.2±1.6     
Wald 99 6.9±0.3 Streit 163 4.9±1.3     
Wärme 16 4.4±1.5 Tadel 10 3.1±1.9     
Weite 44 4.9±1.8 Tod 230 5.6±1.6     
Wonne 5 3.8±1.6 Zwang 82 3.3±1.7     
            
mean±SD 98±83 5.1±1.5   71±86 4.8±1.0   85±143 4.7±1.8 
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APPENDIX 9: Averaged data of the emotional content rating after ERP recording.  
Listing of the words used in the present investigation, divided according to the three 
word classes (emotional positive words: left; emotional negative words: middle; 
emotional neutral words: right). The rating was done on a 7-point scale. The scale 
was labelled on an extreme with: ‘very negative word’ (position ‘1’) and on the other 
extreme: ‘very positive word’ (position ‘7’). In the middle of the scale, i.e. by the 
position ‘4’, there was the label ‘neutral word’. Means and standard deviations of 
the rating are provided for each word. On the bottom of the table, the mean and 
standard deviation (across words) of the rating for each word class are listed.  
 
 
 
word mean SD word mean SD word mean SD 
Freude 6.5 0.7 Äerger 2.3 1.0 Bein 4.1 0.4 
Freund 6.4 0.7 Angst 2.1 1.1 Blatt 4.4 0.7 
Friede 6.4 0.7 Armut 1.6 0.6 Blech 4.0 0.5 
Glück 6.7 0.5 Elend 1.3 0.5 Ebene 4.4 0.7 
Güte 6.3 0.7 Flucht 2.2 1.0 Ecke 4.1 0.3 
Herz 5.7 1.1 Furcht 2.0 1.0 Format 3.9 0.3 
Idee 5.6 0.8 Gift 2.1 1.0 Forum 3.8 0.7 
Kuss 6.7 0.5 Grab 2.6 0.8 Gebiet 4.0 0.4 
Lachen 5.6 1.5 Haft 2.0 1.0 Kugel 4.0 0.7 
Leben 6.0 1.0 Härte 2.8 1.1 Länge 4.0 0.2 
Licht 6.2 0.7 Hass 1.4 1.1 Pfeife 4.0 0.8 
Liebe 6.9 0.3 Hunger 2.7 1.2 Phase 4.0 0.3 
Lust 6.4 0.7 Kälte 2.2 0.7 Regel 3.5 0.7 
Musik 6.4 0.8 Klage 2.5 0.9 Rest 3.9 0.5 
Mutter 6.0 1.2 Krieg 1.3 0.5 Sitte 3.5 1.1 
Nähe 5.7 0.9 Last 2.1 0.7 Umbau 4.0 0.9 
Ofen 4.9 0.9 Leiche 2.2 1.1 Vieh 4.2 0.7 
Rose 5.7 0.9 Mord 1.6 1.4 Waage 4.0 0.4 
Sinn 5.4 1.3 Panik 1.4 0.5 Woche 4.0 0.2 
Sommer 6.4 0.7 Sarg 2.5 1.0 Zitat 4.5 0.8 
Sonne 6.7 0.7 Schlag 2.5 0.9    
Spass 6.4 0.7 Stich 2.6 0.8    
Spiel 5.0 0.9 Strafe 2.0 0.9    
Wald 5.5 1.1 Streit 1.9 0.9    
Wärme 6.0 0.7 Tadel 2.5 1.3    
Weite 5.6 1.1 Tod 2.6 1.1    
Wonne 5.9 0.9 Zwang 1.6 0.7    
mean±SD 6.0±0.5   2.1±0.5   4.0±0.2  
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